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Abstract
Large scale mining projects generate highly variable outcomes. Proponents of mining cite
benefits including job creation and revenue generation, while critics point to adverse social
and economic impacts borne by mining-proximate communities. Community-based concerns
about mining operations have raised ethical and social justice considerations relating to
human-rights and consent. Community development agreements (CDAs) have emerged as an
increasingly common tool to address such concerns and facilitate the delivery of tangible
benefits from mining operations to affected communities. The effectiveness of CDAs,
however, varies widely depending on the negotiated provisions and their implementation.
This work contributes to the understanding of CDAs by refining a comprehensive evaluation
framework that can be used to empirically analyze CDAs. The framework is applied to CDAs
from Australia, Canada, Papua New Guinea, Ghana, Greenland, Mongolia, and Sierra Leone,
following which exploratory statistical analyses are conducted to highlight novel insights that
can be drawn from its application.
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Summary for Lay Audience
The mining industry is considered to be both necessary and controversial. On one hand, the
current structure of our society demands the extraction of minerals. On the other, large mining
projects can generate highly inequitable outcomes, with affected communities bearing the
weight of social and environmental costs. Community-based concerns about mining
operations have raised ethical and social justice considerations relating to human-rights and
consent, which generate conflict between project proponents, government, and local
communities. Written contracts between companies and communities, known as community
development agreements (CDAs), have emerged as an increasingly common tool to address
such concerns and facilitate the delivery of tangible benefits from mining operations to
affected communities. Despite their increasing prevalence, the use and effectiveness of CDAs
to keep the peace and generate positive outcomes for communities remains a controversial
topic. Questions are numerous and far reaching but real answers are few and vague. Are CDAs
effective at generating positive outcomes? What contextual factors are important for CDA
success? What does a well-drafted CDA look like? How are we to evaluate these agreements?
To date, these questions have scarcely been addressed by the literature in an objective and
empirical manner. This work contributes to the understanding of CDAs by refining a
comprehensive evaluation framework that can be used to empirically analyze CDAs. The
framework is applied to CDAs from Australia, Canada, Papua New Guinea, Ghana,
Greenland, Mongolia, and Sierra Leone, following which exploratory statistical analyses are
conducted to highlight novel insights that can be drawn from its application. For the first time,
comprehensive comparative and empirical analyses of CDAs across multiple jurisdictions are
conducted, drawing specific attention to the strengths and weaknesses of different CDAs, and
the importance of external, contextual considerations.
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Preface
“We accept it as normal that people who have never been on the land, who
have no history or connection to the country, may legally secure the right to
come in and, by the very nature of their enterprises, leave in their wake a
cultural and physical landscape utterly transformed and desecrated. What's
more, in granting such mining concessions, often initially for trivial sums to
speculators from distant cities, companies cobbled together with less history
than my dog, the government places no cultural or market value on the land
itself.” 1
I must confess, when I set out on this research journey, I was in many ways uninformed and,
admittedly, ambivalent to the depth of exploitation that our society is built on. The simple
truth is that, downstream of a complex supply chain, the general population is well-insulated
from the raw impacts that the Westernized standard of consumption has on communities
more proximate to the sourcing of our resources.
New resource development projects – such as those in oil, gas, and mining – are proposed
every year, holding out promises of wealth and better livelihoods for the impacted local
communities. Some argue that it is possible to ensure that impacted populations receive
adequate consultation and compensation such that any adverse impacts may be offset. Despite
such arguments, there is an undeniable pattern of human rights violations and environmental
degradation that permeates the resource development industries.
The research to unfold stands as more than a project – it reflects my personal journey down
this rabbit hole. To those who find themselves drawn to understanding these issues, I openly
welcome you to a world of curiosities that you will not soon forget.

1

Wade Davis, The Wayfinders: Why Ancient Wisdom Matters in the Modern World (House of Anansi, 2009).

xii

In our every deliberation, we must consider the impact of our decisions on the next
seven generations.
—Iroquois maxim
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PART 1: CONTEXT AND CONTOURS
A large multinational mining corporation, Mine Inc, has been operating in developing
country X since the 1970s. During this time, Mine Inc has maintained close ties with
a variety of political regimes within country X, including monarchs, military regimes,
militias, and recent democratically elected governments. Mine Inc has seen consistent
growth in its revenues and profits over the years, and has also become a key
contributor to country X’s economy through employment, tax payments and royalties.
In addition to this, Mine Inc has made notable contributions to community
infrastructure, including building roads, schools, and hospitals and is actively involved
in a number of community building ventures. Mine Inc also publishes environmental
and social reports and is a member of numerous initiatives that involve nongovernmental organizations and community groups. Mine Inc has openly conveyed its
commitment to bolstering the proximate communities and has directly entered into
written agreements with these communities on issues relating to revenue distribution,
negotiation, employment, and a host of other infrastructure initiatives. Mine Inc has
received numerous accolades and high-praise for its commitments to sustainable
development.
Despite Mine Inc’s community engagement efforts and substantial financial
contributions that are aimed at promoting welfare and community wellbeing, a number
of conflicts that have emerged between the local Indigenous communities, the
corporation, and the government. The community has found itself facing the brunt of
impacts of Mine Inc’s operations, watching first-hand as their sources of livelihood
and culture have disappeared due to the environmental damage to their lands and
waters. Despite billions of dollars of revenue raised by Mine Inc’s over the course of
its years of operation, the community’s economic, social, and environmental
conditions has incrementally worsened and they continue to live in poverty.
In recent years, armed groups have emerged in the region of Mine Inc’s operations.
These groups have carried out a series of attacks on Mine Inc’s facilities and personnel,
demanding more equitable outcomes and perhaps even a stoppage of the entire
operation. Mine Inc, in an attempt to safeguard its investment and protect shareholder
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interests, increases its security personnel. Country X’s government has deployed the
army to quell protests, resulting in the killing of 15 unarmed villagers and adding to
the growing tension between the community and company that continues to this day.2
This story is not unique – rather, it represents an all-too-familiar litany of troubling
transgressions within the international extractive sector and supply chain. Through the
generation of jobs and opportunities, transnational extractive companies can act as a pillar for
the building of rights and prosperity that were previously not available to individuals in
developing countries. 3 Despite this, public perceptions of the extractive industry remain low 4
– and for good reason, given that transnational extractive companies have continually been
found to be parties to human rights abuses. 5 Over the last few decades, there has been a clear

Inspiration for this example is drawn largely from Subhabrata Bobby Banerjee, “Translocal Power and
Translocal Governance – The Politics of Corporate Responsibility”, in Thomas Maak et al, The Routledge
Companion to Corporate Social Responsibility, 1st ed (New York: Routledge, 2021) at 129; See also e.g. Shin Imai, Leah
Gardner & Sarah Weinberger, “The 'Canada Brand': Violence and Canadian Mining Companies in Latin
America” (2017) Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper No 17/2017 at 12 [Justice Accountability Project] (In a
report published by the Justice and Corporate Accountability Project in 2015, it was found that over a span of
15 years, operations of Canadian TNCs in Latin America had led to 44 deaths and over 400 injuries outside of
the workplace); Daniel Rothenberg & Ben Radley, “’We miners take our lives in our hands save nothing and
believe only in luck’: The lived experience of human rights and labor violations in select artisanal mining sites in
North and South Kivu" (2014) at 55, online (pdf): Heartland Alliance International
<pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6c00/255f9d580a8ecc508357d4f4da4a38142b3d.pdf?_ga=2.238510082.320815582.
1583003067-1582185279.1583003067>; Nicolas Tsurukawa, Prakash Siddharth & Manhart Andreas, "Social
impacts of artisanal cobalt mining in Katanga, Democratic Republic of Congo" (2011) Institute for Applied
Technology, online (pdf): Öko-Institut eV <www.oeko.de/oekodoc/1294/2011-419-en.pdf>.
3Alice de Jonge, “Transnational corporations and international law: bringing TNCs out of the accountability
vacuum” (2011) 7:1 Critical perspectives Intl Bus 66–89 at 67.
4 See e.g. Gabriel Friedman, “Mining in Canada is shrinking, and a wave of impassioned community opposition
is partly to blame”, Financial Post (6 June 2019), online: <financialpost.com/commodities/mining/mining-incanada-is-shrinking-and-a-wave-of-impassioned-community-opposition-is-partly-to-blame>; Duncan Hood,
“People are dying because of Canadian mines. It’s time for the killing to stop”, The Globe and Mail (19 February
2019), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/business/rob-magazine/article-people-are-dying-because-of-ourmines-its-time-for-the-killing-to/>.
5 See John Ruggie, UNHRC, Protect, respect and remedy : a framework for business and human rights:report of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises, 2008, UN Doc A/HRC/8/5; Shin Imai, Bernadette Maheandiran & Valerie Crystal, "Access to Justice
and Corporate Accountability: A Legal Case Study of HudBay in Guatemala" (2014) 35:2 C J of Developmental
Studies 285.
2
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surge in socio-environmental disputes across the world. 6 The tense relationship between the
extractive industries and Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities across the world is a
product of a governance gap, and weak state and corporate mechanisms that have done little
to address and alleviate the negative impacts of socio-environmental conflicts. 7
And yet, to claim that the instances of conflict, human rights abuse and environmental
degradation are products of a deliberate malfeasance by greedy and marauding mining
executives is overly simplistic and strips the problem of its true nature. The problem and, thus
the solution, are not straightforward. The fact of the matter is that many of the companies
accused of wrongdoing began their journey with positive intentions for the communities in
which they operate. There is a strong and genuine sentiment held by many that corporations
can bring benefits to impacted local communities while also seeking a return on value for their
investments.
In theory, it is possible to ensure that impacted populations are adequately compensated with
economic benefits that may offset the adverse impacts that they experience. 8 In practice,
however, there are significant issues associated with the development of natural resource
projects which generate conflict between project proponents, government, and impacted

See generally Daniel Rothenberg & Ben Radley, “’We miners take our lives in our hands save nothing and
believe only in luck’: The lived experience of human rights and labor violations in select artisanal mining sites in
North and South Kivu" (2014) at 55, online (pdf): Heartland Alliance International
<pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6c00/255f9d580a8ecc508357d4f4da4a38142b3d.pdf?_ga=2.238510082.320815582.
1583003067-1582185279.1583003067>; Nicolas Tsurukawa, Prakash Siddharth & Manhart Andreas, "Social
impacts of artisanal cobalt mining in Katanga, Democratic Republic of Congo" (2011) Institute for Applied
Technology, online (pdf): Öko-Institut eV <www.oeko.de/oekodoc/1294/2011-419-en.pdf>.
7 Amissi Melchiade Manirabona & Yenny Véga-Cárdenas, eds, Extractive Industries and Human Rights in an Era of
Global Justice: New Ways of Resolving and Preventing Conflict (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2019); See also Chaterine
Dolan & Dinah Rajak, eds, The Anthropology of Corporate Social Responsibility (New York: Berghahn Books, 2016).
8 Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, “Negotiations in the Indigenous World: Aboriginal Peoples and the Extractive
Industry in Australia and Canada”, online: Routledge & CRC Press <www.routledge.com/Negotiations-in-theIndigenous-World-Aboriginal-Peoples-and-the-Extractive/OFaircheallaigh/p/book/9780815370444>.
6
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Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities. 9 Managing this conflict and ensuring that
resource development projects are designed to mitigate adverse impacts and maximize
community benefits are important priorities affecting the national economies and economic
sustainability of Indigenous and non-Indigenous populations in resource regions.
Developing a feasible strategy to protect social and environmental rights is not easy. Some
postulate that this problem could be resolved with the imposition of new regulations that
create liability for the international conduct of extractive corporate empires. While this is noble
in theory, state actors are often reluctant to do so – there are costs for exacting rules on
business in a state when those rules are not present in other jurisdictions. It is feared that
creating legal requirements that are more robust and do not exist elsewhere could lead to a
dramatic flight of capital out of a country. 10
In brief, this project is focused on evaluating something that might be referred to as the
‘hardening of a norm’. The growing tension between mining companies and stakeholders has
created a dynamic environment where following regulatory standards is no longer sufficient
for developers. 11 Evolving societal expectations over recent decades have changed the way

Cameron Gunton & Sean Markey, “The role of community benefit agreements in natural resource governance
and community development: Issues and prospects” (2021) 73 Resources Policy 102152 at 9; See also Lindsay
Galbraith, Ben Bradshaw & Murray B Rutherford, “Towards a new supraregulatory approach to environmental
assessment in Northern Canada” (2007) 25:1 Impact Assessment & Project Appraisal 27, online:
<doi.org/10.3152/146155107X190596>; “The Integration Imperative: Cumulative Environmental,
Community, and Health Effects of Multiple Natural Resource Developments”, online: University of Northern British
Columbia <www2.unbc.ca/greg-halseth/integration-imperative-cumulative-environmental-community-andhealth-effects-multiple-natural-resource-developments>.
10 Jeffrey Bone, Governing the extractive sector: regulating the foreign conduct of international mining firms, Global Energy
Law and Policy (Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing, 2021) vol 5 at 2.
11 See Jennifer Noel Costanza, “Mining Conflict and the Politics of Obtaining a Social License: Insight from
Guatemala” (2016) 79 World Development 97; Jason Prno & D Scott Slocombe, “Exploring the origins of ‘social
license to operate’ in the mining sector: Perspectives from governance and sustainability theories” (2012) 37:3
Resources Policy 346 [Prno & Scolombe, “Origins of the Social License”]; Jason Prno & D Scott Slocombe, “A
Systems-Based Conceptual Framework for Assessing the Determinants of a Social License to Operate in the
9
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that the extractive industries conduct their operations around the world. Increasingly,
communities affected by resource development operations are demanding to be involved in
decision making, placing pressure on extractive companies to produce more equitable and
positive outcomes. 12 Extractive companies, who have traditionally found comfort by attaining
the proper legal licenses and permits for their operations, are now subject to a form of
regulation that extends beyond black letter law. This social acceptance and form of quasiregulation has become known as the ‘social license to operate’ (SLO). This work is focused on
investigating the relationships between the black-letter law and social norms, arguing that the
increased salience of issues in the extractive industry and stakeholder conflict has hardened
stakeholder expectations into a quasi-regulatory standard. As will be discussed, this is in large
part due to a growing consensus that legal requirements, such as securities disclosure
obligations or ESG reporting requirements, have yet provide the comprehensive picture
required to maintain social control over company behavior, and do not adequately reflect
principles of consent and consultation. 13 Fulfilling stakeholder expectations in today’s

Mining Industry” (2014) 53:3 Environmental Management 672 [Prno & Slocombe, “Systems Based
Framework”].
12 ‘Positive outcomes’ in this context refers to the positive outcomes that may be attained through community
development initiatives, such as increasing the strength and effectiveness of communities, improving peoples’
quality of life, and enabling community members to participate in decision making to achieve greater control
over their lives. Increasing fairness, equity, and equality are significant factors in this regard. For more on equity,
fairness – both procedural and distributional – see e.g. Deanna Kemp & John R Owen, “Community relations
and mining: Core to business but not ‘core business’” (2013) 38:4 Resources Policy 523; Catherine Gross, “A
Measure of Fairness: An Investigative Framework to Explore Perceptions of Fairness and Justice in a Real-Life
Social Conflict” (2008) 15:2 Human Ecology Rev 130; Sameera Hussain et al, “Health intersectoralism in the
Sustainable Development Goal era: from theory to practice” (2020) 16:1 Global Health 15; Michael Marmot,
“Achieving health equity: from root causes to fair outcomes” (2007) 370:9593 The Lancet 1153–1163; Maureen
H McDonough & Patrick D Smith, “Beyond Public Participation: Fairness in Natural Resource Decision
Making” (2001) 14:3 Society & Natural Resources 239–249; Tom R Tyler, “Social Justice: Outcome and
Procedure” (2000) 35:2 International Journal of Psychology 117–125; John C Besley, “Public Engagement and
the Impact of Fairness Perceptions on Decision Favorability and Acceptance” (2010) 32:2 Science
Communication 256–280.
13 See e.g. Ann M Lipton, “Not Everything Is about Investors: The Case for Mandatory Stakeholder Disclosure”
(2020) 37:2 Yale J on Reg 499; Steven Davidoff & Claire Hill, “Limits of Disclosure” (2013) 36:2 Seattle UL Rev
599; Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E Schneider, “The Failure of Mandated Disclosure” (2011) 159:3 U Pa L Rev 647.
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operational landscape generally requires for company commitments that go beyond the blackletter law. 14
The most pertinent example of this ‘hardening’ of stakeholder expectations is the wide-spread
adoption of the community development agreement (CDA), which has emerged as an
increasingly common instrument to manage local community expectations and quell conflict.
Proponents of these negotiated, written agreements argue that these tools can mitigate adverse
project impacts, distribute project benefits, and help fulfill project developers and
governments’ duties to meet requirements for free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) by
consulting and accommodating communities. While CDAs are not widely obligatory on a
global scale, it has become an increasingly common practice for project developers, senior
levels of government, and communities to pursue CDA negotiations for new natural resource
projects. 15
The use and effectiveness of CDAs to keep the peace and generate positive outcomes for
communities is a controversial topic. Questions are numerous and far reaching but real
answers are few and vague. Are CDAs are an effective tool to address the problems associated
with resource development conflicts? Do they truly correlate to positive outcomes? What role
do CDAs actually play in sustainable development? What are the internal and external factors
of CDA implementation that can generate positive outcomes? Do CDAs present a viable

Hillary A Sale, “The Corporate Purpose of Social License” (2020) 94:4 S Cal L Rev 785; Melanie Dare, Jacki
Schirmer & Frank Vanclay, “Community engagement and social licence to operate” (2014) 32:3 Impact
Assessment & Project Appraisal 188–197.
15 Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, “Social Equity and Large Mining Projects: Voluntary Industry Initiatives, Public
Regulation and Community Development Agreements” (2015) 132:1 J Bus Ethics 91 at 97; Jennifer Loutit,
Jacqueline Mandelbaum & Sam Szoke-Burke, “Emerging Practices in Community Development Agreements”
(2016) 7:1 J Sustainable Dev L & Policy 64 at 65; Kristi Disney Bruckner, “Community Development Agreements
in Mining Projects” 44:3 Denver J Itnl L & Policy 413 at 422.
14
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solution that can facilitate equitable outcomes? Can they act as a building block for facilitating
Indigenous self-determination?
All of these questions underpin the research problem at hand. In short, the fundamental
analytical and empirical concern of this work is to address the lack of quantitative evidence
and objective evaluation of these agreements. The objective here is to contribute to the
development of a consolidated framework that can be used to evaluate CDAs. In turn, this
evaluation framework will be applied on a case study basis to obtain a series of data points
that can offer novel insight and discussion, with particular attention being drawn to the
external governance structures that impact CDA negotiation outcomes.
This work is divided into two parts. Part I (Chapters 1-4) begins with a blank canvas and
colours the parameters of the stakes raised by natural resource development projects, the social
license to operate, and stakeholder expectations. It demonstrates that the adoption of CDAs
and the proliferation of the SLO are not to be viewed in a vacuum, but rather represent a longstanding wave of momentum that draws roots from the historic power disequilibrium that has
plagued the extractive industries. Slowly but surely, social norms that have long been
considered to be ‘extra-legal’ have merged with regulatory standards to become quasi-legal
standards to which actors must be responsive. By means of a literature review, the different
roles and frames of CDAs are highlighted, and attention drawn to best-practice guidelines in
the literature that have been outlined for CDA drafting and implementation. Part II applies
the theory outlined in Part I, highlighting a consolidated framework that can be used to
evaluate CDAs in an objective manner. This framework is applied on a case-study basis,
spanning projects from Canada, Australia, Greenland, Ghana, Mongolia, Greenland, Sierra

7

Leone, and Papua New Guinea, following which the data points are analyzed to offer an
example of the insights that can be generated through an empirical evaluation framework.
The ultimate ambition of this project is to apply an evaluative framework for CDAs that can
allow these agreements to be compared with one another. Through a case-by-case approach,
this work consolidates a series of novel data points that can be applied to gain insight into the
workings of CDAs. The final aim is not to provide an affirmative or negative to the question
of whether CDAs are effective, but rather to highlight the importance of external, contextual
factors. Being sensitive to the discrete and unique needs of each local community, the hope is
that the framework can be applied by communities and used as a negotiation tool to help
foster a level playing field when being approached by extractive companies.

8
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Chapter 1

1

Theoretically Speaking

Over the last decade, empirical research has demonstrated that negotiations between extractive
companies and communities have led to highly variable outcomes. 16 Consider the following
example:
1) Company A, in exchange for community approval and support for the project, has
negotiated and signed a written agreement with a community that is situated on a
mineral reserve that the company wants to access. The agreement contains
substantial financial benefits and provisions that afford the community a key role
in project design and environmental management. Provisions include:
 Royalty payments linked to the value of production.
 Requirements for local community members to monitor the project.
 Extensive and detailed provisions to encourage the training, education,
and employment of community members, including specific
provisions to support vulnerable groups.
2) At the same time, Company B entered into negotiations with a community situated
on a diamond reserve elsewhere in the state. Seeking community approval and
support, the company comes to an agreement with the community that is signed
by both parties. The provisions of this agreement include:
 No royalty payments, but rather fixed dollar payments that will not
increase as the project scales up in profitability.
 Contains only vague commitments by the company to encourage
community employment and training.
Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, Negotiations in the Indigenous World: Aboriginal Peoples and the Extractive Industry in Australia
and Canada (New York, US: Routledge, 2015) at 1.

16
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 Limits the exercise of legal rights possessed by community members,
for example the ability to object to project approval or the proposed
environmental management strategies. The agreement specifically
states that the signatories “shall not engage in any unreasonable action
that could either delay or stop the project”. 17
The negotiations and signing of the agreement occurred over a similar time period and
within the same legal jurisdiction. A question therefore arises: why the difference?

1.1
1.1.1

Research Objectives
The Research Problem

In the introduction above, I outlined the objective of this thesis as follows:
In short, the fundamental analytical and empirical concern of this work
is to address the lack of quantitative evidence and objective evaluation
of these agreements.

Ibid at 148 and 175 (These examples are based on real cases in Canada: The Ekati diamond mine and Voisey’s
Bay nickel project).
17
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Researchers such as Thomas Gunton, 18 Eric Werker, 19 Murray Rutherford, 20 Sean Markey, 21
Patrik Söderholmn, 22 Nanna Svahn, 23 Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, 24 Sam Szoke-Burke, 25 Andy
Hira and James Busumtwi-Sam 26 have already laid the foundation for research on CDAs.
Through their work, CDAs have emerged as a discrete area of research that is growing rapidly.
This being said, a review of the literature reveals that the current state of research in this area
– although growing – is still limited. 27 This is not particularly surprising given some of the
main characteristics of CDAs. 28 By their nature, CDAs are dynamic instruments that are
context and time dependent – meaning that CDA provisions and designs change from
agreement to agreement depending on the objectives of the communities negotiating them. 29
These objectives in turn may be influenced by expectations and broader rights or policy

Gunton & Markey, supra note 9; See also Thomas Gunton, Eric Werker & Sean Markey, “Community benefit
agreements and natural resource development: Achieving better outcomes” (2021) 73 Resources Policy 102155.
19 Eric Werker, Maggie Cascadden and Katherine Zmuda, “Policies for Generating Socioeconomic Benefits from
Natural Resource Extraction Projects: A Research Report for the Government of the Northwest Territories” (23
April
2017),
online
(pdf):
Legislative
Assembly
of
the
Northwest
Territories
<www.ntassembly.ca/sites/assembly/files/td_272-183.pdf>.
20 Murray Rutherford, “Impact assessment in British Columbia” in Kevin S Hanna, ed, Environmental Impact
Assessment: Practice and Participation (Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2016) at 238.
21 Jonathan Boron & Sean Markey, “Exerting Sovereignty Through Relational Self-determination: A Case Study
of Mineral Development In Stk’emlupsemc te Secwépemc Territory” (2020) 15:4 J Rural & Community
Development, online: <journals.brandonu.ca/jrcd/article/view/1822>.
22 Patrik Söderholm & Nanna Svahn, “Mining, regional development and benefit-sharing in developed countries”
(2015) 45 Resources Policy 78.
23 Ibid.
24 Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, “Extractive industries and Indigenous peoples: A changing dynamic?” (2013) 30 J
Rural Studies 20; Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, “Public participation and environmental impact assessment: Purposes,
implications, and lessons for public policy making” (2010) 30:1 Environmental Impact Assessment Rev 19–27;
Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh & Tony Corbett, “Indigenous participation in environmental management of mining
projects: The role of negotiated agreements” (2005) 14:5 Environmental Politics 629–647.
25 Sam Szoke-Burke & Kaitlin Y Cordes, “Mechanisms for Consultation and Free, Prior and Informed Consent
in the Negotiation of Investment Contracts” (2020) 41:1 Northwestern J Intl L & Business 49; Sam Szoke-Burke,
“Not Only ‘Context’: Why Transitional Justice Programs Can No Longer Ignore Violations of Economic and
Social Rights” (2015) 50:3 Texas Intl LJ 465.
26 Andy Hira & James Busumtwi-Sam, “Improving mining community benefits through better monitoring and
evaluation” (2021) 73 Resources Policy 102138.
27 Gunton & Markey, supra note 9 at 8.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid at 7.
18
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regimes that shift over time. Additionally, while research accessibility may be improving, many
CDAs are confidential which makes it challenging to undertake comprehensive empirical
research to determine their role in resource development. 30
A few authors do use empirical evidence in their evaluations and framing of CDAs, 31 but it
must be emphasized that such evidence is scarce. 32 The literature evidently suffers from a lack
of consistent criteria and evaluative tools for CDAs. In a review of CDA literature, Gunton
and Markey found that:
“[M]ore research must be undertaken in critical areas [of CDAs], for
example: 1) determinants of [CDA] success (i.e., why some …succeed
in benefiting communities and why some fail)… 2) comprehensive
instruments that can improve [CDA] outcomes for all involved parties;
3) the primary underlying question, the role of resource development
on community-level economic development; and 4) more empirically
based research that uses consistent evaluation frameworks to
quantitatively assess the impacts of [CDAs] and the factors affecting
[CDA] outcomes.” 33
In line with this, O’Faircheallaigh states that many of the critiques of CDAs are not based on
solid empirical evaluation of CDA outcomes and argues for more empirically based analysis
to explain differences in outcomes in order to understand how better outcomes can be

Doris Dreyer, Impact and benefits agreements: Do the Ross River Dena benefit from mineral projects? (Master’s thesis,
University of Northern British Columbia, 2004).
31 Ibid; See also John Loxley, “Assessment of the Mary River Project: Impacts and Benefits” (2019), online (pdf):
Ocean’s North <www.oceansnorth.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Assessment-of-the-Mary-River-ProjectImpacts-and-Benefits-final-draft.pdf>.
32 Gunton & Markey, supra note 9 at 8.
33 Ibid at 9.
30
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achieved by local communities. 34 This is a conclusion drawn repeatedly throughout the
existing research on CDAs. 35
The absence of empirical research and analysis of these tools is particularly concerning given
that CDAs have emerged as industry norms – their use is widespread across the extractive
industries and a multitude of legal jurisdictions. 36 Local communities, industry, and interested
third parties face difficulties in evaluating the robustness of a given agreement and comparing
such agreements with another in the same or different jurisdictions. 37 The lack of an evaluative
measure hinders a given community’s ability to negotiate, implement, seek advice, share
experiences, and evaluate the CDA. 38
Adding to this complexity is the fact that one-half of the world’s major mining producer
countries have adopted community development requirements into their mining laws. 39 While
there is variation in these laws, some countries have gone as far as to mandate the drafting,
negotiation, and agreement of a CDA in order for mining concessions to be granted. There is
a global upward trend of integrating CDAs into hard law that has been overlooked by scholars
working at the nexus of natural resource development projects and corporate social

34 Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, “Explaining outcomes from negotiated agreements in Australia and Canada” (2021)
70 Resources Policy 101922.
35 Gunton, Werker & Markey, supra note 18 at 9; Jason Prno, Ben Bradshaw & Dianne Lapierre, “Impact Benefit
Agreements: Are they working?” (Paper presented at the Canadian Institute of Mining, Metallurgy and Petroleum
Annual Conference, Vancouver, British Columbia, May 11, 2010) [unpublished]; Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh,
“Evaluating Agreements between Indigenous Peoples and Resource Developers” in Marcia Langton et al, eds,
Honour Among Nations? Treaties and Agreements with Indigenous People (Victoria, Australia: Melbourne University Press,
2004) 303.
36 O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 15 at 97; Loutit et al, supra note 15 at 65; Brucker et al, supra note 15 at 422.
37 Maggie Cascadden, Thomas Gunton & Murray Rutherford, “Best practices for Impact Benefit Agreements”
(2021) 70 Resources Policy 101921 at 4.
38 Ibid.
39 Kendra Dupuy, "Community development requirements in mining laws." (2014) 1:2 Extractive Industries &
Society 200 at 201.
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responsibility. 40 CDAs are becoming increasingly relevant for corporations and communities
alike, and thus there is an imminent need to be able to evaluate CDAs, understand what they
mean, and the factors that influence their success.
The legal context in which these agreements are drafted, negotiated and signed varies
considerably. In some jurisdictions, agreements with Indigenous landowners or local
communities must be in place before resource development may proceed. 41 In others,
community consent is not required, but there are legal requirements for consultation with
Indigenous peoples that overwhelmingly result in the conclusion of agreements. 42 In many
instances, the agreements may not even be required by law, but the corporations themselves
decide that the CDA is an essential pre-condition for its investment. 43
There is considerable variability in the negotiation outcomes of CDAs and their provisions.
Some local communities and Indigenous groups negotiate well, attaining favorable outcomes
that allow them to reap substantial economic benefits from agreements, while at the same time
achieving a significant role in environmental management and protection of social and cultural
values. 44 Other agreements, negotiated and signed in similar circumstances, generate few
economic benefits and do little to help minimize adverse cultural or environmental impacts. 45
Explaining this variability is critical to being able to understand how more positive outcomes
may be achieved, and research to date has not adequately addressed this issue.

Ibid.
O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 34 at 1.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 24 at 22.
45 O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 16 at 70.
40
41
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Questions on the merits of CDAs and variability in their outcomes stem from the reality that
researchers have yet to craft a consolidated theory to unify the different frames and
perspectives of CDAs. 46 Practically speaking, this serves as a barrier because it means that
CDAs – although they are commonplace tools in the industry – have not yet been subjected
to a universally adopted assessment framework that would allow for an empirical means of
evaluation of CDA provisions and implementation. In conjunction with the disproportionate
power dynamics in the negotiation of these agreements and the shroud of confidentiality
surrounding them, local communities face substantial barriers in the negotiation process and
achieving best-outcomes.
In sum, there are three main problems that the current work seeks to address:
1) The lack of empirical evidence on CDAs.
2) The disproportionate power dynamics in CDA negotiations and how they can be
addressed.
3) The evolution of these agreements from “soft law” to “hard law” instruments that has
been overlooked by scholarship to date.

1.1.2

Original Contribution

CDAs present a number of questions that puzzle academia, communities, and industry alike.
Common questions in this realm include: To what extent do CDAs offer an opportunity for
Indigenous peoples and local communities to share in the economic benefits created by
extractive industries? Do they help minimise or control negative environmental and cultural
impacts? Do they constrain the rights of local communities? What factors facilitate the

46

Gunton & Markey, supra note 9 at 8.
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successful implementation of these agreements? Before any of these questions can even begin
to be addressed, it is imperative that a unified understanding be developed of how to draft a
“successful” CDA and what provisions it is to contain.
Thus, my original contribution to science is to address different limitations and gaps existing
within the CDA literature:
1) The lack of case study analysis: The current research canvasses and comparatively
evaluates different CDAs across a range of jurisdictions. This is the first attempt in the
literature to engage in an empirical analysis of whole CDAs across multiple
jurisdictions and compare them with one another.
2) Consideration of external factors: Much of the CDA literature to date has been
dedicated towards understanding whether CDAs are ethical or whether they have had
a positive outcome in a given context. To date, generally speaking, research of this
kind has veered away from empirical methods of analyses. Using an analytical scoring
framework for CDAs, this work will produce a series of data scores that represent the
relative strength of a CDA. In turn, exploratory statistical analyses will be conducted
on the various legal and institutional metrics of a country – such as its rule of law and
control of corruption – and the relationship that they have with the obtained CDA
scores.
3) Building a database of CDA scores: This research will – for the first time in the
literature – publish metrics highlighting the different strengths of CDAs across a range
of jurisdictions. These scores are important for answering the following types of
questions:
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i. What provisions of CDAs relate to better outcomes? Are some more
impactful than others?
ii. Which companies produce better and more robust CDAs?
iii. Have CDAs have become more robust over time?
iv. What is the relationship between rule-of-law indicators, corruption
indicators, foreign-investment indicators, and CDA robustness?

1.1.3

Research Boundaries

In contemplating this problem, I wish to emphasize that this particular work does not directly
seek to discern whether CDAs are effective or not. Rather, this thesis aims to further develop
the methodology for answering this question. Due to the current state of the literature, in
order to achieve this research objective, this work must abstain from attempting to resolve the
debate of whether CDAs are ‘good’ or ‘bad’. The simple fact of the matter is that questions
regarding the efficacy of CDAs have many tantalizing angles and are reflections of complex
situations that far escape what may be effectively covered in the current work.
One significant limitation on this work is a reflection of industry and community practices
rather than a limitation of the research methodology employed. CDAs are characteristically
confidential, which makes it difficult to undertake empirical research on them. 47 As
highlighted by Adebayo and Werker, confidentiality issues mean that most of the provisions

See Godswill Agbaitoro, “Legal strategy for resolving the socio-economic and environmental symptoms of the
resource curse in Nigeria: the role of impact and benefit agreements (IBAs)” (2018) 44:3 Commonwealth L Bull
381; Christopher Alcantara & Michael Morden, “Indigenous multilevel governance and power relations” (2019)
7:2 Territory, Politics, Governance 250; Ken J Caine & Naomi Krogman, “Powerful or Just Plain Power-Full? A
Power Analysis of Impact and Benefit Agreements in Canada’s North” (2010) 23:1 Organization & Environment
76–98; Courtney Fidler & Michael Hitch, “Impact and benefit agreements: a contentious issue for environmental
and aboriginal justice” (2007) 35:2 Environments J 50 at 53.
47

18

of different CDAs remain unknown, making it difficult to draw conclusions. 48 Recent efforts
by the Columbia Centre on Sustainable Investment has made strides in creating a public
repository of CDAs, 49 but this database of private CDAs represents only a fraction of the
agreements that have been or are active across the world. 50
Additionally, despite my additions and amendments, the CDA evaluation framework that
serves as the basis for this work should be understood as being necessarily incomplete. The
establishment of best practices and a statistically reliable evaluation framework is a complex
undertaking that requires the “testing of alternative practices relative to outcomes in a variety
of contexts to determine if the proposed practice is in fact the best practice.” 51 Some argue
that it is not possible to determine whether a particular practice is, in fact, the “best” and that
the more realistic pursuit is to determine whether said practice achieves a desired outcome. 52
Discussion and application of a best-practices evaluation framework should be subject to an
ongoing evaluation and revision of both practices and scoring criteria to reflect the greater
knowledge and nuance that future research is certain to uncover. 53
Importantly, I will also not attempt to employ methodologies that lay beyond my areas of
study: namely, the social sciences and the law. Ideally, of course, the avenues explored within

Eric Adebayo & Eric Werker, “How much are benefit-sharing agreements worth to communities affected by
mining?” (2021) 71 Resources Policy 101970 at 1; Neil Craik, Holly Gardner & Daniel McCarthy, “Indigenous –
corporate private governance and legitimacy: Lessons learned from impact and benefit agreements” (2017) 52
Resources Policy 379.
49 “Open Community Contracts” (last visited June 2022), online: Columbia Center for Sustainable Investment, online:
<opencommunitycontracts.org> [CCSI Database].
50 Hira & Busumtwi-Sam, supra note 26.
51 Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 6, citing Stuart Bretschneider, Frederick J Marc-Aurele Jr
& Jiannan Wu, “‘Best Practices’ Research: A Methodological Guide for the Perplexed” (2005) 15:2 J Public
Administration Research & Theory 307.
52 Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 6; See Eugene Bardach & Eric M Patashnik, A practical guide
for policy analysis: the eightfold path to more effective problem solving (Washington, DC; CQ Press, 2019).
53 Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 7.
48
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this work would be supplemented with fieldwork and discussions with community members.
Surveys and interviews would undoubtedly enrich the discussion to unfold, adding texture and
nuance to the evaluation of CDAs. Without such fieldwork, I am not able to draw insights on
the successful implementations of CDAs, nor will I attempt to uncover an ultimate conclusion
about whether the evaluation scores of different CDAs relate to equitable outcomes.

1.2

Key Concepts

Several concepts are key in appreciating the research problem across its different dimensions:
‘multinational corporations’, the ‘resource curse’, and ‘community development agreements’.
Each of these concepts present controversy and issues with terminology that must be clarified.

1.2.1

“Multinational Corporations”

The principal actor that has emerged as the vehicle for the issues discussed in this work is the
multinational corporation (MNC). These vast entities, backed by shareholder investment and
massive revenue streams, operate indiscriminately across different borders while maintaining
headquarters in specific countries. By using their home-state to defend their interests
domestically and abroad, 54 MNCs have become ever growing players in the global economy. 55
With over 80,000 MNCs now spanning the globe, 56 it takes no stretch of the imagination to
contemplate the increasing influence that MNCs have with respect to social and environmental
issues. This is especially evident when discussing the mining and extractive sector and the
controversy that surrounds the industry.

Gordon & Jeffery Webber, Blood of extraction: Canadian imperialism in Latin America (Nova Scotia; Fernwood
Publishing, 2016) at 13.
55 See Carolyn Egri & David Ralston, “Corporate responsibility: A review of international management research
from 1998 to 2007” (2008) 14:4 J Int Management 319; Liesbeth Enneking et al, Accountability, international business
operations and the law : providing justice for corporate human rights violations in global value chains (Abingdon, UK: Routledge,
2020).
56 de Jonge, supra note 3.
54 Todd
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The global extractive industry is one of the largest in the world, operating in more than 100
countries and generating a total revenue of over 5 trillion dollars. 57 Non-renewable mineral
resources play a dominant role in the economies of 81 countries, collectively accounting for a
quarter of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP). 58 Foreign direct investment (FDI)
continues to grow in the areas of production, natural resource extraction, and social services. 59
The result is that of the top 100 largest economies in the world, 52 are corporations rather
than states. 60
MNCs are under increasing scrutiny in their home countries and in the countries where they
invest to demonstrate that they are operating in a sustainable and community approved
manner. 61 The instances of violent upheavals, rebellion, and extended litigation that directly
implicates MNCs, serve as reminders of the importance of developing robust and durable
mechanisms to support and enforce company-community engagement. 62

Banerjee, supra note 2 at 132.
“Extractive
Industries
–
Overview”
(last
modified
2016),
online:
World
Bank
<www.worldbank.org/en/topic/extractiveindustries/ overview>.
59 Eliza Echeverry, “Violence, Development, and Canada’s New Transnational Jurisprudence” (2018) 4:1 Conflict
and Society 167 at 175.
60 Julia Ruth-Maria Wetzel, Human Rights in Transnational Business, (Switzerland: Springer International Publishing)
at 3.
61 O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 24 at 227; Bruce Harvey & Simon Nish, “Rio Tinto and Indigenous Community
Agreement Making in Australia” (2005) 23:4 J Energy & Natural Resources L 499; Catherine Coumans, “Realising
Solidarity - Indigenous peoples and NGOs in the contested terrains of mining and corporate accountability” in
Ciaran O'Faircheallaigh & Saleem Ali, eds, Earth Matters - Indigenous Peoples, the Extractive Industries and Corporate
Social Responsibility, 1st ed (London, UK : Routledge, 2008).
62 O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 58 at 227; See David Brereton et al, “World Bank Extractive Industries Sourcebook
Good
Practice
Notes”
(2012),
online
(pdf):
The
World
Bank
<documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/388421468151145000/pdf/712990v20WP0P100Good0Practice0No
tes.pdf>; Emily McAteer, Jamie Cerretti & Saleem Ali, “Shareholder activism and corporate behaviour in
Ecuador - A comparative study of two oil ventures” in O’Faircheallaigh & Ali, supra note 58; Suzana Sawyer &
Edmund Terence Gomez, eds, The Politics of Resource Extraction Indigenous Peoples, Multinational Corporations and the
State, (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan London, 2012).
57
58
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1.2.2

“Resource Curse”

Questions about equitable distribution of benefits go to the heart of the scholarly debate of
the “resource curse” hypothesis – that is, the notion that countries with an abundance of
natural resources are more likely to be poor and to experience civil war and authoritarian
governance. 63 The resource curse thesis has long dominated social science and ethics debates
relating to mining. 64 Gaining momentum in the 1990s, the theory suggests that natural
resource abundance generates economic, political, and social distortions which ultimately
undermine the contributions of the extractive industry to development. 65 Robust support
exists to support the conclusion that natural resource wealth tends to adversely affect a
country’s governance. 66 As outlined in a review by Michael Ross, “one type of mineral wealth,
petroleum, has at least three harmful effects: It tends to make authoritarian regimes more
durable, to increase certain types of corruption, and to help trigger violent conflict in low- and
middle-income countries.” 67
More than 3.5 billion people, comprising half the world’s population, live in resource-rich but
cash-poor regions. Subhabrata Bobby Banerjee outlines some features that are shared by a
majority of these regions including “weak rule of law, weak governmental legitimacy, large
power disparities between communities and business, and the presence of diverse Indigenous
populations.”

68

The point to be emphasized here, and throughout the rest of this work, is

Michael L Ross, “What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?” (2015) 18:1 Annual Rev Political Science
239 at 240-8.
64 Anthony Bebbington et al, “Contention and Ambiguity: Mining and the Possibilities of Development: Mining
and the Possibilities of Development” (2008) 39:6 Development & Change 887 at 890; Chris Ballard & Glenn
Banks, “Resource Wars: The Anthropology of Mining” (2003) 32:1 Annual Rev Anthropology 287–313.
65 Bebbington et al, supra note 64.
66 Ross, supra note 63 at 239.
67 Ibid.
68 Gordon & Webber, supra note 54 at 31.
63
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that there is a clear pattern across the Americas, Africa, Asia, Europe, and Australia that shows
that the benefits that are reaped from natural resource development projects are not equitably
shared by the communities that are most impacted by them. 69
Why does this mismanagement of resource revenue occur? A key pivot in literature in the last
decade suggests that it is the underlying political institutions of resource rich-societies that
determine the outcomes of resource wealth. 70 Some scholars argue that states with weak
institutions are more likely to rely on resource exploitation for revenue generation, since these
states lack institutional foundations that are required for economic development. 71 However,
the presence of weak-institutions does not prevent resource-rich states from trying to change
course through the creation of new institutions and the adoption of new tools. CDAs are one
example of these tools, aimed at fairly distributing the costs and benefits of resource extraction
and production in society.

1.2.3

“Community Development Agreements”

There is some definitional ambiguity relating to what a CDA is. Also referred to as impactbenefit agreements and community benefit agreements, the CDA is commonly thought of as
a formal, written and negotiated agreement between industry (e.g. the resource extraction
company) and local communities agreeing to how these communities will access development
initiatives and benefits. 72 The agreement is designed to “impose obligations on each

Ballard & Banks, supra note 64 at 289.
Giles Atkinson & Kirk Hamilton, “Savings, Growth, and the Resource Curse Hypothesis” (2003) 31:11 World
Development 1793; Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, “Institutions and the Resource Curse” (2006)
116:508 Economic J; Victor Menaldo, The institutions curse: Natural resources, politics, and development (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2016)
71 Menaldo, supra note 70; Ross, supra note 63 at 239.
72 See O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 15 at 96; See also Tapan K Sarker, “Voluntary codes of conduct and their
implementation in the Australian mining and petroleum industries: is there a business case for CSR?” (2013) 2:2
Asian J Bus Ethics 205.
69
70
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participating entity and…affect the distribution of costs and the allocation of benefits from a
project” 73 with the ultimate goal of improving the welfare of mining-affected communities
and reducing the conflict around resource extraction. By minimizing the negative project
impacts and providing benefits to communities that they could not enjoy in the absence of the
development, these agreements can reduce or eliminate conflict surrounding the development.
A key definitional issue involves the concept of “community”, which can be open to a range
of differing interpretations. In the context of CDAs, there are two prevailing meanings of
“community”. 74 The first refers to people, often Indigenous, with shared cultural and social
ties, through their association with an area of land or water that may be affected by a resource
development project. The second refers to people who reside in a location adjacent to, or
downstream from, a mining project. 75
There is no universally accepted definition or parameters of a “local community”. 76 Note that
reliance on either of the two meanings discussed does not imply a singular attitude or approach
to resource development or CDAs. Rather, it is meant to highlight the scale of variability that
exists in the use of this term. During the negotiation process, reference to local communities
may be made in a number of ways including, but not limited to:
“[T]hose that are…impacted or affected by extractive activities;
geographically, as the population living near to an extractive project,

Ciaran O'Faircheallaigh, "International recognition of indigenous rights, indigenous control of development
and domestic political mobilisation" (2012) 47:4 Australian J Political Science 531.
74 O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 15 at 96.
75 Ibid.
76 Arun Agrawal & Clark Gibson, “Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role of Community in Natural
Resource Conservation” (1999) 27:4 World Development 629 at 630.
73
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or in the license area, or in the legal jurisdiction in which a project
takes place; through geographically-tied cultural identity, as people
residing near to a mining area that have a common identity, interest,
and/or claim on land in a project area, such as indigenous peoples;
through control over property rights, where communities are the
holder or owner of land rights in the project area.” 77

1.3

Thesis Structure

In the Introduction to Part I, I briefly outlined the two different parts of this thesis. In total, they
comprise seven chapters. Part I establishes the parameters of CDAs, situated in the context
of the social license to operate and the fractured history of mining and development. This
effectively sets the stage for Part II, which evaluates a number of CDAs based on their
provisions and analyzes the resultant scores. The work unfolds as follows:
 Chapter 1 introduces the research problem and outlines the thesis’ original
contribution to science while also highlighting the boundaries and limitations of the
research. It identifies the difficulty in evaluating CDAs, explaining the motivation
behind the work. It then details the thesis structure and discusses the theoretical
framework underpinning the research.
 Chapter 2 reviews the history of the extractive industries and the long-standing tension
between neoliberal ideals and community rights. It touches on aspects of capitalism,
foreign direct investment, and human rights. This chapter sets the frame for the
research, and invites the reader to use it as a lens to analyze the remainder of the work.
Kendra Elizabeth Dupuy, Harnessing Natural Resources for Development: New Legal Regimes for Localized Benefit Sharing
in the Mining Sector (PhD, University of Washington, 2016) [unpublished] at 28.
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 Chapter 3 describes the emergence of the social license to operate and its hardening
into a quasi-regulatory norm. It outlines the elusive nature of the social license and its
boundaries. Taking note of the confusion that surrounds the term, it discusses how
and why the social license is tightening its grip on the extractive industries.
 Chapter 4 is an in-depth discussion of community development agreements. It posits
that CDAs are an extension of the SLO, plagued by the same issues of vagueness and
inconsistency as the latter. Two different frames are introduced for CDAs, each with
competing views on the merits and role of CDAs in sustainable development. The
chapter closes with a brief discussion on the lack of empirical data and confidentiality
issues which have hindered research in this area.
 Chapter 5 outlines the method of the evaluation process and marks the beginning of
Part II of the thesis. Importantly, it reviews a leading CDA best-practice framework
and proposes several amendments to its criteria and scoring system. Following this,
the framework is applied to score a number of CDAs across a number of jurisdictions.
The collected data are then analyzed and interpreted through several statistical means.
Through an exploratory analysis, several relationships are identified that can provide
insight into CDA robustness and their role in the resource development context.
 Chapter 6 collates the data from Chapter 5 and uses it to draw conclusions on CDAs
and sustainable development. The discussion develops against the background of
insights uncovered in Chapters 2 through 5, ultimately making recommendations for
future avenues of research.

26

1.4

Theoretical Framework and Themes

This work is guided by blend of theories relating to social norms, extractivism, and political
ecology to create a product that is – at its core – grounded in pragmatism. Using the theoretical
perspectives discussed below, the ultimate aim is to identify the existing complexities of these
agreements and offer explanations for their variability in robustness and outcomes.

1.4.1

Law and Social Norms
“Social norms are hard to describe; they are fuzzy; they drift. People
enforce social norms inconsistently, sporadically, unpredictably. Social
norms keep a rudimentary sort of order and are surely superior to
chaos, but they provoke a longing for predictability, a longing that can
be satisfied only by a wealthy and powerful government.” 78

Drawing on the influence of Eric Posner, 79 Robert Ellickson, 80 Stewart Macaulay, 81 and Karl
Llewellyn, 82

among others, this thesis follows a tradition of work that criticizes legal

scholarship for focusing too much on the state and, consequently, neglecting the relationship
between citizens and the government. One theme that emerges from this is that many legal
rules are best understood as efforts to harness the independent regulatory power of social
norms. Generally, attempts to codify or legislate social norms are a risky endeavor because
norms are poorly understood, complex, and highly sensitive to factors that are difficult to
control. 83

Eric A Posner, Law and Social Norms (Harvard University Press, 2022) at 221.
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Social norms and social acceptance should be understood as labels that are attached to
behavioral regularities that emerge and persist in the “absence of organized, conscious
direction by individuals.” 84 As is discussed below, what distinguishes the SLO as a social norm
from other behavioral regularities is that departure from the behavior prescribed by the SLO
provokes certain sanctions and responses from community members. These sanctions emerge
endogenously, purely as a consequence of community members acting in a rational interest of
self and cultural preservation. 85 From this, we see that MNC behaviors that involve social and
environmental interests cannot, today, be purely explained in terms of instrumental threats
and obligations to comply with the law, and that there is an increasing incentive for
corporations to move “beyond compliance” as a result of the interplay between social
pressures and economic constraints. 86
MNCs, generally speaking, perceive their social obligations as going beyond their legal
obligations, and demanding of substantial care and attention. 87 Over the last several decades,
regulatory standards have tightened and growing legal threats have led many MNCs to assume
that any hazards or harm that may be brought by the corporation, even if not expressly illegal
today, will sooner or later be subject to consequences in the form of public censure, negative
impacts on shareholders, government action, and legal liability. 88 On this point, Neil
Gunningham, Robert Kagan, and Dorothy Thornton researched perceptions of the SLO by
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pulp industry corporate executives. One telling response from an environmental manager at a
major American MNC goes as follows:
‘The [Environmental Protection Agency] is such a monolith, it can’t
adapt. It takes a decade for something to happen. The environmental
community is really setting the tone. It’s done far more to make
companies accountable for pollution. It does more to keep me on my
toes, to give me an incentive to go to my management and say, we have
got to do better because the community can sue us and also give us
bigger rewards.’ 89
Obligations demanded by a SLO routinely alter legal enforcement mechanisms by pressuring
regulators to enforce environmental and community rights more vigilantly, and through the
filing of civil suits. 90 Community members, using the SLO and legitimacy provided by a CDA,
may lend extra enforcement energy and weight to the existing regulatory and legal license
requirements in a given jurisdiction. 91 In response to this effort, MNCs are pushed towards
full legal compliance and, furthermore, investing into beyond-compliance measures that
provide a margin of safety against violations. 92
A company’s failure to respond appropriately to its breaches of the SLO brings a risk of a
tighter regulatory license, as politicians and ultimately regulators respond to community
dissatisfaction. 93 More broadly speaking, the way that enforcement agencies and state actors

Ibid at 314.
Ibid at 308
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exercise their discretion may, in part, be influenced by the norms and expectations of the
community where the operations take place. 94
Traditionally speaking then, the SLO has been defined by its extra-legal nature. This, however,
is changing. With the emergence of CDAs, it is becoming increasingly evident that the
acquisition of the SLO can go through the formal legal system. 95 With the support of the legal
nature of CDAs, the SLO is progressively ‘hardening’ from an illusory, industry driven
concept, to a legal institutionalised tool that is elevated beyond traditional perceptions of social
norms.

1.4.2

Extractivism and Environmental Justice

Extractivism refers to a mindset and pattern of resource extraction based on removing as much
material as possible for as much profit as possible. 96 Examples of extractivist activities in
today’s economy include mineral and coal mining, oil production, and other development
activities of the like. Adverse environmental and social consequences in these projects often
ensue, given that capturing resources on this enormous scale requires the physical
rearrangement of landscapes and sometimes complex chemical processes to attain the desired
substances.
Extractivism is not merely the use of natural resources, which is something that humans have
been doing since the dawn of time. 97 Rather, it is characterized by a neoliberal, late-capitalist

you to do business… we operate under a license from the public in every place we do business, so we have to be
sensitive to public concerns’ at 331).
94 Ibid.
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96 Anna J Willow, Understanding ExtrACTIVISM, 1st ed (New York: Routledge, 2018) at 3.
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outlook that has an inherently unsustainable single-mindedness that favors short-term profit
over long term environmental and social consequences. The extractive schemes imposed by
MNCs who have been authorized by greater regulatory bodies jeopardize communities’
capacity to function as independent entities and undermine place-based identities. 98 Thus,
unlike extraction, extractivism is both a principle and a practice – an ideology and a system of
operation. The purpose of extractivism is intertwined with the societal inequalities that have
historically been developed in the wake of intensified agricultural production and surplus. In
this sense, extractivism values natural resources not primarily for what they are and what they
may be used for, but for the profits that they yield. 99
Earth does not have the luxury of boundless, unclaimed territory. Regions that have long been
inhabited and valued in ways that are largely incompatible with neoliberal notions of living,
are routinely sacrificed in the name of extraction and profit. As stated by Anna Willow:
“[E]xtractivist projects are often perceived as attacks and are,
consequently, often met with defensive resistance. Conflicts between
those intent on profiting from the removal of natural resources and
those determined to protect their lands and lives have been frequent
and fierce.” 100
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Environmental justice is an emerging social movement and area of study that takes action to
counter extractivist development and its damaging impacts. It is a polyvalent term 101 that
represents an interdisciplinary body of literature that includes theories of the environment and
justice, 102 sustainable governance, 103 environmental anthropology, 104 and political ecology. 105
Principally, environmental justice posits that the injustice that is experienced by marginalized
groups is expressed in a number of different ways. For example, people with low incomes tend
to lack access to educational opportunities and suffer health disparities related to inadequate
nutrition or the unaffordability of preventative practices. Marginalized communities are also
far more likely to face the brunt of the impacts of a disproportionately damaged
environment. 106

1.4.3

Political Ecology

People think about the environments they encounter in culturally constructed and diverse
ways. The different ways of viewing and valuing land and resources lead to different ways of
using them. As such, landscapes are often highly contested. 107 Here, environmental justice
perspectives connect with political ecology. Political ecology investigates how power
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arrangements between and within human groups concurrently shape and are shaped by
available resources and changing ecological conditions. 108
First coined by Eric Wolf, an economic anthropologist, the term ‘political ecology’ was used
to underscore the effects of political relationships on human-environment interactions.
Defined as “the study of manifold constructions of nature in contexts of power,” 109 political
ecology is an interdisciplinary theoretical effort. The concept of ‘power’ can be conceptualized
in a variety of ways: as an ‘inscribed capacity’; a collectively produced resource mobilized by
groups to achieve a common goal; or as a shifting phenomenon that is manifested as a series
of “strategies, techniques, and practices.” 110
Political ecology perspectives are united by their attention to how power relationships – at
scales that range from small, remote communities to the entire world – guide actions toward
the environment and how political factors inform “complex cultural and conceptual
interchanges and reciprocal impacts of nature and culture.” 111 Viewed through the lens of
political ecology, power does not merely manifest through the ability to control or dominate
groups, but also as a “fluid medium” that is produced collectively through social movements
and networks of individuals aiming for the same goals. 112 It requires the consideration of a
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multitude of questions such as: who is represented in development decisions? Where and how
are the decisions made? Whose knowledge counts and why? How do power dynamics
influence development decisions?
In short, political ecology emphasizes the influence of political and economic contexts on
environmental issues. 113 In relation to the current work, CDAs stand as an example of how
politics are inevitably ecological and how ecologies are inherently political.

1.5

Conclusion

Thus far I have identified and discussed the research problem (1.1.1); outlined my original
contribution to science (1.1.2) and described the boundaries of this work. Following this, I
addressed the key terms that are used in the thesis (1.2). I then outlined the structure of the
thesis (1.3), followed by a discussion of the theoretical foundations around which this work is
constructed (1.4).
With the theory and objectives clarified, the canvas for this work has been set. To add colour,
Chapter 2 discusses the emergence and evolution of the mining industry, drawing particular
attention to both its benefits and challenges.
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Chapter 2

2

Setting the Stage – The Backdrop of Mining

Each year more than four trillion kilograms of minerals are extracted from the earth114 –
enough material to construct over 4000 Eiffel Towers or cover an area greater than 100
football fields. 115 Perhaps even more telling, a study by Minerals Education Coalition found
that each person in the United States requires over 40,000 pounds of minerals each year in
order to maintain their standard of living. 116 Buildings, transportation networks,
communication systems, machinery and technology of every kind all depend on minerals that
are clawed from beneath the earth’s surface. 117 Computers and smartphones rely on precious
metals such as gold, silver and platinum, as well as rare-earth elements such as europium and
yttrium. 118 Other mined minerals, such as copper or aluminium, are required for electrical
grids and pipes. 119 The concrete roads that connect society rely on gravel, sand and varied

114 “All the metals we mine each year, in one visualization”, online: World Economic Forum
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115 Sara Bice, Responsible mining: Key principles for industry integrity (Abindon, Oxon: Routledge, 2016) at 1.
116 “How many pounds of minerals are required by the average person in a year? | U.S. Geological Survey” (last
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University of California Press, 2017) at 1.
118 See National Research Council of the National Academies, “Minerals, Critical Minerals, and the U.S. Economy
| The National Academies Press”, online: <nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/12034/minerals-criticalminerals-and-the-us-economy> (On the mineral content of a modern American automobile and consumer
electronic goods, including computers and cell phones); Committee on Critical Mineral Impacts et al., National
Research Council of the National Academies, Minerals, Critical Minerals, and the U.S. Economy (Washington,
DC: National Academies Press, 2008), 50– 57. (On the mineral content of a modern American automobile and
consumer electronic goods, including computers and cell phones); T E Graedel et al, “On the materials basis of
modern society” (2015) 112:20 Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 6295 (On the signiﬁcance of minerals to modern life
generally).
119 Ibid.
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mixtures of calcium and silicon. 120 Even the modern industrial food system and supply chains
rely heavily on mining and extractive processes – nitrogen and phosphorous are key elements
that support plant yield and growth. 121
The mining industry reaches across the world, ranging from the Amazon Basin, the Australian
Outback, the Rocky Mountains, the Democratic Republic of Congo and seemingly everywhere
in-between. Whether in the Global North or South, members of industrialized societies are
ceaselessly and intensively depleting the world’s finite mineral resources. While nearly every
material aspect of our daily lives is facilitated by mining, 122 many of us never acknowledge the
deep connections that we hold to an industry that is a hot-bed for controversy 123 and shapes
the prospects of future generations. 124
Whether one views mining as humanity’s heroic mastery of nature or a spectacle of short-term
thinking, mining has frequently stood as an analogy for all extraction. 125 Mining is a lens
through which we debate deeper differences of opinion concerning human–environment
relationships. It reflects profound societal anxieties about the intensity and pace of
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environmental transformation, loss of local control, and rapid (and often imposed)
sociocultural change. 126 For its proponents, mining means progress. 127 But for its critics,
mining epitomizes the extractivist desire to remove as much as possible, as quickly as possible,
by any means possible. 128

2.1

Early Roots – For Gold, God, and Glory
Men also, and by his suggestion taught,
Ransacked the centre, and with impious hands
Rifled the bowels of their mother Earth
For treasures better hid. Soon had his crew
Opened into the hill a spacious wound,
And dogged out ribs of gold. Let none admire. 129

Access to minerals and metals has long underpinned the development of human society. 130
The struggle for the control of such resources has determined the locations of civilizations,
economic growth, and has been a driver of conflict since the dawn of humanity. 131 The
industry’s long history is closely connected to the history of European expansion and
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colonialism. 132 Historians use the memorable phrase “gold, God, and glory” 133 to encapsulate
the motives of the European expansion that began in the 15th century. 134
The rise of the Spanish Empire in the sixteenth century was famously motivated by the quest
for precious metals. At first, the spoils of conquest were marked by gold and silver. 135 Soon
after, desires for control and wealth gave way to a systemic search for new types of mineral
deposits. 136 In South America, the arrival of the Spanish Colonizers was evidently marked by
the capitalization of mineral reserves, which allowed for rapid economic development through
the intensification of mining activity. Indigenous peoples, branded on their cheeks to
demonstrate that they were property of the Spanish Crown, were enslaved and forced to mine
on a commercial scale. 137 The miners followed the conquistadores, the knights and soldiers of the
Spanish empire, side by side with missionaries and religious leaders, locating mineral reserves
and using them to create wealth. 138 Commanded by Hernán Cortés, Spanish conquistadores
and local tribes conquered the Aztec capital city of Tenochtitlán. Mere months after this
conquest, Cortés was dispatching miners and foundry men to investigate metal deposits in the
southwest of modern-day Mexico. 139 The establishment of various colonial mining districts
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under the command of Cortés represents a paradigmatic example of early commodity
frontiers. 140
Similarly, the voyages of Columbus and his backers were part of the 15th century imperial
outreach to shorten trade routes and to find new resources to support a rising population. 141
Columbus travelled to the East Indies with the expectations of attaining mineral wealth that
could be traded alongside spices and textiles. 142 While they did encounter gold on the island
of Hispaniola, the process of extraction and exportation was one built on the laborious
exploitation of the island’s inhabitants. Using the forced labour of the Indigenous Taino and
enslaved Africans, Hispaniola quickly became an early producer and exporter of gold. 143 For
nearly 300 years, colonial Spanish mining increased its production of copper, gold, silver and
other metals, developing a form of proto-industrial production in the early modern world. 144
Similar instances of abuse linked to the extractive sector have occurred across Africa. The
expropriation of natural resources was one of the many ways that the colonial powers exerted
dominance over local African populations. 145 For example, in what is now modern-day Ghana,
the British colonial state removed and imprisoned local leaders and opened the doors for

McNeill & Vrtis, supra 117 at 22.
Ibid at 403 (‘While local conditions were variable and thus generalizations difficult, in the middle of the
fourteenth century, many parts of western Europe had faced a collective resource shortage: their populations
pressed on the limits of medieval agricultural productivity. A reckoning was delayed by the Black Death, but by
1500 or so, the population of western Europe had recovered, and local conditions of scarcity once again
appeared.’) See William Chester Jordan, The Great Famine: Northern Europe in the Early Fourteenth Century (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1996), at 7-36; Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, The Peasants of Languedoc, John Day, trans,
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974); William McNeill, “The Impact of the Mongol Empire on Shifting
Disease Balances, 1200– 1500,” in Plagues and Peoples (1976; reprinted, New York: Anchor, 1998), 161– 207.
142 Hugh Thomas, Rivers Of Gold: The Rise Of The Spanish Empire, From Columbus To Magellan (New York: Random
House Trade Paperbacks, 2005); Clara Estow, "Reflections on Gold: On the Late Medieval Background of the
Spanish Enterprise of the Indies" (1993) 6 Mediaevistik 8.
143 Ibid.
144 McNeill & Vrtis, supra 117 at 23.
145 Bone, supra note 10 at 19.
140
141

39

corporations to appropriate the lucrative gold mining industry. 146 Likewise, the last 150 years
of the Congo’s history have seen brutality and abuse of local populations stemming from the
extractive industries. 147 Similar instances can be found across a multitude of different
countries. 148
Historically speaking, there was a stark social and economic disparity between miners and
those who conquered them. 149 While the mine owners received wine and clothing from
foreign merchants, the miners toiled away in slavery. 150 The colonization of huge areas of the
globe – from Ireland, to India, the Indigenous lands of the North and South Americas, and
much of Africa – and the early instances of the exploitation of natural resources are the roots
of modern day extractivist paradigms. In contemporary times, it is evident that the industry
and its challenges have evolved – no longer do we see the same proliferation of territorial
conquests and power ruled by colonizers over the colonized. Instead, the centuries of mineral
exploitation spurred industrial production and economic growth, which have given rise to new
power disequilibria in the resource development context. 151

2.2

Modern Day Mining – A Balance of Conflicting Needs
From above, a mine pit appears as a still, contemplative organism, a great greybrown amoeba alive with a cellular thrum of human activity. It is so wide, your
eyes must first work to take it all in, to grasp the expanse, before waking up to
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specks of movement… Dump trucks carry hundreds of tonnes of overburden
along the haulage roads, up and out. It is only when one of these trucks
rumbles nearby that you begin to grasp the size and depth of the pit. The truck,
which in the pit appears like a childhood Tonka toy, rolls on tyres two lanes
wide and more than twice as tall as your average miner, each costing more than
a Mercedes Roadster. The drivers of these gargantuan gas guzzlers are specially
trained and usually earn six figures a year. 152
Both physically and economically, today’s mining industry is one of phenomenal scale. The
revenue of the top 40 global mining companies, which represent a vast majority of the whole
industry, amounted to nearly $656 billion USD in 2020 153 – a value that exceeds the purchasing
power of many small-to-medium sized countries. 154 In 2020, the direct contribution of
Canada’s minerals and metals sector to Canada’s gross domestic product (GDP) was $70
billion, which represented 3% of Canada’s total GDP. 155 If the indirect effects from the
minerals and metals sector are accounted for, the industry contributes a further $37 billion to
the GDP – a total contribution of $107 billion to Canada’s GDP. 156
Natural resource development is one of the biggest economic drivers at the local, national and
global level. 157 This makes sense, given that modern industrial societies are exhibiting an
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increasing functional dependence on minerals and metals. Rare earth metals, for example, have
unique capabilities that make them essential to technology, manufacturing, and military
sectors. 158 These metals are required for the production of smart phones, electric and hybrid
cars, computers, oil refineries, televisions, lighting, fiber optics, superconductors, permanent
magnets, and military aircrafts amongst countless other items. 159 In 2012, Americans spent
US$1.25 trillion on household equipment, recreational vehicles, cars and car parts alone. 160
Each of these parts require raw materials – many of them mined – and energy to fuel
production and further consumption.
Our appetite for modern life and reliance on the resources to sustain it is compounded by calls
for a greener economy and the increasing demand for clean energy. 161 In a report published
by the World Bank Group, it was found that the demand for minerals, such as nickel, lithium,
and cobalt, could increase by approximately 500% by 2050. 162 To meet the demand for the
transition to a green economy and clean energy, it is estimated that over 3 billion tons of
minerals and metals will be needed for clean power production and energy storage. 163
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These figures illustrate the importance of minerals and mining in the modern context. A new
relationship has emerged between industrial societies and mines that has restructured power
dynamics and the natural world in fundamental ways. 164 As minerals and mines have become
integrated into the core of economic production, they have altered whole economies, reshaped
social and cultural patterns, redirected scientific initiatives, and have placed private corporate
power and the fortune of local communities in the spotlight. 165
While Western societies have historically been dominant in the mining industry, developing
nations have emerged as significant players in today’s global economy. Generating more than
one-fifth of total global mineral production, mineral extraction is an increasingly important
component of developing economies. 166 Recently discovered mineral deposits in Mongolia,
for example, hold the potential to boost foreign investment and generate billions of dollars of
revenue. 167 The mining industry’s potential to contribute significantly to socio-economic
upliftment is a vitally important consideration for emerging countries and rural economies. By
virtue of its scale, mining operations require, and thus facilitate, the development of significant
infrastructure and may potentially distribute substantial economic benefits to historically
impoverished or marginalized communities. For developing nations that are home to the
necessary combination of geology and climate, the potential wealth that may be injected into
the economy is staggering. For example, one of the world’s largest mining companies, Barrick
Gold:
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 has contributed $7.9 billion to Mali’s economy over the last 24 years; 168
 represents approximately 5% of the annual tax revenues in the Dominican
Republic; 169
 has paid more than $1.7 billion in tax and excise revenue since 1990. 170
Similarly, Rio Tinto also makes substantial economic contributions to the communities that
are impacted by their development operations. In 2021, Rio Tinto contributed:
 $222.9 million in payments to landowners, which are non-discretionary compensation
payments made by the company under land access, mine development, native title,
impact benefit and other legally binding compensation agreements; 171
 $72 million in community investments, which comprise voluntary financial
commitments; 172
 $19.1 million in development contributions, including in-kind donations of assets and
employee time that aim to deliver social, economic and/or environmental benefits for
a community, and which Rio Tinto is mandated to make under a legally binding
agreement, by a regulatory authority or otherwise by law. 173
However, as alluded to above, these figures and benefits tend to come at a cost that is borne
by individuals and communities in the form of environmental and cultural damage.

2.3

An Evolving Industry - Lessons Learned

The Democratic Republic of Congo has an estimated US $24 trillion in untapped mineral
wealth. 174 However, rather than facilitating better health and development outcomes, this

168 “Barrick Gold Corporation - Mining’s Critical Role in the Fight Against Poverty”, online:
<www.barrick.com/English/news/news-details/2021/minings-critical-role-in-the-fight-againstpoverty/default.aspx>.
169 Ibid.
170 Ibid.
171 Rio Tinto, supra note 127.
172 Ibid.
173 Ibid.
174 J Morgan, “DR Congo’s $24 Trillion Fortune” (2009) 350:52 African Business.
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wealth has been found to drive conflict and human rights abuses. 175 Similarly, rebel groups in
Angola made use of ‘blood diamonds’ to generate revenue and fuel civil war. 176 As for the
mineral deposits in Mongolia, the costs of mineral wealth are measured by the impacts on
water and community culture, rather than through conflict. In an area that receives an average
annual rainfall of 80 mm per year, Mongolian herders worry that the Oyu Tolgoi mine will
contaminate or soak up this resource. 177 Like many other Indigenous communities across the
world, they fear that the presence of an open pit mine, zoning requirements, and heavy
machinery will defeat their way of life and endanger their culture and livelihood. 178
Concerns are fueled by the dozens of mining spills and tailings dam failures in recent decades.
In 1995, the Omai gold mine in Guyana released over 800 million gallons of cyanide and heavy
metals sludge which destroyed fish and animal life in close vicinity to the tailings dam, and
contaminated river water that was essential for the drinking supplies of communities. 179 In
2000, a tailings dam owned by Aurul, which held 100 metric tonnes of cyanide contaminated
water, faulted and unleashed wastewater which eventually reached the Tisza River and then

175 See e.g. Emily Veale, “Is there Blood on you Hands-Free Device: Examining Legislative Approaches to the
Conflict Minerals Problem in the Democratic Republic of Congo Note” (2012) 21:2 Cardozo J Intl & Comp L
503; Shannon Raj, “Blood Electronics: Congo’s Conflict Minerals and the Legislation That Could Cleanse the
Trade Note” (2010) 84:4 S Cal L Rev 981.
176Quint Hoekstra, “Conflict diamonds and the Angolan Civil War (1992–2002)” (2019) 40:7 Third World Q
1322; See also Logan Hennessy, “Where There Is No Company: Indigenous Peoples, Sustainability, and the
Challenges of Mid-Stream Mining Reforms in Guyana’s Small-Scale Gold Sector” (2015) 20:1 New Political
Economy 126 at 129.
177 Oyu Tolgoi Watch et al, “A Useless Sham – A Review of the Oyu Tolgoi Copper/Gold Mine Environmental
and Social Impact Assessment” (December 2012), online (pdf): CEE Bankwatch <bankwatch.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/05/a-useless-sham-OT-ESIA-review-14Dec2012.pdf>.
178 Ibid.
179 Camille Gaskin-Reyes, “Case Study Guyana: Collapse of Omai Dam Holding Mining Waste” (last visited 19
June 2022), online: Georgetown – Center for New Designs and Learning in Scholarship
<blogs.commons.georgetown.edu/rio-doce-environment-blog/guyana-collapse-of-the-omami-mine-wastedam/>.
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the Danube. 180 The spill has been called Europe’s worst environmental disaster since
Chernobyl. 181 As recently as 2019, the Córrego do Feijão mine, in Brumadinho, Brazil
collapsed and killed 270 people. The list goes on, but in each instance, local people suffered
from contaminated waterways, endangered health, and interrupted livelihood. 182
As described earlier, the deleterious impacts of mining in developing nations are so severe and
common that the pattern has been dubbed the ‘resource curse’. 183 The lack of accountability,
absence of strong governance and enforcement mechanisms, tolerance of corrupt practices,
and profit-motivated business behavior contribute to environments in which the needs of local
communities may come secondary to economic gain. 184 However, while developing countries
shoulder the bulk of mining’s negative impacts, it should be emphasized that these effects can
occur to varying degrees wherever mining operations are found. In developed nations, the
negative impacts of mining disproportionately affect communities that are more likely to face
marginalization and vulnerabilities associated with indigeneity or low socio-economic
status. 185Although it is more likely that impacted communities in developed nations enjoy
greater protection from legitimate governments through robust environmental protection
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regimes, social programmes, and economic compensation, mining nevertheless routinely
presents challenges and precipitates conflict. 186
It is evident today that the global mining industry has developed a collective conscience that
was not practically present prior to the 20th century. The litany of complaints, concerns, and
conflicts has given the industry lesson after lesson, slowly fostering an industry-wide response
to the growing social and environmental threats posed by its operations. 187 In what is
considered a watershed moment in the industry, the leaching of toxic chemicals into the Papua
New Guinean Fly River downstream from BHP Billiton’s Ok Tedi mine attracted worldwide
attention to the industry. 188 In 1998, the heads of ten major global mining companies came
together at the Global Mining Initiative to address the growing scrutiny on the mining industry.
This sparked industry-wide interest in the impacts of mining and the duties of companies to
prevent, mitigate and respond to those impacts. Social and environmental responsibility has
emerged as a widely acknowledged component in the contemporary mining operations. 189
In tandem with this increased attention from industry, resistance movements and conflict
reflect an emergent agency of local communities to fight against structural inequalities and
corporate power. Examples are far reaching and prevalent across the world, including
Newmont Mining’s decision to suspend the expansion plans for its mine in Cerro Quilish,
Peru; Osisko’s decision to abandon its gold mining project in the La Rioja province of
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Argentina; 190 the Serbian government’s revocation of Rio Tinto’s mine permits in Jadar; 191
and numerous others. All of these movements occurred largely outside the formal ‘legal’ and
deliberative processes that have traditionally offered security for corporations and their
investments.
These trends are representative of a shift in governance and the evolution of a sustainable
development paradigm that focuses on the social and environmental impacts of
development. 192 Where the expectations of local communities are not fulfilled, conflict and
delays are commonplace. 193 Full legal compliance with state law is no longer a sufficient means
to satisfy the rapidly accelerating expectations of society with regards to mining issues. 194
Extending beyond traditional considerations of company operations and government
regulation, company-community power asymmetries 195 have been placed in the spotlight.
Emerging from this paradigm shift is the term known as the “social license to operate” (SLO)
– a term that refers, generally, to the community’s ongoing acceptance of a company’s

190 Banajaree, supra note 2 at 140 (‘Recent examples include Newmont Mining’s decision to suspend expansion
plans for a mine in Cerro Quilish in Peru…Osisko’s decision to abandon its gold mining project in La Rioja
province of Argentina…and a Supreme Court decision in India reversing a prior approval given to Vedanta
Limited to build a bauxite mine in the state of Odisha…These movements occurred largely outside the formal
deliberative processes that tended to exclude local communities from direct participation.’).
191 Ivana Sekularac, “Serbia revokes Rio Tinto lithium project licences amid protests”, Reuters (20 January 2022),
online: <www.reuters.com/business/retail-consumer/serbian-government-revokes-rio-tintos-licences-lithiumproject-2022-01-20/>.
192 Yenny Vega-Cárdenas & Nathalie Parra, “Nature as a Subject of Rights: A Mechanism to Achieve
Environmental Justice in the Atrato River Case in Colombia” Amissi Melchiade Manirabona & Yenny VégaCárdenas, eds, Extractive Industries and Human Rights in an Era of Global Justice: New Ways of Resolving and Preventing
Conflict (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2019) 127 at 135.
193 Costanza, supra note 11.
194 Ibid; See also Peter Edwards et al, “Social Licence to Operate and Forestry - An Introduction to the Special
Issue” (2016) 89 Forestry 473.
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operations. 196 Although contemporary usage of the term first appeared in a publication by
William Moore in 1996, 197 the idea is often attributed to a speech made by Jim Cooney in
1997. 198 While Moore’s use of the term focuses on environmental stewardship, Cooney’s
focuses on community well-being. Cooney observed a widespread failure of governments to
protect the interests of communities while granting legal licenses for mining. 199 To compensate
for government failures which produce community opposition later, Cooney recommended
that mining companies seek a social licence – that is, approval – directly from communities.
Academia and industry practice indicate that Cooney’s conceptualization of the concept has
come to dominate discourse and operations within the mining industry. 200
From the corporate head-office to the remote mine site, mining companies’ policies and
actions reflect an acceptance of social responsibility and the SLO concept. Companies are
making a greater effort to involve the community in their operations and have formalized
community relations roles in these contexts. Reflecting the expanding importance of this social
acceptance, community consultation committees are considered to be a conventional practice
in today’s standards. 201 The emergent company policies, activities, and public commitments
of major miners illustrate a critical shift in the way that companies approach their business.
The growing concern with earning and maintaining the SLO 202 and going “beyond
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compliance” 203 is indicative of an industry that is reflecting on its values, practice, and the
impact that it has on the world.

203

Gunningham, Kagan & Thorton, supra note 86 at 316.
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Chapter 3

3

The Social License to Operate – A Critical Review

3.1

Pinning Down the Social License – Definitional Ambiguity

Defining the term Social License to Operate (SLO) has proven to be an elusive task – it is a
moving target that appears to transcend traditional categorizations. Even today, the SLO
remains a poorly defined idea 204 that tends to bundled together with equally popular – but
perhaps contentious 205 – concepts such as corporate social responsibility (CSR) and
sustainability. 206 Generally, SLO has been regarded as a metaphorical concept that represents
a resource development company having the broad, ongoing approval and acceptance of
society to conduct its activities. 207 Framed differently, the SLO is indicative of a community's
acceptance or approval of a project or the project operator's ongoing presence in the
community. 208 Thomson and Joyce formally articulated the parameters of the SLO in 2008
arguing that the concept is composed of three elements: (1) it is granted by the impacted
community; 209 (2) it is informal, intangible and non-permanent; (3) it has to be earned and then
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maintained. 210 Similarly, the Australian Centre for Corporate Social Responsibility has defined
the term as the “acceptance or approval continually granted to an organisation's operations or
project by local community and other stakeholders”. 211 Stakeholders, in this context, are
generally defined as networks of “individuals, groups, and organisations that are either affected
by the operation or that can affect the operation”. 212
The metaphorical nature of the SLO has presented problems for practitioners in resource
development, business and the legal profession. Clearly, the SLO is not a ‘license’ as
understood in the usual sense. In this context, ‘license’ is used as a metaphor that conveys the
formal acceptance of a resource development company’s operations by the local community.
It stands for the notion that resource development companies must satisfy some formal
criteria in order to gain trust and social acceptance. 213 Undoubtedly, the concept has an
intuitive appeal in the resource development industries, where practitioners have become
accustomed to meeting the conditions of formal licensing processes. 214 It has been posited
that part of the appeal of the SLO stems from the fact that it mirrors the language of legal
licenses used by many companies within the industry. 215 On the other hand, however, the ongoing and shifting nature of community acceptance means that the criteria for attaining and
maintaining the SLO are far from clear. Thus, while the language is the same, the metaphor is
not perfect. As noted by Pierre Lassonde, former President of Newmont Mining Corporation,
the SLO cannot be acquired by simply “going to a government ministry and making an

210 Ibid; Ian Thomson & Susan Joyce, “The Social License to Operate: What It Is and Why Does It Seem so
Difficult to Obtain?” (PDAC Convention, Toronto, March, 2008) [unpublished] [Thomson & Joyce, “PDAC”].
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application”; it requires “far more than money to become part of the communities in which
you operate.” 216
Legal and social licenses speak to the “acceptance” of development companies from different
perspectives. The SLO is “perceived as something that must be earned from a community of
stakeholders.” 217 There are no defined parameters that a company must follow to obtain an
SLO. Although a legal license provides an indication of the minimum standard of behavior
that is expected of an operation, mere regulatory approval does not correspond with social
approval for that same activity. 218 It is defined by the values and expectations of a diverse
community of stakeholders and reflects the changing strength and quality of the level of
approval granted by a community. 219 While the government can define and enforce different
legislative requirements for a mining license, the SLO is based on beliefs, opinions and
perceptions which are subject to change as new information is acquired or when new social
pressures come to bear. 220 It is precisely this characteristic that has given rise to debate and
uncertainty in academia and industry. Understanding when community acceptance has been
granted, how it is to be maintained, and who has granted it are key questions that, if
ascertained, stand to benefit both companies and communities.
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3.2
Emergence of the SLO - Community Acceptance as a
Critical Risk Factor
In reaction to a series of economic crises during 1970s that had destabilized the global
economy, 221 developed countries entered the 1980s with the adoption of restrictive monetary
policies that were aimed at reducing inflation. 222 Higher interest rates, lower growth, and
declining levels of trade led many developing countries to experience balance-of-payment
difficulties in the early 1980s. 223 These difficulties, in conjunction with large fiscal deficits,
contributed to high levels of debt in the public sector and set the stage for the crisis of the
1980s. 224 The debt crisis is generally considered to have started when, in August 1982, Mexico
declared that it would no longer be able to service its debt. 225 This ignited a succession of
sovereign defaults around the world, with one country after another declaring a similar inability
to repay.
The 1980s shouldered the weight of policy reforms that were aimed at stabilization,
liberalization and the privatization of key industries, including those within the extractive
sector. 226 Collectively known as the Washington Consensus – representing the influence of the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the United States Treasury – developing
countries were pressured into deals offering debt relief and financial support conditional on

221 World Economic and Social Survey, “The end of the Golden Age, the debt crisis and development setback”,
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the adoption of such reforms. 227 This led to a loosening of many regulatory standards across
different sectors, most evident in the mining sector. 228
The liberalization of mining laws during the 1980s and 1990s was certainly successful in
attracting foreign investment. 229 However, this meant that resource extraction companies
operated on favorable financial terms in a loose regulatory environment which left many
proximate communities vulnerable to experience the brunt of extractive operations. For
instance, between 1972 and 1989, the Panguna mine in Papua New Guinea, developed and
majority-owned by Rio Tinto, was one of the world’s largest copper and gold mines. 230 During
this period, the company’s local subsidiary, Bougainville Copper Limited discharged over a
billion tonnes of mine waste into local river systems, devastating the environment and the
health and livelihoods of local communities. 231 Unequal distribution and anger over the mine’s
profits led to an insurrection, triggering a civil war that cost the lives of an estimated 15,000
people. 232 In Africa, the Niger Delta has experienced large swaths of environmental
degradation and community destruction that have been closely linked to the operations of
Shell Petroleum Company. 233 The Niger Delta crisis reached its peak when Ken Saro-Wiwa,
the leader of a transnational environmental justice movement was arrested and executed in
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1995. 234 Similar examples can be found throughout Latin America, Africa, and South
America. 235
In the 1990s the industry saw the development of numerous soft law frameworks aimed at
fostering sustainable development, equitable benefit sharing, and improving corporate
interactions with local communities. 236 Such concepts were first introduced by the 1992 Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development 237 and have continually evolved since then. 238
Despite the development of these frameworks, the weakening of domestic regulations meant
that corporations faced little accountability for their actions in developing nations. Soft law
frameworks and the proliferation of CSR ideals were not able to adequately address the power
asymmetries between communities and developers, leaving communities at the mercy of
corporate decision makers. 239
By the turn of the century, managing social risk factors had arguably become the most
significant challenge for resource development companies. 240 The SLO arose due to multiple
factors during this period, including increased global awareness of the negative impacts of
mining; shareholder pressure to improve practices; 241 the development of lending policies
safeguarding communities and the environment; 242 and a steady stream of social activism in
the developing world, where affected communities and Indigenous peoples had started to
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stake claims to natural resources in competition with states and mining firms. 243 Communities
halt or impede on resource development projects, sometimes even without having an
recognized legal right to do so. 244
The lack of a SLO manifests in a multitude of different ways, including the slow down or
shutdown of projects and the creation of a volatile socio-political environment, normally
marked by acts of resistance such as protests, roadblocks, boycotts, and coordinated
conflict. 245 When such situations occur the SLO is considered to be either “withheld” or
“withdrawn”. 246 Governments may refuse to issue permits or may retract ones that have
already been issued where the situation has become socially unstable – such as in Jadar, Serbia,
where the Serbian government revoked Rio Tinto’s lithium exploration licenses after the
environmental concerns sparked massive protests across the nation.
Across the world, financial losses owing to delays, stoppages and conflict have emerged as
critical considerations for resource development companies. In India, for example, extractive
projects representing an investment of nearly $50 million have been halted by massive protests
and resistance movements. 247 In the Philippines, land disputes put a $5.9 billion investment
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in a copper and gold mine at risk – a project that was projected to add 1% to the national
GDP. 248 These actions and the results indicate that new mechanisms of enforcement and
regulation are slowly emerging. Resistance movements can serve as the “catalyst for shifts in
the political economy leading to changes in social arrangements about property rights,
governance, authority, and accountability, which in turn influence decision-making processes
and outcomes in corporation” 249
Industry publications reflect the importance of SLO, highlighting its evolution into a crucial
factor that is considered at the outset of development operations. 250 In a report published by
Ernst & Young, a multinational professional services firm, “maintaining a social license to
operate” was identified to be a top risk faced by the mining industry, ranking as a top 3 risk
since 2018. 251 Much of the risk faced by developers lies in the power of communities to
negatively impact the reputation of companies. 252 The “reputational capital” 253 of a company
can be eroded through boycotts, negative publicity, and legal challenges. The extractive
industries have embraced the concept of SLO as a defensive measure that is designed to
manage social risks and avoid disruptions to resource development projects. 254 Avoiding
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damage to reputation and profit act as key drivers for corporate investment in attaining a
SLO. 255
The transactional approach that corporations take in their management of social risks leads to
stark differences in the conceptualisation of SLO between communities and businesses. 256
SLO literature, which frequently focuses on the concept from a business perspective, 257
indicates that there is some consensus that the SLO is a “highly normative concept” 258 that
prevents an operation from commencing without the consent of the community. 259 Some
argue that the modern conceptualization of SLO has fostered a disproportionate power
dynamic where activists exploit the term to undermine projects. 260 Owen and Kemp posit that
while SLO has contributed to raising the profile of social issues, it suffers from a critical failure
in that it is not able to develop a collaborative developmental agenda for the extractive
industries or to provide a means for restoring the lost confidence of impacted communities
and stakeholders. 261
From a legal point of view, the SLO has been described as a “composite concept” 262 and a
nexus for cross cutting issues – such as environmental protection, sustainable development,
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human rights, free and prior consultation, and the protection of other fundamental rights 263 –
that belongs in the realm of transnational public policy. 264 In line with this idea, the SLO has
been integrated in the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
(UNGPs), 265 which has since become the global standard concerning the recognition, respect
and protection of fundamental rights. 266 SLO is also credited as having influenced the revision
of the ILO Tripartite Declaration Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy 267
and the OECD Guidelines for Multiple National Enterprises. 268
To date, there is no static procedure by which resource extraction companies can successfully
obtain an SLO. 269 Equally pressing is the lack of scholarly consensus on determining when
exactly an SLO may be said to have been attained. 270 The increasing interest in SLO has
produced a corresponding increase in the formal treatment of the concept. Acknowledgment
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of the concept by governments and regulatory entities has added another interpretational layer
to the SLO construct and has brewed a new area of contention in SLO discourse. 271

271
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Chapter 4

4

Community Development Agreements: The Hardening of a
Norm
4.1

Introduction – A Call for Certainty

Conflicts surrounding mining projects cost human lives, time, energy, and substantial sums of
money. 272 To avoid these costs, mining companies and mining affected communities have
increasingly turned to signing contracts with one another. 273 These contracts, known as
community development agreements (CDAs), outline the responsibilities and rights of the
parties, as well as the governance mechanisms of the corporate and community
stakeholders. 274 In addition to the economic benefits that CDAs can provide to communities,
these contractual tools can also protect the cultural heritage of Indigenous groups when
negotiations meaningfully address the imbalance in bargaining power. 275
The emerging trend of CDAs in the resource extraction industry stems from the idea that, in
order to proceed with resource development operations, companies need to obtain
community approval – that is, the social license to operate (SLO). Due to its amorphous
nature, the conceptualization of SLO will likely continue to escape definition and
characterization. Nonetheless, the concept has been framed as undergoing a process of
“juridification” and “hardening”, where the acquisition of the SLO and the expectations held
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by stakeholders are increasingly being approached as a matter of law. 276 Research in this area
indicates a “proliferation of law” into extra-legal areas, including human rights and
transnational business ethics, and an increased legislative regulation of corporations and
development processes. 277
With a SLO, now physically represented and legitimized by a signed CDA, companies and
investors can mitigate the risks associated with protests and conflict that can lead to significant
disruption of mining activities. 278 However, despite the now widespread adoption of these
contractual tools, many of the potential benefits of CDAs are unknown or not wellunderstood. 279

4.2

Legal Reform and The “Hardening” of a Norm

Prior to the turn of the century, state-owned enterprises and industries were privatized and
opened for foreign investment, and resource extraction corporations began operating in areas
with loose regulation and little oversight. 280 However, in the early 2000s, some states and
international actors realized that these policy reforms did little to stimulate national
development, increase social welfare, and bolster the economy. 281 Consequently, over the last
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20 years, efforts have been made to overhaul legislation and renegotiate existing mining
agreements. This period has seen the development of a new wave of regulatory codes that
reflect voluntary, regional, and transnational initiatives that emphasize transparency and
accountability in the resource extraction industries. 282 Concepts that are intended to enable
companies to obtain community acceptance have been legislated into different mining laws
around the world. 283
A study conducted by Kendra Dupuy reveals that “[b]etween 1986 and 2012, thirty-two states
adopted new provisions into their mining laws that required firms and/or governments to
generate positive socio-economic outcomes for local communities affected by mining
operations.” 284 The institutionalization of voluntary initiatives and SLO may elevate the
concept above the realm of corporate social responsibility and other voluntary initiatives and
help address the criticisms described above. 285
CDAs, also known as “impact benefit agreements”, are common in these new provisions and
are considered to be instrumental in attaining a SLO. These agreements are, in theory, a new
way to improve outcomes and reduce conflict between companies and communities “by
providing a stable set of expectations among stakeholders and community members,
transparency and measurement in regard to the fulfillment of a company’s promises, and a
legal/quasi legal document that could potentially be enforced.” 286 Over the last five years,
CDAs have become the primary vehicle by which mining companies reach an agreement with
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local communities for access to natural resource reserves in exchange for a variety of
benefits. 287

4.3

The Agreement Making Process

The agreement making process for CDAs tends to vary with each agreement but can be
broken down into several different stages.

4.3.1

Pre-Negotiation Stage

The pre-negotiation stage involves the company and the community or communities laying
the groundwork for negotiations. 288 The pre-negotiation stage provides the parties with the
opportunity to approach and voice concerns regarding significant issues and conflicts, without
the risk of a formal commitment. 289 Precursor agreements are common at this stage, such as
a negotiating framework or a memorandum of understanding which can set out the rules that
govern the process for negotiating the CDA. 290

4.3.2

Research and Consultation Stage

Generally, this phase includes stakeholder mapping and planning to determine who stands to
be affected by the project – that is, the interested and proximate communities. 291 The company
at this stage meets with community representatives to understand capacity limitations and the
infrastructure that is required or desired in the place of the project.
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4.3.3

Negotiation and Endorsement of Final Agreement

Once the agreement making process has concluded, the key focus should be the monitoring
and the implementation of the agreement to ensure that the parties to the CDA comply with
their accepted obligations and that the benefits are distributed in the manner prescribed in the
agreement. Importantly, many agreements do not provide any insight or details regarding the
first and second stages of the agreement-making process. Rather, knowledge of practices in
these early stages tends to rely largely on secondary literature and analysis. 292

4.4

Content of CDAs

As noted, the content of CDAs varies considerably because, as negotiated agreements, they
are highly adaptable to local circumstances and priorities. 293 Generally, CDAs provide
community consent for proposed or existing resource development activity in return for a
package of community beneﬁts and mitigation measures. 294 Beneﬁts can include participation
of and preference for local businesses in procurement and contracting; 295 preferential access
to employment opportunities, and training programs to enhance ‘employability’ of community
members; 296 and a revenue stream for the community related to the scale of the profitability
of the operation. 297 Impact mitigation measures can focus on management and protection of
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a community’s cultural heritage; 298 and community participation in decision making and
environmental management. 299 The last measure is of particular interest given the tendency
for states to reduce their involvement in environmental regulation. 300

4.5

A Question of Effectiveness – Two Different Frames

CDAs between mining companies and local communities are negotiated in the majority of all
major mining projects in Canada and Australia, and increasingly in developing nations across
the world. 301 Clearly, CDAs present potentially substantial benefits for communities that are
often seriously disadvantaged with regards to access to economic opportunities, infrastructure,
and social services. However, as will be discussed, agreements can result in significant changes
to the relationships that communities have with the state, including the legal and regulatory
processes available to them. 302
The ultimate question that permeates literature on CDAs relates to their roles in the resource
development process and whether they adequately address the interests of project proponents
and impacted communities. In other words, who do these CDAs truly benefit? What is their
purpose and impact? In a systemic review of the literature by Cameron Gunton and Sean
Markey, 303 it was revealed that there are two principal ways that the role of CDAs have been
framed:
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1) Instruments that reinforce and legitimize the status quo.
2) Instruments that facilitate sustainable development and improve community
outcomes.
These are discussed in depth in the review by Gunton & Markey, but some points warrant
discussion to provide colour to our analysis.

4.5.1

Instruments That Reinforce and Legitimize the Status Quo of
Natural Resource Governance

In this first frame, CDAs are treated as a negative force potentially leaving communities worse
off over the long run. The “status quo of natural resource governance” refers to the
arrangements and methods by which private project developers, MNCs and senior levels of
government target and maintain control over natural resources and lands. 304 In doing so,
community access to the project benefits becomes limited which leaves community members
to shoulder the burden of adverse impacts with little to gain. 305
There are several prominent themes outlined in the review, asserting that CDAs:
•

Perpetuate unequal power dynamics between communities, project
developers, and senior levels of government; 306
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•

Enable senior levels of government to abdicate their responsibilities to provide
services to communities; 307

•

Perpetuate injustices and/or disagreements within or between neighboring
communities; 308 and

•

Undermine the role of other types of regulatory mechanisms. 309

In theory, CDAs could help to manage the uneven bargaining power among foreign
companies, the host government, and the local communities and create a more stable
foundation for mining community relations. 310 This frame emphasizes that there are reasons
to question this premise. A review of CDA literature reveals the absence of a common
framework or universally accepted set of standards on CDAs to guide negotiation and
implementation across countries. 311 Communities’ capacity in negotiating these agreements is
limited, and the agreements often lack minimum standards for disclosure of details. 312 Thus,
they are largely a product of the negotiating power of the parties, which – as previously
mentioned – is predominantly in favour of corporations and host governments. 313
Processes for ratifying the agreements and their use as an indicator of social acceptance have
also been called into question. CDA negotiations tend to be initiated by project developers
under existing policy institutions and processes that favor industry development. 314 Under this
frame, CDAs prioritize project certainty and an expeditious process over achieving positive
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outcomes for communities. 315 In some cases, communities sign agreements because they
believe they have little choice and that a project will go ahead regardless of whether they
approve it or not. 316

4.5.2

Tools for Facilitating Sustainable Development

In the second frame, CDAs are defined as instruments that facilitate sustainable development.
Literature under this frame views CDAs as a positive force, emphasizing their ability to identify
and contribute to sustainable community development, including the social, economic, and
environmental wellbeing of a community. There are several prominent themes under this
frame, arguing that CDAs:
•

Facilitate economic and social development in remote communities; 317

•

Restructure power dynamics and allow communities to assert sovereignty; 318

•

Persist as durable policy instruments in the long term; 319

•

Mitigate the adverse impacts of natural resource development; 320

•

Secure community approval; 321 and

•

Reduce conflict between communities, project developers, and senior levels of
government. 322

Under this lens, CDAs offer the opportunity for communities to share in the economic
benefits generated by resource extraction. This may be through the revenue generated from
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the projects 323 and non-revenue benefits such as training opportunities,

324

local business

opportunities, 325 and improvement of community infrastructure. 326 CDAs may offer
communities access to an income stream in the form of royalty or other payments. CDAs may
also assist in meeting a community’s short-term and long-term needs relating to health,
education, and housing. For example, Aboriginal traditional owners of the Argyle diamond
mine project in Western Australia have been able to use the revenues from a CDA signed with
Argyle Diamonds Ltd to help facilitate and expand Aboriginal business, enhance education,
improve literacy, and support youth development initiatives. 327
Broadly, access to income from resource development projects can provide local communities
with a degree of autonomy that allows them to establish their own priorities, rather than
needing to rely on public funding based on the priorities of the state. 328 Some argue that this
serves to bolster the negotiating power of such communities when dealing with the state in
relation to provision of services, land title, and governance. 329 There are concerns that, due to
a new stream of income from the project, the government will cut its expenditure and services
for the communities. 330 Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh argues that, if done with care and proper
judgement, the additional mining revenues can be used as leverage for greater public
expenditure for the community and the impacted region. 331
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Importantly, negotiating a CDA may assist in attaining community approval and acceptance
for resource development projects; that is, the SLO. 332 From an industry perspective,
obtaining an SLO is important for project developers to increase project certainty, protect
investments, and manage the expectations of shareholders and local stakeholders. 333 Research
indicates that CDAs are highly valued by shareholders when communities have strong
property rights protections, and a history of protests and social mobilization. 334 Such
communities are more likely to enter into conflict with the development company, leading to
disruptions and delays that negatively impact value. Firms want to invest into resource rich
states, but generally lack sufficient information about the quality of the investment
environment and its risk profile: Will the government respect the legal permits and investment
for the mining project in question? Will local communities uphold the social contract and
acceptance? What, in fact, is the social contract? What are its parameters? These are all
questions that a CDA can address.
In theory, CDAs can help restructure the power dynamics in a given environment, and help
enable communities to assert sovereignty over territories and natural resources. 335 While
outcomes may not be guaranteed, and the needs of each community may vary across different
project sites, environments, and jurisdictions, CDAs can help address issues that are not
adequately addressed through alternative legal mechanisms and that could otherwise motivate
conflict or litigation. 336
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4.6
4.6.1

Variability in Outcomes and Questions of Evaluation
Variability

The limited research that has been effected on CDAs has revealed that the contents and
outcomes of CDAs are highly variable. 337 As mentioned above, it is problematic that little
empirical work has been done to understand how and why these CDAs differ. There are some
exceptions to this trend however, most notably seen in the work of Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh
who conducted a comprehensive empirical study examining 45 agreements across Australia’s
major mining regions. Roughly 25% of agreements represented strongly positive outcomes
for Indigenous signatories, offering substantial economic benefits, environmental preservation
and management, and protection of cultural heritage. At the other end of the spectrum, 25%
of agreements provided for minimal financial benefits, with little to no role in environmental
or cultural heritage management for the Indigenous signatories. The remaining 50% were
spread across the spectrum between these two extremes. 338 This pattern is consistent with
other research focused on CDAs in Australia, 339 and echoes findings within the Canadian
context. 340 Other research indicates that CDAs, even in successful cases, generally fail to meet
stakeholder expectations. A study by Jason Prno found that while CDAs delivered benefits to
community members to varying degrees, most beneficiaries of the agreement expressed
disappointment in the final form that the economic and social benefits took. 341 The details of
CDAs are generally not well known in communities, due to the confidentiality of these
agreements or poor communication and information sharing by the signatory parties.
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What explains this variability? Which factors contribute to CDA success in negotiation and
implementation? Three possible explanations are outlined in the literature. The first is offered
by researchers who propose that CDAs are products of neo-liberal governance strategies that
have been designed to maintain corporate and state power and to continue the marginalization
of Indigenous peoples. 342 A second is that outcomes are determined by the legal regime of the
country where the project is situated in. 343 The third posits that variable outcomes could be
the result of institutional differences affecting the organizational, political, and negotiating
capacity of local communities and Indigenous peoples when negotiating the agreements. 344

4.6.2

Instruments of Neo-Liberal Governance Strategies

Canadian and Australian academic writing on negotiated agreements in the resource
development context tends to be dominated by the neo-liberal perspective. 345 The arguments
in this realm of theory rely on analyzing the nature of modern, liberal democratic states and
their relations with the actors involved in these agreements, namely corporations and
Indigenous peoples. 346
At the heart of the company-community power asymmetries are questions about equity and
the distribution of the costs and benefits of resource exploitation. 347 How should society
allocate scarce resources among individuals? With regards to the benefits of extraction, who
in the community should receive the financial benefits and how much of it are they entitled
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to? 348 Questions of distributive fairness and justice are generally addressed by governments
through the imposition of various policies and law. The crux of this argument then is that the
direct negotiation of CDAs between industry and local communities has allowed for the host
state to withdraw from its role of regulating relations between the two, which has left the
communities vulnerable to exploitation. 349
Some academics in this realm assert that CDAs are a “new form of cultural and economic
colonization insofar as [they] promote resource extraction in Indigenous territories and restrict
sovereign control of communities over affected lands.” 350 Agreements are also said to not be
representative of a widespread involvement of the communities or Indigenous signatories, but
rather to be dominated by lawyers and community elites. 351
Another popular critique from this perspective is that the agreements focus almost exclusively
on generating and distributing the economic benefits of resource development projects. In
doing so, the agreements are said to ignore or largely discount their cultural and environmental
impacts and to preclude alternative development strategies that would prioritize the cultural
and environmental values of the host community. 352 By committing to a CDA, community
leaders also commit their community to a specific model of development that favors

Dupuy, supra note 77 at 21.
O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 34.
350 Emilie Cameron & Tyler Levitan, “Impact and Benefit Agreements and the Neoliberalization of Resource
Governance and Indigenous-State Relations in Northern Canada” (2014) 93:1 Studies in Political Economy 25
at 33.
351 Martin Papillon & Thierry Rodon, “Proponent-Indigenous agreements and the implementation of the right
to free, prior, and informed consent in Canada” (2017) 62 Environmental Impact Assessment Rev 216; StLaurent & Billon, supra note 300.
352 Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, “Explaining outcomes from negotiated agreements in Australia and Canada” (2021)
70 Resources Policy 101922 at 4; See Ken J Caine & Naomi Krogman, “Powerful or Just Plain Power-Full? A
Power Analysis of Impact and Benefit Agreements in Canada’s North” (2010) 23:1 Organization & Environment
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quantifiable benefits (e.g. employment, education, income) over more nuanced and complex
facets of their culture and environment. 353
However, this realm of theory is generally not based on any detailed analysis of the actual
agreements themselves. Emphasized by O’Faircheallaigh (2021), the factual accuracy of the
neo-liberal critique is open to serious question:
“For instance, as the examples…from the Kimberley and Labrador regions
illustrate, some agreements are far from restricted in their focus to
economic matters and deal extensively with environmental issues and
questions of sustainability. These examples also highlight the fact that not
all agreements contain ‘no objection’ clauses, with some specifically
protecting the rights of Aboriginal signatories to object to project
approvals. Far from being ‘dominated by lawyers and Aboriginal elites’,
many negotiations involve extensive community participation” 354
Moreover, while the neo-liberal critique can well account for the less positive outcomes of
CDA negotiations, it does not explain the variability of positive outcomes that have been
documented repeatedly across a variety of different contexts. For example, Innu and Inuit
Peoples in Labrador in the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador in Canada, negotiated
agreements for the Voisey’s Bay nickel project which affords them a key role in project design
and environmental management, and provides for substantial economic and financial benefits.
The Voisey’s Bay agreements:

353
354

See Papillon & Rodon, supra note 351.
O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 34 at 4.
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•

Include royalty payments linked to the value of production, with a further upside when
nickel prices are high; 355

•

Require that the project be developed on a scale much smaller than that desired by
project developer. The smaller scale was desired by the communities to reduce the
project’s environmental impact, and to prolong mine life. This allows the Innu and
Inuit more time to develop the capacity to take full advantage of economic
opportunities created by the project. 356

•

Require Innu or Inuit environmental monitors to be on site 365 days a year; 357

•

Give Innu and Inuit a role in the grant of environmental permits for the project; 358

•

Include extensive and detailed provisions to encourage Aboriginal employment,
including specific provisions on employment of Innu and Inuit women. 359

The Voisey’s Bay agreement reflects a shift in power over fundamental issues such as the
project scale and decisions regarding project infrastructure. In sum then, this perspective does
not do enough to analyze and understand the degree of variability between different agreement
provisions and their outcomes, and so an alternative explanation must be sought.

4.6.3

Differences in Legal Regimes

Another explanation is that variable outcomes reflect differences in the legal regimes here the
resource development project is situated. For example, Indigenous landowners in Australia
have a weak position with regards to recognition of their rights and bargaining power. 360
Under the Native Title Act, Indigenous landowners enjoy only a “Right to Negotiate” with
developers. If a negotiated agreement is not achieved with six months, the resource

O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 16 at 190-2.
Ibid.
357 Ibid.
358 Ibid.
359 Ibid.
360 Ibid.
355
356
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development company may seek the approval to proceed from the National Native Title
Tribunal, a government appointed tribunal. In an analysis by Lily O’Neill et al, 361 it was found
that in 115 out of 118 cases, leading up to May 2019, approval for development was given. 362
Additionally, where a matter is referred to the Tribunal for a decision, the Indigenous
landowners may no longer obtain rights to a royalty-type payment as a component of the
compensation provided from the project. In sum, Indigenous landowners face enormous
pressure to reach an agreement during the six-month “Right to Negotiate” period – a pressure
which is not applied to developers, who thus obtain a very strong bargaining position. 363
In the Canadian context, until the early-1990s, CDAs were mainly negotiated between
government and mining companies, often excluding Indigenous communities. 364 In the
modern day, the government typically does not play any direct role in the negotiation of these
agreements that are also not regulated by any legislation. 365 In response to conflicting
economic and political pressuring arising from dissatisfied communities, the Canadian
government developed “regimes to promote and constrain engagement between extractive
ﬁrms and affected communities in order to delegate…the responsibility of social mediation
onto extractive projects themselves.” 366

361 Lily O’Neill, A Tale of Two Agreements: Negotiating Aboriginal Land Access Agreements in Australia’s Natural Gas
Industry (PhD dissertation, University of Melbourne, 2017) [unpublished].
362 O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 34 at 4.
363 Ibid.
364Michael Hitch, Impact and Beneﬁt Agreements and the Political Ecology of Mineral Development in Nunavut (PhD
dissertation, University of Waterloo, 2006).
365 St-Laurent & Billon, supra note 300 at 594; See Gibson & O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 295.
366 David Szablowski, “Operationalizing Free, Prior, and Informed Consent in the Extractive Industry Sector?
Examining the Challenges of a Negotiated Model of Justice” (2010) 30:1–2 Canadian J Development Studies 111
at 113.
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This led to the adoption of market-related mechanisms proposed by industry to improve its
social and environmental legitimacy, 367 which has been characterized by “a shift from a
traditional (i.e. state-community) to a more liberal system of governance where non-state
actors play a central role in governance through company-community agreements.” 368 The
result of this is a “hybrid regime” of governance, marked by a “selective absence” of the state
in negotiations of CDAs, thereby shifting responsibility and power to mining companies. 369
This has been framed as a redefining of the government’s role through a “privatization of
certain government functions.” 370
However, the legal context itself does not offer an adequate explanation for the variability in
provisions and outcomes of CDAs – there can be great variability in the robustness and
success of these agreements within the same legal jurisdiction. 371 If the variability was purely a
matter of the legal regime, then the variability would be better accounted for.

4.6.4

Confidentiality

Transparency is a particularly important issue when discussing CDAs and their variability. As
mentioned above, CDAs generally include confidentiality clauses that limit access to the
content of the agreements. 372 By definition, confidentiality clauses restrict access of these
documents to the public and prevent third parties or similarly positioned communities from
using these agreements as a reference point. Granted, there are reasons for why confidentiality
Bonnie K Campbell, Myriam Laforce & Bruno Sarrasin, Pouvoir et régulation dans le secteur minier: leçons à partir de
l’expérience canadienne (Québec: Presses de l’Université du Québec, 2012).
368 St-Laurent & Billon, supra note 300.
369 Ibid at 595.
370 Ibid.
371 O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 34 at 4.
372 Alcantara & Morden, supra note 47 at 257.
367
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clauses are commonly used. Some Indigenous groups value confidentiality clauses “out of fear
that federal and provincial governments could alter their funding relationship in light of what
is established in the [CDA].” 373 However, confidentiality carries clear implications for the
company-community power asymmetry in practice. Industry parties benefit from such clauses
because they limit the ability of Indigenous groups and signatory communities to examine and
leverage other agreements. While companies and industry partners may operate with the
endless trove of corporate and expert knowledge, supplemented with teams of lawyers and
consultants, the local communities must operate without access to the experiences of other
communities. 374 Confidentiality provisions may also “severely constrain the capacity of
Aboriginal groups to communicate with the media and other stakeholders”. 375
The transparency issue brings focus to the differences in the negotiating capacity of the
signatories. CDAs are highly technical documents that are, generally speaking, “more closely
catered to industry than Indigenous approaches to issues like cultural and ecological
conservation.” 376 A given community may have only had the opportunity to participate in a
single CDA negotiation, whereas major resource development companies may be parties to
dozens of CDAs in a multitude of different states and legal jurisdictions.

4.6.5

A Collective Action Problem – Institutional Failures

At the heart of it, the issues discussed thus far represent a collective action problem. Theories
on collective action and human behavior tell us that groups of individuals with common
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Ibid.
375 Gibson & O'Faircheallaigh, supra note 295 at 49.
376 Alcantara & Morden, supra note 47 at 257.
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interests, such as the provision of goods and services that will benefit society, will not
necessarily attempt to work together to further their collective interest. From this perspective,
individuals generally have few incentives to provide public goods, given that many people will
benefit regardless of whether they contribute. The individual perceives themselves as bearing
the greatest cost for providing the good – a perspective that leads to sub-optimal social
behavior based on self-interest. 377
Mancur Olson has outlined three ways to address collective actions problems: (1) through
small groups; (2) coercion; and (3) by providing group members with selective incentives. 378
Kendra Dupuy posits that there is a fourth solution: the state can “bear the entire cost of, and
assume the responsibility for, providing public goods.” 379 In light of the market failure to
equitably distribute the benefits of resources, the state can be considered an institutional
solution to help reduce the transaction costs of negotiation. O’Faircheallaigh found that
neither the scale of the mining, the type of company involved, the corporate policies, nor the
timing of the negotiations could account for the overall variability in outcomes. Rather, the
analysis clearly demonstrated the impact of overarching legislative frameworks and
institutional organization. 380
A principal argument relied on in this work is that institutional quality determines, to a large
extent, the outcomes of resource wealth. The ability of extractive industries to achieve an
equitable distribution of benefits depends not on corporate altruism, but rather on well-

Dupuy, supra note 77 at 76.
Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action : Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard University Press,
1971).
379 Dupuy, supra note 77 at 76.
380 O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 15 at 202
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designed institutional frameworks and policies that ensure “prudent management and
allocation of extractive industry resource benefits.” 381 Weak states, in contrast to this point,
lack the institutional capacity or willingness to provide the public goods and services required
to meet basic human needs. 382 These states, lacking the ability to carry out their critical
responsibilities, are often corrupt, poor, authoritarian, politically unstable, and have a weak
rule of law. 383
The weaker a state is, the less likely it is to be able to provide public goods and services. 384 As
such, one solution for such states is to allocate the responsibility to non-state actors, such as
non-governmental organizations or private companies. States can use hard law and financial
incentives to target mining forms to assume this responsibility. Problematically, these private
companies may lack incentives to do socially desirable things 385 and do not necessarily
internalize the negative externalities generated by extractive activities – rather, such
externalities are often shouldered by those living in proximity to the mining operations.
The distributional imbalance of the costs and benefits of mining is not only a market failure,
but also a political one. To turn resource wealth into economic development for communities
proximate to the extraction, some states have adopted new legislation to rectify the imbalance,
including legislation mandating CDAs or direct revenue distribution to the community.
Distribution of mining revenues and benefits to local communities requires the presence of

Thomas Akabzaa, “Mining in Ghana: Implications for National Economic Development and Poverty
Reduction” in Bonnie Campbell, ed, Mining in Africa: Regulation and Development (Ottawa: Pluto Press, 2009) at 209.
382 Susan Rice & Stewart Patrick, “Index of State Weakness in the Developing World” (26 February 2008), online:
The Brookings Institute <www.brookings.edu/research/index-of-state-weakness-in-the-developing-world/>.
383 Dupuy, supra note 77.
384 Ibid.
385 Matthew Potoski & Aseem Prakash, Voluntary Programs: A Club Theory Perspective (Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press, 2009) at 1.
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strong institutions at all levels to prevent corruption and elite capture in the collection, transfer,
and use of funds. 386 Designing good institutions to facilitate equitable outcomes for
communities requires an understanding of the interests of the actors involved, as well as
understanding the different tools available to address the problem. As mentioned, CDAs are
an emerging model for providing communities access to development initiatives and benefits.
As they become increasingly adopted into legislation across the world, it is imperative that
more work be done to understand the role that they play, their efficacy, and whether they
provide a solution to institutional failures.

Erika Weinthal & Pauline Jones Luong, “Combating the Resource Curse: An Alternative Solution to Managing
Resource Wealth” (2006) 4:1 Perspectives on Politics 35; Ross, supra note 63 at 239.
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PART II: THEORY TO PRACTICE – A QUESTION OF
EVALUATION
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Chapter 5

5

An Evaluative Framework for CDAs

5.1

Introduction – A Black Box for Negotiation

Theoretically, CDAs can help manage the uneven bargaining power between companies and
host communities, and create a more stable foundation for project relations. 387 However, the
lack of guidance and quantifiable metrics undermines this premise. A review of CDAs by the
World Bank made note of the absence of a common framework and universal set of guidelines
across countries. 388 Ramsey Hart writes that while CDAs have helped some communities
increase their oversight of mining areas, the capacity of the communities to negotiate the
agreements is limited. As a result, the agreements often lack minimum standards for disclosure
of details and largely stand as a product of the negotiating power of communities and their
lawyers. 389 In some cases, communities are pressured to sign agreements because they feel as
that they have little choice in the matter on the whole and that the project would go ahead
regardless of whether they protest or not. 390 Such views are reinforced repeatedly throughout
the literature. 391
While CDAs can be an effective means of distributing project benefits and attaining a SLO,
their effectiveness is contingent on the context and structure of the agreement. 392 To date,
much of the literature in this realm has focused on the implementation of the agreements with

Hira & Busumtwi-Sam, supra note 26 at 3.
Ibid.
389 Ibid.
390 Anil Hira, “The hollow core: breakdowns in global governance of CSR” (2020) 6:4–5 Global Affairs 461;
O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 24.
391 Hira & Busumtwi-Sam, supra note 26 at 3.
392 Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37.
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little focus on the provisions of the agreements themselves. What should be included in a
CDA is surprisingly ambiguous, given that these tools have become industry norms. 393 The
lack of clear metrics for evaluating these agreements impacts communities’ perceptions of the
expected outcomes and what is actually achieved. 394 This is not to say that there is no research
that outlines guidelines and best practices for CDAs – to the contrary, a review of the literature
shows at least 30 publications that suggest best practices. 395 Yet, while these publications make
important contributions, the majority of them fail to provide a complete list of all the best
practices that are outlined across a review of the entire literature. In addition, best practices
provided for in majority of these publications “are not explicitly defined such that they can be
easily implemented.” 396
Maggie Cascadden, in collaboration with Thomas Gunton and Murray Rutherford, took note
of this and recently published a comprehensive summary of the theory and best practices
surrounding CDAs, synthesizing them into a framework to guide the evaluation of CDA
provisions and their implementation. 397 The framework, in addition to consolidating a list of
best-practices for CDAs, provides for explicit sub-criteria and indicators in the form of a
checklist that allows for an easier set of guidelines in negotiating, designing, and evaluating
CDAs. 398 The Cascadden-Gunton-Rutherford evaluation framework is a significant step
towards crafting a consolidated theory to unify the different frames and perspectives on

See Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37.
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CDAs. This framework allows for the use of a uniform set of criteria to evaluate the provisions
and implementation of CDAs. As noted by Cascadden et al:
“Ongoing research is…required to refine definitions and test subcriteria and indicators where necessary to make the framework easier
to apply. Although an effort has been made to make the indicators as
explicit as possible, the framework can be improved by increasing
precision and clarity in the definition of the indicators based on
empirical evaluation.” 399
In addition, Cascadden et al point out that the “proposed [CDA] evaluation framework should
be subject to ongoing case-study testing to confirm the effectiveness of the best practices
criteria”. 400
This work aims to translate theory into practice. Using the Cascadden-Gunton-Rutherford
framework as the foundation, the sections to unfold will adopt and refine certain aspects of
the framework to make it more inclusive of community concerns and to develop a more
complete scoring mechanism. Following this, a case study analysis will be taken of 17
agreements across 7 countries in a novel attempt to compare CDAs from different
jurisdictions with one another and evaluate their robustness. In doing so, the hope is that the
final product may stand as a reference point for mining affected communities preparing to
enter into CDA negotiations. By drawing specific attention to the provisions of CDAs across
a multitude of jurisdictions, it becomes possible to add nuance and supplement experience for
local communities.

399
400
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5.2
5.2.1

Methodology
Introduction to the Framework

Based on a review of 30 best practice studies, stemming from academic, industry,
governmental, and non-governmental organization literature, Maggie Cascadden, Thomas
Gunton and Murray Rutherford developed a CDA best practice framework that can be used
for negotiating agreements. 401 By identifying and merging the best practices contained in the
30 studies, a three-tiered evaluative model was created. The Cascadden-Gunton-Rutherford
framework is comprised of 10 general best practice criteria, 44 sub-criteria and 89 specific
indicators that are presented in the form of a checklist that may be used to guide the
negotiation, implementation and management of CDAs, and to evaluate the robustness of
different CDAs based on the provisions that they contain.
I am using the Cascadden-Gunton-Rutherford framework as foundation for two reasons.
First, the framework is more comprehensive than any other framework or guideline that has
been published to date. For instance, even the most comprehensive studies that were reviewed
“contained only 20 of the 44 best practices sub-criteria presented in the proposed
framework.” 402 Second, the framework introduces novel sub-criteria, going beyond existing
frameworks by providing explicit indictors in the form of a checklist that allows for a more
transparent and easy to follow set of guidelines for negotiating and evaluating CDAs.
I will now canvas the Cascadden-Gunton-Rutherford model and the different criteria
identified. Following this, I will highlight the areas that are need of improvement and will
describe the modifications that I have made.

401
402

Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 3.
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5.2.2

Cascadden-Gunton-Rutherford Model

As mentioned, there are 10 overarching best-practice criteria: empowering; respect for local
culture; affirmation; open communication; capacity building; equity; enforceability; effective
implementation; monitoring and adaptability; and breadth.

5.2.2.1

Criterion 1: Empowering

The empowering criterion concerns the inclusion and empowerment of the community in the
CDA negotiation and implementation process. 403 As discussed above, unequal power
dynamics tend to taint the negotiation and implementation of CDAs. 404 The sub-criteria are
as follows:
1. Every affected community and stakeholder is a party to the agreement. 405 Thus, regardless of whether
the stakeholders in question have a formally recognized legal title or their geographic
proximity, the goal is to consult with all groups that are to be impacted by the project. 406
2. There must be an explicit requirement to consider and include vulnerable and marginalized groups in the
CDA process. 407 This is particularly important due to the fact that CDA negotiations are
usually a product of individuals or organizations who represent the community. 408

Ibid at 3.
Ken J Caine & Naomi Krogman, “Powerful or Just Plain Power-Full? A Power Analysis of Impact and Benefit
Agreements in Canada’s North” (2010) 23:1 Organization & Environment 76.
405 Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 3.
406 Courtney Fidler, “Increasing the sustainability of a resource development: Aboriginal engagement and
negotiated agreements” (2010) 12:2 Environ Dev Sustain 233–244.; Sandra Gogal, Richard Reigert & JoAnn
Jamieson, “Aboriginal Impact and Benefit Agreements: Practical Considerations” (2005) 43:1 Alta L Rev 129–
158; Loutit et al, supra note 15 at 30.
407 Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 3; see also Sam Szoke-Burke et al, “Negotiating contracts
with investors” (September 2018), online:
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Importantly, these representatives may not be representative of marginalized groups
including youth, women, elderly, and ethnic minorities. 409
3. Community sovereignty is maintained. 410 Due to unequal bargaining power, the community may
at times consent to the transfer of legal rights to the developer or may even consent to
provisions that constrain the legal and political rights of the community. 411 These
provisions prevent the community from taking action under government legislation, may
prevent civil action, mobility rights, and prevent participation in environmental review
processes or media interviews.
4. Funds generated as a result of the CDA should be under the control of the recipient community. 412 This
empowers community members to take control and maintain their sense of agency as they
decide, based on their own priorities, how to spend the revenue by from the project. 413
5. The community has its own community plan prepared prior to CDA negotiations which reflects the
community’s goals and objectives. 414 This novel practice proposed by Cascadden et al looks to
ensure that the agreements reflect the specific characteristics and aspirations of the
community.

Prno, Bradshaw & Lapierre, supra note 35; ICMM, supra note 114; “6 major steps to reach a community
development
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(May
2016),
online
(pdf):
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<oxfamibis.dk/sites/default/files/PDF%20global/Sierra%20Leone%20PDF/6_steps_to_reach_a_com_dev_
agree.pdf>[Oxfam IBIS].
410 Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 3.
411 Irene Sosa and Karyn Keenan, “Impact benefit agreements between Aboriginal communities and mining
companies: their use in Canada” (2001), online (pdf): Canadian Environmental Law Association
<www.cela.ca/sites/cela.ca/files/uploads/IBAeng.pdf>; O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 24.
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5.2.2.2

Criterion 2: Respect for Local Culture

This criterion emphasizes the importance of respecting and preserving local cultural and
heritage throughout the lifetime of the project. 415 The sub-criterion are as follows:
1. Project employees take part in cross-cultural training to ensure that they understand local culture and
customs. 416 Cross cultural training is important because it facilitates a respectful and
collaborative community-company relationship by supporting the “cultural” integrity of
the community. 417
2. Traditional or community knowledge is included in the project design and management. 418 There is no
universally accepted definition of traditional knowledge, but generally it is understood to
mean the “knowledge, know-how, skills and practices that are developed, sustained and
passed on from generation to generation within a community, often forming part of its
cultural or spiritual identity.” 419
3. Work schedules should accommodate the cultural needs and traditions of community members. 420
Harvesting practices, cultural events, and local traditional hunting should not be disturbed
as a result of the development, as such disruption would detract from the recruitment and
retainment of Indigenous employees and would be detrimental to their ways of being. 421
Ibid.
Ibid; Dreyer, supra note 30; Fidler & Hitch, supra note 47; Steven Kennett, A Guide to Impact and Benefit
Agreements, (Calgary, Canada: University of Calgary Press, 1999).
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Proposed Modifications
Sub-Criterion 2.3 – Work schedules should accommodate cultural needs : I suggest the
addition of several indicators to the framework to better inform the evaluation of whether
cultural needs are accommodated within work schedules. They appear as follows:
Original:
2.3) Employee work schedules are designed to suit cultural needs.
i.

Employee work schedules are designed to suit cultural needs.

Amended:
2.3) Employee work schedules are designed to suit cultural needs including:
i.

Traditional holidays and celebrations.

ii.

Traditional practices, such as fishing, harvesting, or hunting.

The need for this amendment arose from the comparison of different agreements, some of
which accommodated traditional practices but made no mention of traditional holidays and
celebrations. 422

5.2.2.3

Criterion 3: Affirmation

Considered among some researchers to be the most important factor to CDA success, 423 this
criterion measures the commitment of signatories to the CDA and the quality of relationship
that exists between the signatories. 424 The sub-criteria are as follows:
1. The agreement is negotiated in good faith. 425 Negotiating in good faith, as articulated by
Cascadden et al, means that the “project proponent’s and the community’s intent is to
insecurity and association with mental health in an indigenous population in Panamá” (2021) 24:17 Public Health
Nutrition 5869.
422 See Mary River Project Contract 2018.
423 Dreyer, supra note 30; Brereton, supra note 61; Kennett, supra note 416
424 Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 4.
425 Ibid.
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reach a mutually satisfactory agreement that meets the objectives of both parties.” 426 There
is to be no oppressive or coercive behavior that places undue pressure on reaching an
agreement. 427
2. The community-company relationship is trusting and maintained. 428 As a matter of principle, the
relationship between the company and the community should begin early on, prior to the
regulatory approval of the project, and should be respectful, mutually beneficial, and
trusting. 429 Parties should aim for a close relationship that fosters open communication
and face-to-face interaction throughout the negotiation. 430
3. The agreement is seems as legitimate by the community. 431 Elite capture and corruption are serious
concerns in the CDA context, and thus it is imperative that the community is formally
involved in creating objectives that guide negotiations and have formal mechanisms, such
as a community vote, to hold their representatives accountable. 432 The community
negotiator and signatory must be accountable and representative of the community.
4. The company is committed to the agreement’s success. 433 A clear, dedicated commitment to the
agreement is imperative. Press releases, statements of commitment, and formal affirmation
of the agreement by senior management contribute greatly in this regard. 434
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5. The CDA’s role in the project approval process is clear. 435 This sub-criterion is best represented in
jurisdictions where signing the CDA is a prerequisite for project approval. In a growing
number of jurisdictions, consultation is mandatory before the project is granted legal
approval. 436 Adopting a requirement for a CDA into the licensing process, as Sierra Leone
and Mongolia have done, 437 can serve to increase the degree of consultation and
community involvement in the process. 438
6. The CDA does not replace the government’s role in supporting the community. 439 It is possible that
host governments may perceive the financial support, social benefits, and impact
mitigation by CDAs as an incentive to reduce their own contributions. 440 It is fairly
common, especially in remote or less-developed areas that are deficient in infrastructure
and essential services, for mining companies to assume the responsibility of patching up
the “functional gaps” of the government. 441

Proposed Modifications
Criterion 3.1 – The agreement is negotiated in good faith : The original framework
instructs the evaluator to determine whether the agreement was negotiated in good faith. This,
however, is subject to a high level of subjectivity based on the sources of the evaluator and
their perceptions of what “good faith” is. In an effort to move to a more objective means,
another indicator was added.

Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 4.
Resolve Report, supra note 432.
437 Dupuy, supra note 77.
438 Gogal, Riegert, Jamieson, supra note 406.
439 Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 4.
440 St-Laurent & Billon, supra note 300 at 596.
441 Ibid.
435
436
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Original:
3.1) The agreement is negotiated in good faith.
i.

There is evidence that the agreement was signed in good faith, such as a
signed agreement clause.

Amended:
3.1) The agreement is negotiated in good faith.
i.

There is evidence that the agreement was signed in good faith, such as a
signed agreement clause.

ii.

There are positive statements (e.g. in press releases, interviews, or publications) on the
partnership by community members, company representatives, or the government.

The idea here is to inform the judgement of whether the agreements were negotiated in ‘good
faith’ using publicly available statements and publications. Signed agreement clauses are
relatively common across agreements, thus it is likely not the best barometer of whether the
negotiations took place in good faith. The key consideration underpinning this criterion is
whether there is a genuine commitment to consultation and negotiation between the parties.
In the Canadian context, genuine commitment to consultation and the negotiation process
has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of Canada as requiring “good faith efforts to
understand each other’s concerns and move to address them.” 442

Reports of protests,

conflict, expressions of distrust from community members, forward looking statements by
companies and communities, and expressions of commitment are taken together to form an
impression of whether consultations were exercised in good faith. Future research should seek
to elaborate on concepts of good faith and how it may be better evaluated.

442

Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 2 SCR 511 at para 49.
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Criterion 3.5 – The agreement’s role in the project approval process is clear: The
indicator provided in the original framework considers only whether project approval is
contingent on the signing of an agreement. While this encapsulates agreements made in
jurisdictions where CDAs are mandated, there are key situations that overlooked.
Original:
3.5) The agreement’s role in the project approval process is clear
i.

Project approval is contingent on concluding a CDA with the
impacted communities.

Amended:
3.5) The agreement’s role in the project approval process is clear
i.

Project approval is contingent on concluding a CDA with the
impacted communities.

ii.

Community approval has been identified as a critical component of the project.

The need for this indicator was drawn from the Raglan Mine in Quebec, Canada. In that
instance, although the Raglan Mine is located within an area covered by the James Bar and
Northern Quebec Agreement, there was no requirement at the time for a CDA with the
affected communities in the land claim. Importantly, however, the company planned to use
Deception Bay as a port in its operations and also to use Deception Bay and adjacent waters
for intermittent shipping of supplies and mineral products. 443 At the same time, Inuit
beneficiaries under the Agreement claimed to have "rights, titles, claims and interests in the
offshore area surrounding Quebec and Labrador, which [were] ... the subject of negotiations
with the Government of Canada”.
Thus, Falconbridge, the original developer of the Raglan Mine, viewed community approval
as critical as it implicated much of their operations. Under the original framework, this nuance
443

See Raglan Agreement page 3.
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would not be captured given that Falconbridge did not need an agreement per se in order to
attain approval for the mining project.

Criterion 3.6 – The agreement does not replace the government’s role in supporting
the community : The original framework specifies that this sub-criterion is met when
government funding and services are not reduced due to the agreement. In practice, evaluating
this sub-criterion based on this one indicator is a difficult task. It is helpful, both to
communities and to an interested evaluator of an agreement, to see express statements of
assurance within the agreement. Such a provision suggests that the issue was contemplated
and discussed by the parties.
Original:
3.6) The agreement does not replace the government's role in supporting the
community.
i.

Government services and government funding for the community are not
reduced due to the CDA.

Amended:
3.6) The agreement does not replace the government's role in supporting the
community.
i.

Government services and government funding for the community are not
reduced due to the CDA.

ii.

It is explicitly stated within the agreement that the CDA is not to replace government
services, development or funding.

97

5.2.2.4

Criterion 4: Open Communication

Having an open stream of communications helps to build trust and avoid tension. The fourth
criterion is thus to engage in open communication. 444 The sub-criteria are as follows:
1. A precursor agreement is signed. 445 A precursor agreement, such as a memorandum of
understanding, can provide the community with additional time to prepare for
negotiations and guide their strategy throughout the process. 446 The precursor agreement
should ideally be a signed document that has been reviewed by the signatories, which sets
out a framework for the negotiations to unfold and the objectives of the CDA. 447
2. The CDA, and precursor agreement, monitoring results, and other relevant information are publicly
available. 448 As discussed above, confidentiality is a significant barrier when attempting to
negotiate, seek advice, evaluate, monitor, and implement the agreement. While there could
conceivably be legitimate instances in which sensitive information needs to be confidential
to avoid adverse consequences to the community, 449 there are many deleterious
consequences. These clauses can prevent signatory communities from discussing issues
with wider communities, collaborating with the media and civil society, and prevent access
to judicial and regulatory systems. 450
3. Communication between signatories continues throughout project operation. 451 A systematic,
discussion-based process is ideal here. Regularly scheduled meetings between community
members and company employees where grievances and concerns may be discussed can
help foster open communication channels. 452 The meetings and discussions should be free

Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 4.
Ibid.
446 Gibson & O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 295; NRCAN Report, supra note 430.
447 Sosa & Keenan, supra note 411; Cathleen Knotsch & Jacek Warda, “Impact Benefit Agreements: A Tool for
Healthy
Inuit
Communities?”
(March
2009),
online
(pdf):
<ruor.uottawa.ca/bitstream/10393/30211/1/2009_IBA_Summary.pdf>.
448 Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 4.
449 Craik, Gardner & McCarthy, supra note 48; Gogal, Riegert, Jamieson, supra note 406.
450 Craik, Gardner & McCarthy, supra note 48; St-Laurent & Billon, supra note 300 at 596; Szoke-Burke et al, supra
note 407; Papillon & Rodon, supra note 351.
451 Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 4.
452 Dreyer, supra note 30.
444
445
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from jargon and conducted in the local language, or the language that is most accessible
to the community. 453
4. There is continuity in who is involved with the CDA making and implementation process. 454 Continuity
in the personnel involved in the negotiation and implementation of the agreement can
minimize misunderstandings regarding the intent of the parties. 455 In addition, this
practice helps to maintain the ‘organizational memory’ of information and knowledge
created in the course of consultation, negotiation, and implementation.

Proposed Amendments
Novel Sub-Criterion 4.5 – The agreement is accessible to the local community : A trend
in the agreements analyzed was the presence of highly technical wording and jargon. The
original framework provides for little evaluation on whether the agreement is accessible and
understandable to local communities. Aside from providing the agreement in the local
language, it is important to acknowledge that development companies enter regions with
sophisticated legal teams and technical experts. To mitigate this issue, it is helpful for
agreements to have summaries or simplified versions of different provisions to have them
simplified.

CCAB Report, supra note 426; Rio Tinto, “Why Agreements Matter: A Resource Guide for Integrating
Agreements into Communities and Social Performance Work at Rio Tinto” (March 2016), online (pdf): Rio Tinto
<www.riotinto.com/documents/Rio_Tinto_Why_Agreements_Matter.pdf> [Rio Tinto Report]; NRCAN
Report, supra note 430.
454 Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 4.
455 O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 16; Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, “Implementing agreements between Indigenous
peoples and resource developers in Australia and Canada”, Aboriginal Politics and Public Sector Management Research
Paper
No
13
(13
January
2003),
online(pdf):
<metisportals.ca/MetisRights/wp/wpadmin/images/Implementing%20Agreements%20between%20Indigenous%20Peoples%20and%20Resource%
20Developers.pdf>.
453
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Novel:
4.5) The agreement is accessible to the local community.
i.

The agreement is written in a manner such that it avoids overly technical terminology or
legal jargon.

ii.

The agreement takes into account the literacy level and experience of the community in
reading contracts.

iii.

The agreement is available in the local language.

This provision is drawn from the Argyle Management Plan Agreement of the Argyle Diamond
Mines in Australia. In that agreement, each section is preceded by a summary of the provisions
detailed below it. There is an emphasis on making the agreement easily understandable to
those without a technical background.

5.2.2.5

Criterion 5: Capacity Building

Local communities may lack sufficient skills or training to participate in the negotiation
process, and may have difficulty participating in the employment and business opportunities
opened up by the agreement. 456 As discussed at length above, the resources and capacity in
negotiations are often unequally distributed between companies and communities. This
criterion is focused on building the capacity of the community to allow for meaningful
participation and effective negotiation in the process. 457
1. Each party’s capacity is assessed. 458 A comprehensive assessment of community capacity
should be done. This assessment should address the deficiencies and understand the time
Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 4; See also Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, A New Approach to
Policy Evaluation: Mining and Indigenous People (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate, 2002); O’Faircheallaigh, supra
note 16.
457 Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 4.
458 Ibid; See Dreyer, supra note 30; Craik, Gardner & McCarthy, supra note 48; Gogal, Riegert, Jamieson, supra
note 406; see also Loutit et al, supra note 15.
456
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and resources that will be required to foster effective participation prior to the
commencement of negotiations.
2. Capacity building initiatives exist and are funded. 459 Whether the funding comes from the
investing company or the government, it should be sufficient to address capacity restraints,
job training, community governance, and local business development. 460
3. There is a dedicated person in charge of employment and training of the local community. 461
4. Capacity building provisions should be locally available. 462 The capacity building programs should
be delivered at the location of the community to improve access and the participation rate
for community residents.

Proposed Amendments
Novel Sub-Criterion 5.5) The agreement promotes equal opportunities and capacity
building for vulnerable groups : While the original framework assesses the inclusion of
vulnerable groups in the negotiation process, it does not provide express consideration for
such groups regarding employment, training and other capacity building initiatives. Thus, a
new sub-criterion was created.
Novel:
5.5) The agreement promotes equal opportunities and capacity building for vulnerable groups.
i.

There are provisions that encourage the recruitment, employment, training, and
education of women and other vulnerable groups, including the youth and elderly.

Novel Sub-Criterion 5.6 – Physical and psychological well-being are prioritized : There
is a growing body of evidence suggesting that natural resource development projects may
Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 4
See Dreyer, supra note 30; Craik, Gardner & McCarthy, supra note 48; Siebenmorgan & Bradshaw, supra note
420; Kennett, supra note 416; Knotsch & Warda, supra note 447.
461 Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 4; Kennett, supra note 416; Knotsch & Warda, supra note
447.
462 Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 4; Siebenmorgan & Bradshaw, supra note 420.
459Cascadden,
460
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result in adverse social, economic, and cultural impacts which in turn has cumulative impacts
on the health and well-being of individuals and communities. 463 Impacted communities are
often already vulnerable and may experience the deleterious effects of resource extraction for
generations. 464 There are a host of factors associated with working in the mining industry that
may impact the mental health and wellbeing of community members and employees including:
working long hours, performing tasks that are both physically demanding and repetitive,
working considerable distances from home, and displacement from familial social support
networks. 465 Most mines are located in rural or remote areas, where the availability of local
professional support services is limited. 466In addition, mining affects the strong cultural ties
held by communities and can contribute to a loss of culture and identify 467 – factors which
are closely linked to negative mental health outcomes. 468
The original framework does not assess whether the CDA in question considers and provides
for physical and mental health care. As such, sub-criterion 5.6 is proposed.

Melissa Aalhus, Barb Oke & Raina Fumerton, “The social determinants of health impacts of resource
extraction and development in rural and northern communities: A summary of impacts and promising practices
for
assessment
and
monitoring”
(January
2018),
online
(pdf):
Northern
Health
<www.northernhealth.ca/sites/northern_health/files/services/office-health-resourcedevelopment/documents/impacts-promising-practices-assessment-monitoring.pdf> at iv; Mindy Thompson
Fullilove, "Psychiatric implications of displacement: Contributions from the psychology of place"(1996) (153):12
American J of Psychiatry.
464 Jameson K Hirsch et al, “Psychosocial Impact of Fracking: a Review of the Literature on the Mental Health
Consequences of Hydraulic Fracturing” (2018) 16:1 Int J Ment Health Addiction 1 at 2.
465 Ross J Tynan et al, “Feasibility and acceptability of strategies to address mental health and mental ill-health in
the Australian coal mining industry” (2018) 12:1 Intl J Mental Health Systems 66 at 2.
466 J S Humphreys, S Mathews-Cowey & H C Weinand, “Factors in accessibility of general practice in rural
Australia” (1997) 166:11 Med J Aust 577–580.
467 Marina Wetzlmaier, “Cultural Impacts of Mining in Indigenous Peoples’ Ancestral Domains in the
Philippines” (2012) 5:2 Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies 335; Theodore Downing et al, "Indigenous
peoples and mining encounters: Strategies and tactics" Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development, Report 57 (2002),
online
(pdf):
International
Institute
for
Environment
and
Development
<pubs.iied.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/migrate/G00548.pdf>.
468Ashlea Williams, Terryann Clark & Sonia Lewycka, "The associations between cultural identity and mental
health outcomes for indigenous Māori youth in New Zealand" (2018) 6:319 Frontiers in public health; Stephane
M Shepherd et al, “The impact of indigenous cultural identity and cultural engagement on violent offending”
(2017) 18:1 BMC Public Health 50.
463

102

Novel:
5.6) Physical and psychological well-being are prioritized
i.

There is monitoring and mitigation of health impacts, including the psychological
impacts stemming from the project, lifestyle adjustments, and interference with cultural
and traditional practices.

ii.

5.2.2.6

Cultural practices are safeguarded and encouraged.

Criterion 6: Equity

The sixth criterion is to achieve an equitable distribution of the benefits and costs. 469 The subcriteria are as follows:
1. No community member is worse off as a result of the project, considering mitigation and compensation. 470
The project benefits should be dispersed among community members and mitigation
measures should be implemented to ensure that no community member bears a negative
personal or social cost as a result of the project. 471 For example, if a community member
is no longer able to engage in a traditional activity, the company should work to find a way
to mitigate and compensate the community member to their satisfaction for the loss that
has been experienced.
2. Financial benefits are scaled to the total project benefits. 472 The financial benefits that are to be
distributed to the community should be measured as a percentage of the total project
benefits so that the community is aware of the proportional distribution and can assess
whether the financial benefits are equitable. 473

Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 5.
Ibid.
471 Prno, Bradshaw & Lapierre, supra note 35.
472Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 5.; Prno, Bradshaw & Lapierre, supra note 35.
473 Cameron Gunton et al, “Impact Benefit Agreement Guidebook. Resource and Environmental Management”
(March 2020), online(pdf): Simon Fraser University <rem-main.rem.sfu.ca/planning/IBA/IBA_Guidebook_224.pdf>; Craik, Gardner & McCarthy, supra note 48.
469
470
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3. Financial benefits are delivered to suit community needs. 474 The benefits that are distributed should
be simple to administer, flexible, tailored to the local context, and public reported to the
community. 475
4. Contracts are designed for and favor local businesses. 476 Contracting with local businesses supports
community economic development, fosters autonomy, and helps to build capacity. By
favoring local businesses, communities are able to inject greater financial benefits into their
local economy. Companies should agree to measurable targets of the contracts or dollars
to be spent on procuring services and products from local companies, including a
preferential treatment for local companies in the bidding process.
5. Community members are preferentially hired. 477 In addition to a preferential hiring process,
companies should help create opportunities for community members to advance into
higher skilled positions. 478 Career development and retention of community employees is
also important. 479 As with local businesses, measurable targets for community hires are
key for effective implementation of this sub-criterion.

Proposed Modification:
Sub-criterion 6.5 – Community members are preferentially hired : An indicator of this
sub-criterion, as per the original framework, states that “[t]here are provisions with measurable
targets and milestones that require hiring community members.” I propose to break this
indicator down into two separate ones, such that agreements that have preferential hiring
provisions but do not have measurable targets are still assigned some value. In addition,
community members with criminal records may face significant hurdles for finding
employment in the resource development context. Overcoming criminal barriers to

Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 5.
Ibid; Loutit et al, supra note 15.
476 Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 5; Kennett, supra note 416.
477 Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 5.
478 Kennett, supra note 416.
479 Fidler & Hitch, supra note 47.
474
475
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employment can create better futures for community members. 480 Additionally, CDAs are
mostly signed with communities whose rights have been legally recognized, meaning that
employment and capacity benefits are, at least in some instances, available only to those with
legally recognized status. 481 The new proposed indicators attempt to accommodate these
factors.

480 Aboriginal Mining Education Forum, “Forging Stronger Pathways to Education and Employment: A Report
of Proceedings” (February 2013), online (pdf): Mining Industry Human Resources Council <mihr.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/Forging-Stronger-pathways.pdf>; See e.g. Avery Zingel, “Criminal records a barrier
to employment in N.W.T., says MLA”, CBC News (28 February 2021), online: CBC
<www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/criminal-records-employment-nwt-1.5928795>; Levon Sevunts, “Social ills
keep many on the sidelines of NWT’s diamond boom”, Eye On The Arctic (29 August 2012), online:
<www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2012/08/29/social-ills-keep-many-on-the-sidelines-of-nwts-diamondboom>.
481 Joanie Caron, Hugo Asselin & Jean-Michel Beaudoin, “Indigenous employees’ perceptions of the strategies
used by mining employers to promote their recruitment, integration and retention” (2020) 68 Resources Policy
101793; David Martin, David Trigger & Joni Parmenterm “Mining in Aboriginal Australia: economic impacts,
sustainable livelihoods and cultural difference at Century Mine, northwest Queensland” in Emma Gilberthorpe
& Gavin Hilson, eds, Natural Resource Extraction and Indigenous Livelihoods: Development Challenges in an Era of
Globalization (New York: Routledge, 2014) at 37.
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Original:
6.5) Community members are preferentially hired.
i.

There are provisions with measurable targets and milestones that require
hiring community members.

ii.

There are provisions with measurable targets and milestones that support
advancement of community members into higher skilled and higher
paying positions.

iii.

There are provisions with measurable targets and milestones that support
retention of community members in the project workforce.

Modified:
6.5) Community members are preferentially hired.
i.

There are provisions that prescribe the preferential hiring of community members.

ii.

Legal registration and previously legal offences are not significant barriers for
employment opportunities.

iii.

There are provisions with measurable targets and milestones that require
hiring community members.

iv.

There are provisions with measurable targets and milestones that support
advancement of community members into higher skilled and higher
paying positions.

v.

There are provisions with measurable targets and milestones that support
retention of community members in the project workforce.

5.2.2.7

Criterion 7: Enforceability

This criterion assesses the level of certainty with which one can expect that the objectives and
obligations under the agreement will be met. 482 Uncertainties regarding the enforceability of a

482

Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 5.
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CDA can have a detrimental effect on community perception of the agreement, and can hinder
the CDA’s potential to successful share benefits and mitigate costs. 483 The sub-criterion are
as follows:
1. The CDA includes a dispute resolution mechanism. 484 The CDA should outline a formal,
culturally appropriate and co-managed dispute resolution process that can deal with issues
and conflicts that may arise over the course of the agreement. 485 Cascadden et al prescribe
a “mutually agreed upon arbitration process, aimed at resolving disputes in cases where
the…parties cannot agree without mediation.” 486
2. The CDA is a legally binding document. 487A legally binding CDA adds legitimacy, and helps to
ensure that the provisions are implemented, or that contractual remedies can be pursued
if they are not. 488
3. The CDA is jointly governed with a clearly outlined framework. 489 A formal governance structure
that is responsible for managing, enforcing and implementing the CDA can promote
transparency, accountability, and successful implementation. 490 It is important that the
governance structure is comprised of both community and project representatives so that
it reflects the spirit of negotiation and compromise that marks the agreement. 491
4. The CDA’s provisions have measurable targets. 492 The objectives outlined in the agreement
should have measurable targets and timelines. Specificity to the provisions and promises

St-Laurent & Billon, supra note 300.
Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 5.
485 Fidler & Hitch, supra note 47; Kennett, supra note 416; Siebenmorgan & Bradshaw, supra note 420; Sosa &
Keenan, supra note 411; Rio Tinto Report, supra note 453; O’Reilly & Eacott, supra note 417.
486 Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 5.
487 Ibid.
488 O’Reilly & Eacott, supra note 417; Oxfam IBIS, supra note 409; Szoke-Burke et al, supra note 407.
489 Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 5.
490 Indigenous Support Services and ACIL Consulting, Agreements between Mining Companies and Indigenous
Communities (Prahan, Victoria: Australian Minerals & Energy Environment Foundation, 2012); Sarkar et al, supra
note 305.
491 Brereton, supra note 61.
492 Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 5.
483
484
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that are made is essential for enforcement as they provide clarity on the obligations of the
parties. 493
5. There are penalties for non-compliance with the CDA. 494 Again, like the sub-criterion above, this
helps to maintain accountability for all signatories involved. 495

Proposed Modifications
Sub-Criterion 7.2 – The agreement is a legally binding document: Several indicators are
proposed for this sub-criterion. The focus here is to elaborate on the original indicators to
give greater nuance to the analysis. Clearly, given that CDAs are negotiated and signed across
a variety of jurisdictions, it cannot be easily ascertained whether an agreement is “legally
binding” in a given jurisdiction. Adding to this, to date there is a scarcity of litigation and legal
writing relating to CDAs and other benefit agreements. I propose that this sub-criterion is
better framed as whether the parties intend for the agreement to be legally binding. The
proposed indicators evaluate whether the agreement has been drafted with a sufficient degree
of specificity to give a legal nature. Namely, it is important for the provisions in a given
agreement to avoid the use of vague “best efforts” language that is highly discretionary in
nature. 496 Explicit statements on legal rights and the legal nature of the document help indicate
the intention of the parties for the agreement to be legally binding. The following amendments
are suggested:

Sarkar et al, supra note 305.; Fidler & Hitch, supra note 47; Knotsch & Warda, supra note 447.
Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 5.
495 Gibson & O'Faircheallaigh, supra note 295; Loutit et al, supra note 15; O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 16.
496 Dayna Nadine Scott, “Extraction Contracting: The Struggle for Control of Indigenous Lands” (2020) 119:2
South Atlantic Q 269.
493
494
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Original:
7.2) The agreement is a legally binding document.
i.

All provisions are written such that they are legally enforceable

ii.

The agreement has been reviewed by legal experts representing the
community.

Modified:
7.2) The agreement is intended to be legally binding
i.

The agreement avoids the use of vague language that is difficult to enforce (i.e. a reliance
on “best efforts” or “reasonable measures”).

ii.

All provisions are written such that they are legally enforceable, meaning
that they are specific.

iii.

The agreement has been reviewed by legal experts representing the
community.

iv.

Legal action is expressly stated as an avenue available to the signatories in the event of
a breach.

v.

There is a choice of law and forum clause.

vi.

The agreement explicitly states that it is a legal document.

Sub-Criterion 7.5 – There are penalties for non-compliance with the agreement: The
original indicator for this sub-criterion overlooks the high variability in penalty provisions
across different agreements. In particular, this indicator does not consider whether there are
penalties for non-compliance that apply to all signatory parties. For example, the CDA for the
Khushuut Coal Mine in Mongolia outlines penalties for non-compliance but only for noncompliance by community members. In other words, the local community faces clear financial

109

ramifications if they violate any aspect of the agreement, however the consequences that the
company may face for non-compliance are not clear. Article 14.13 for instance states:
“…The Company is also entitled with the right to demand from Khovd
aimag the reimbursement of all financing allocated under this Agreement
if the Project operation in 2014 and 2015 was interrupted or illegally
stopped for over 30 days in total in respective years...” 497
This is just one example of a strong penalty that the community faces for non-compliance.
There are no penalties outlined for the company in the event of non-compliance. Under the
original framework, there is uncertainty as to how this would be evaluated given that there are
penalties for non-compliance, albeit not applying to all signatories. Thus the proposed
amendments are as follows:
Original:
7.5) There are penalties for non-compliance with the agreement.
i.

There are penalties for non-compliance with the agreement.

Modified:
7.5) There are penalties for non-compliance with the agreement.
i.

There are penalties for non-compliance with the agreement, including fines,
disciplinary measures, and mitigative actions.

ii.

5.2.2.8

The company and community are both subject to penalties.

Criterion 8: Effective Implementation

Equally important as the negotiation and content of the CDA is its implementation. Effective
implementation is marked by the following sub-criteria:

497

See MoEnCo Khovd Aimag Agreement.
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1. Each provision is included in an implementation plan. 498 Each provision should have a plan that
outlines the process, obligations, timelines, and milestones. 499
2. There is funding for IBA implementation. 500 The funding should be sufficient to cover the
implementation of the different provisions, including the costs associated with external
consultation, the hiring process, infrastructural requirements and so on. 501
3. There is an overseer of IBA implementation. 502 As found by O’Faircheallaigh, agreements have
failed because there was no overarching body or governance structure to oversee the
implementation of the agreement. 503
4. The implementation process is collaboratively designed. 504 The company and the community should
collaborate to design the implementation process of the agreement. 505 The emphasis here
is on levelling the power dynamic, making the signatory communities partners rather than
simply beneficiaries.

Proposed Modifications
Sub-Criterion 8.2 – There is funding for agreement implementation : In addition to
providing sufficient funding for the implementation of the agreement, it is important for the
process of payment to be clearly outlined, in terms of who/what the payments will be made
to, who will have access to the payments and funds, and supervision of the payments and fund
withdrawals. Provisions help facilitate the establishment of strong local institutions that can

Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 5.
Gibson & O'Faircheallaigh, supra note 295; Browne & Robertson, supra note 295; O’Faircheallaigh, supra note
16.
500 Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 5.
501 Gibson & O'Faircheallaigh, supra note 295; Sarkar et al, supra note 305.
502 Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 5.5; St-Laurent & Billon, supra note 300 at 596;
O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 455.
503 O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 455.
504 Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 5.
505 Fidler, supra note 406; Gibson & O'Faircheallaigh, supra note 295; Knotsch & Warda, supra note 447; ICMM,
supra note 114.
498
499
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prevent corruption and elite capture in the collection, transfer and use of funds. 506 The new
proposed indicator for this sub-criterion aims to consider the transparency of communitybased natural resource payments and funds, by evaluating whether a clear process and rules
have been established for payments and fund allocation.
Original:
8.2) There is funding for agreement implementation.
i.

There is sufficient funding to implement employment, business
contracting, environment and culture protection, financial, training and
education, community development, and closure and reclamation
provisions

Modified:
8.2) There is funding for agreement implementation.
i.

There is sufficient funding to implement employment, business
contracting, environment and culture protection, financial, training and
education, community development, and closure and reclamation
provisions.

ii.

The process of payment is clearly outlined, in terms of when payments will be made and
who will have access and supervision of the payments.

5.2.2.9

Criterion 9: Monitoring and Adaptability

In order to ensure that the project is progressing smoothly and that all signatories are fulfilling
their responsibilities, there must be proper monitoring of the agreement. The CDA and its
implementation must be monitored and adapted to address deficiencies in achieving CDA

Dupuy, supra note 77 at 121; See Weinthal & Luong, supra note 386; Michael Ross, “How Mineral-Rich States
Can Reduce Inequality” in Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey Sachs, & Joseph Stiglitz, eds, Escaping the Resource Curse,
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007) 237.
506
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objectives and to address the new risks and adverse impacts that may be developing. 507
Effective monitoring is marked by the following sub-criteria:
1. Progress towards CDA objectives and project impacts are periodically monitored. 508 The monitoring
should be a transparent process with appropriate metrics that is conducted on regularly
scheduled basis, the results of which are publicly available. 509
2. The community and the company jointly monitor the CDA. 510 The company should provide for
capacity building in relation to the ongoing monitoring of the agreement, agreeing to their
participation in the relevant monitoring tasks and processes. 511
3. A baseline assessment of the environmental, cultural, and socioeconomic conditions of the community is
conducted. 512 This assessment should be jointly conducted. Local communities and
Indigenous peoples often have long-standing ties to the land which provides key insight
into impact assessment and baseline studies. Community members can contribute
traditional knowledge and understanding of ecosystems, social issues, and may identify
and communicate culturally significant concepts and locations. 513
4. There is funding for monitoring. 514
5. CDA deficiencies that have been identified in monitoring are mitigated. 515
6. There is a process for amending the agreement. 516 The process for amending the agreement should
be straightforward and predictable. Research indicates that an inability to revise

Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 5.
Ibid.
509 Browne & Robertson, supra note 295; Loutit et al, supra note 15; Rio Tinto Report, supra note 453; SzokeBurke et al, supra note 407; Sarkar et al, supra note 305.
510 Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 5.
511 Browne & Robertson, supra note 295; Dreyer, supra note 30; Loutit et al, supra note 15; Rio Tinto Report, supra
note 453; Szoke-Burke et al, supra note 407; Sarkar et al, supra note 305.
512 Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 6.
513 Ibid; Szoke-Burke et al, supra note 407; Dreyer, supra note 30; Siebenmorgan, & Bradshaw, supra note 420.
514 Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 6.; Sosa & Keenan, supra note 407; Rio Tinto Report, supra
note 453.
515 Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 6; Sarkar et al, supra note 305; Browne & Robertson, supra
note 295.
516 Ibid.
507
508
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agreements after signing can lead to failure. 517 Circumstances and goals are sure to change
during the life of a project, which can span decades. Recognition of this fact and making
the agreement a ‘living document’ can facilitate better outcomes.

Proposed Modifications
Sub-Criterion 9.6 – There is a process for amending the agreement: With similar
justification as the proposed indicators above, I propose an additional indicator that adds more
nuance to the evaluation of this sub-criterion. A number of agreements analysed contain
provisions that allude to amendment or renegotiation. However, these provisions are not all
written to be equal – some are much more descriptive than others. Consider the amendment
provisions of the following two agreements:

Table 1. Comparison of Amendment Provisions
CDA of Fiskenaesset Ruby Project, Greenland

CDA of Porgera Gold Mine, Papua New
Guinea

Section 7 – Amendment of Agreement
7.1) This agreement may be amended by written agreement of all
Parties.
7.2) This agreement shall be amended, when it is necessary due to
substantially changed circumstances, amended or new agreements
regarding use of Greenland Workers or Greenland Enterprises,
including conclusion of construction agreements with Greenland
Enterprises, or if it is necessary to meet requirements under the
Mineral Resources Act, the Licence, or other rules of law, licence
terms or provisions from time to time in force in Greenland.
7.3) An amendment of this agreement shall be set out in an
addendum to this agreement. If major amendments are agreed, a
new version of the agreement shall be made by the Parties.
8 – Amendment of Appendices
8.1) The Appendices may be amended by written agreement of all
Parties.
8.2) The Appendices shall be amended, when it is necessary due
to changed circumstances, amended or new agreements regarding
use of Greenland Workers or Greenland Enterprises and
conclusion of construction agreements with Greenland
Enterprises, or if it is necessary to meet requirements under the
Mineral Resources Act, the Licence or other rules of law, licence
terms or provisions from time to time in force in Greenland.
8.3) Before the first of March each year the Parties shall discuss
the application and effect of all the Appendices in the previous
517

Prno, Bradshaw & Lapierre, supra note 35.

Section 27 – Variation: The parties may from time to time by
Agreement in writing vary any of the provisions in this
Agreement.
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year and agree the contents of draft appendices for the following
year and subsequent years.
8.4) The Greenland Authorities shall submit the draft appendices
mentioned in clause 8.3 for consultation. The consultation
procedure shall include local public authorities, Greenland
employers' organisations and workers' organisations as well as
local Greenland associations and organisations, whose articles of
association aim to promote important interests in connection
with social sustainability or environmental protection. In
connection with the consultation, the consulted parties shall be
given information, that can form the basis for comments on
aspects in this agreement. that have particular significance for
Greenland Enterprises, Greenland Workers or in relation to the
social or environmental impacts of the activities under the
Licence.
8.5) No later than May each year, the Parties shall agree on and
sign all the appendices for the following and subsequent years.
9 – Principles for Amendments of Plans under this
Agreement
9.1) Amendments of Plans under this Agreement
9.1.1) The Plans to be made by the Licensee under this
agreement, which are the Benefit and Impact Plan, the
Monitoring Plan and the Evaluation Plan, shall be kept updated in
relation to changed circumstances and developments. The
Licensee shall amend a Plan under this agreement, when this is
required. It may for example be required in connection with an
amendment of a mineral exploitation plan or closure plan, or with
a development in mineral exploitation activities, in society or in
socio-economic or other matters comprised by this agreement
and its objective. The Licensee shall submit an amended Plan as
soon as reasonably possible and no later than 28 days after the
occurrence of the changed circumstance or development. An
amendment of a Plan under this agreement shall be approved by
the Greenland Authorities.
9.1.2) The Licensee shall as far as possible plan and implement
changes regarding activities and Plans under this agreement in
accordance with the provisions and objectives of this agreement,
which would apply to corresponding initial activities and Plans
under this agreement.

It is clear that these agreements differ dramatically in their process for amendment. A new
sub-indicator is proposed to help account for this:
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Original:
9.6) There is a process for amending the agreement.
i.

There is a process by which the parties can re-open the agreement for
negotiation.

Modified:
9.6) There is a process for amending the agreement.
i.

There is a process by which the parties can re-open the agreement for
negotiation.

ii.

The process is descriptive and accessible to community members.

Novel Sub-Indicator 9.7 – There is a transitional plan outlined in the event of a change
in ownership : Mining projects typically go through several phases including exploration,
development, extraction, rehabilitation and post-closure. Importantly, the ownership of the
respective rights granted during the different phases may change. 518 In the event of a change
of ownership, sometimes spurred by insolvency issues or the competitive acquisition by other
development companies, it is important that the CDA stipulates the rights that will be
honoured by the successor company. 519 Doing so ensures continuity to the agreement and
may help provide certainty for communities who have already signed a CDA with a particular
company.
Novel:
9.7) There is a transitional plan outlined in the event of a change in ownership.
i.

The rights and obligations of the signatories are outlined in the event of a change in
ownership.

518 James M, Otto, “How Do We Legislate for Improved Community Development?” in Tony Addison & Alan
Roe, eds, Extractive industries: the management of resources as a driver of sustainable development UNU-WIDER studies in
development economics, first edition ed (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2018) at 690.
519 Ibid.
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5.2.2.10

Criterion 10: Breadth

The CDA should be sufficiently broad to cover the full range of the project’s impacts and to
encompass all phases of the project. 520 The sub-criteria are as follows:
1. The CDA addresses all project phases: construction, operation, and closure and reclamation. 521 Mining
projects have a limited lifespan, making it imperative to ensure that there are ongoing
benefits after the closure of the project to ensure long-term benefits to the community.
2. The CDA contains the breadth of necessary provisions. 522 This includes provisions for financial
benefit distribution, employment, training, contracting, environmental protection, and
protection of culture and sacred cultural sites. Mitigation provisions should also be
included for all potential adverse effects. 523

5.2.3

Scoring of the Cascadden-Gunton-Rutherford model

The evaluation prescribed by Cascadden et al includes a verbal assessment for each subcriterion and a final rating using a four-point scale. 524 The rating system is based on a scoring
methodology developed at Simon Fraser University by the Sustainable Planning Research
Group. 525 Regardless of whether the sub-criterion is a dichotomous, quantitative, or qualitative
factor, the evaluation of it is based on the following scale:
 Not met = two or more major deficiencies.
 Partially met = no more than one major deficiency.
Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 6.
Ibid; Kennett, supra note 416; Resolve Report, supra note 432.; Szoke-Burke et al, supra note 407
522 Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 6.
523 Ibid; Dreyer, supra note 30; Gogal, Riegert & Jamieson, supra note 406; ICMM, supra note 114; Knotsch &
Warda, supra note 447; Loutit et al, supra note 15; Prno, Bradshaw & Lapierre, supra note 35.; Siebenmorgan, &
Bradshaw, supra note 420.
524 Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 9.
525 Meghan Ellis, Thomas Gunton & Murray Rutherford, “A methodology for evaluating environmental planning
systems: a case study of Canada” (2010) 91:6 J Environmental Management 1268 at 1270.
520
521
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 Largely met = no major deficiencies.
 Fully met = no deficiencies.
Following the evaluation of the sub-criterion according to the scale above, the final step is to
calculate an aggregate score for the criterion in question. After finding the performance rating
for each criterion, they are summed to calculate an overall score. The points are assigned as
follows:
Verbal Assessment

Deficiencies

Points

Not met

Two or more major deficiencies.

0

Weak

No more than one major deficiency

1

Strong

No major deficiencies.

2

Fully Met

No deficiencies.

3

Thus far I have discussed the original framework and my proposed amendments. The next
section will introduce the modified Cascadden-Gunton-Rutherford framework, the modified
rating system, and will then apply them to a series of cases.

5.3
The Current Research – A Global Study of Existing
CDAs
5.3.1

Introduction

The Cascadden-Gunton-Rutherford framework provides a comprehensive tool that assists in
developing, managing, and evaluating CDAs. The validity of the framework, as outlined above,
is supported by the existing literature and shared consensus of CDA best practices on which
the framework is based. Despite this, however, Cascadden et al caution that the best practices
that have been derived from the literature review have not all been rigorously tested to
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determine their impact on outcomes. 526 In particular, Cascadden et al identify two areas that
warrant further investigation and refinement:
1) The evaluation framework should be subjected to ongoing case study testing to
confirm its effectiveness on evaluating best-practices criteria. 527
2) Ongoing research is required to “refine definitions and test sub-criteria and indicators
where necessary to make the framework easier to apply.” 528
Thus, part of the current work involves building on the Cascadden-Gunton-Rutherford
framework with the aim of increasing precision and clarity of the indicators and the rating
system itself.
In the sections that follow, I engage in an analysis of publicly available CDAs from a range of
jurisdictions with the intention of applying a modified version of the Cascadden-GuntonRutherford framework. This dataset represents a new and novel contribution to the existing
empirical evidence regarding the provisions and negotiation outcomes of CDAs, and remains
the only dataset to analyze whole CDAs across multiple countries. After scoring them, an
analysis of the data is done to identify whether any statistically significant relationships or
differences exist across a series of variables.

Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 8.
Ibid.
528 Ibid.
526
527
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5.3.2

Modified Cascadden-Gunton-Rutherford Model – A Sharpening of
the Blade

In modifying the original Cascadden-Gunton-Rutherford framework, the aim was not to
develop a new analytical tool, but rather to refine and sharpen the existing one. Keeping to
spirit of the original framework, new sub-criterion and indicators are proposed that provide
nuance to the original criteria. The newly introduced sub-criterion and indicators are drawn
from literature and leading provisions 529 in the analyzed CDAs. Table 2 outlines the modified
framework, adding emphasis to the new sub-criterion and indicators that have been adopted.
Table 2. Modified Cascadden-Gunton-Rutherford Framework
Criteria
1. Empowering

2. Respects
Local Culture

Sub-Criteria
1.1 Every affected community
is a participant in the
agreement making process

Indicator
i. All communities with legal rights impacted by
the project are consulted.
ii. All communities with unrecognized legal
rights impacted by the project site are
consulted.
iii. All communities who may experience
downstream effects of the project are consulted.

1.2 Vulnerable and
marginalized groups are
included in the agreement
making process

i. Women, youth, or elder groups impacted by
the project are consulted in the CDA-making
process.
ii. The agreement community negotiation team
includes representatives from marginalized
interests.

1.3 Community sovereignty is
maintained

i. The community retains all of its rights, such
as governance, access to land and resources,
participation in regulatory processes, and land
monitoring powers, in the agreement.

1.4 Agreement funds are
managed by the recipient
community

i. All funds paid to the community under the
agreement are managed by the recipient
community.

1.5 The community has its
own goals and development
plan, which the project is only
a part of

i. The impacted community has its own longterm development plan for the area.
ii. The development plan was prepared prior to
commencement of agreement negotiations and
the negotiations are guided by the community
objectives in the development plan.

2.1 Project employees take
part in cross-cultural training

i. There is cross-cultural training available to
project employees.
ii. Cross cultural training is mandatory for all
employees.

Rating

Recommendations

“Leading provision” in this context refers to a stand-out provision in a given CDA that was not covered in
any of the analyzed agreements.
529
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3. Affirmation

4. Open
Communication

2.2 Traditional or community
knowledge is included in the
project design and
management

i. Traditional knowledge is collected or known
by the project designers.
ii. Traditional knowledge is used to design the
project.

2.3 Employment schedules
accommodate community
members' cultural needs

Employee work schedules are designed to
suit cultural needs including:
i. Traditional holidays and celebrations.
ii. Traditional practices, such as fishing,
harvesting, and hunting.

3.1 The agreement is
negotiated in good faith

i. There is evidence that the agreement was
signed in good faith, such as a signed agreement
clause.
ii. There are positive statements on the
partnership by community members,
company representatives, or government.

3.2 The community-company
relationship is trusting and
maintained

i. The community and company see each other
as trustworthy
ii. There are regularly scheduled face-to-face
interactions between company employees and
community members.

3.3 The agreement is seems as
legitimate by the community

i. The negotiator or negotiation team
representing the community is accountable to
and approved by the community.
ii. The agreement is formally approved by the
community by a community vote.

3.4 The company is
committed to the agreement's
success

i. Employees, including upper-level
management, formally affirm commitment to
the CDA, either by signing the CDA or by a
formal declaration of support for the
agreement.

3.5 The agreement’s role in
the project approval process is
clear

i. Project approval is contingent on concluding
an CDA with the impacted communities.
ii. Community approval is identified as a
critical component of the project.

3.6 The agreement does not
replace the government's role
in supporting the community

i. Government services and government
funding for the community are not reduced due
to the agreement.
ii. It is explicitly stated within the
agreement that the CDA is not to replace
government services, development or
funding.

4.1 A precursor agreement is
signed (e.g. a memorandum of
understanding)

i. There is a signed, public precursor agreement
that provides a framework for agreement
negotiations.
ii. The precursor agreement outlines the
objectives and process of negotiating an
agreement.

4.2 the CDA, any precursor
agreement, monitoring results,
and other CDA relevant
information are publicly
available

i. The CDA precursor agreement is publicly
available.
ii. The CDA is publicly available.
iii. The CDA’s monitoring results are publicly
reported on a regular basis.
iv. The CDA and monitoring results are
available in the local language(s).

4.3 Communication between
signatories continues to
throughout project operation

i. There are regularly scheduled meetings that
community members and company employees
can attend to discuss CDA performance and
project management issues.
ii. Community members and company
employees are able to discuss all matters and
grievances at these meetings.
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iii. If needed or requested communication is
done in the locally spoken language(s).

5. Capacity
Building

6. Equity

4.4 There is continuity in who
is involved with the CDA
making and implementation
process

i. There is staff continuity throughout CDA
negotiation and CDA implementation.
ii. New staff are required to complete an CDA
orientation program comanaged by the
community and company.

4.6 The agreement is
accessible to the local
community

i. The agreement is written in a manner
such that it avoids overly technical
terminology or legal jargon.
ii. The agreement takes into account the
literacy level and experience of the
community in reading contracts.
iii. The agreement is available in the local
language.

5.1 Each party's capacity is
assessed

i. The capacity of the community to participate
in CDA negotiations and manage the CDA is
assessed by the community and any capacity
constraints are identified.
ii. Parties have sufficient time to fully prepare
for negotiations.
iii. The signatories develop a plan to address all
identified capacity constraints prior to
commencement of CDA negotiations.

5.2 Capacity building
initiatives exist and are funded

i. There is sufficient funding and resources to
address community capacity restraints.
ii. Sufficient resources are provided for job
training.
iii. Sufficient resources are provided to develop
community governance capacity necessary for
management of the agreement.
iv. Sufficient resources are provided for local
business development.

5.3 There is a dedicated
person in charge of
employment and training of
the local community

i. There is a dedicated person accountable to the
community in charge of employment and
training of local community members.

5.4 Capacity building
provisions should be locally
available

i. There are job training and capacity building
initiatives provided within the community

5.5 The agreement
promotes equal
opportunities and capacity
building for vulnerable
groups

i. There are provisions that encourage the
recruitment, employment, training, and
education of women and other vulnerable
groups, including the youth and elderly.

5.6 Physical and
psychological well-being is
treated as a priority

i. There is monitoring and mitigation of
health impacts, including the psychological
impacts stemming from the project, lifestyle
adjustments, and interference with cultural
and traditional practices.
ii. Cultural practices are safeguarded and
encouraged.

6.1 No community member is
worse off as a result of the
project, considering mitigation
and compensation

i. There are provisions to ensure that any
member of the community adversely impacted
by the project is fully compensated for adverse
effect

6.2 Financial benefits are
scaled to the total project
benefits

i. The financial benefits for the community are
assessed as a proportion of total financial
project benefits, defined in terms of gross
project revenue and net project value
ii. Financial benefit payments to the community
are based on overall project profitability
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6.3 Financial benefits are
delivered to suit community
needs

i. The financial payment benefit formulas are
consistent with community objectives for a
stable and predictable flow of payments.

6.4 Contracts are designed for
and favour local businesses

i. Local businesses have an advantage in the
contract bidding processes.
ii. Contracts are unbundled to allow for small
local business participation.
iii. There are measurable targets for contracting
with local business.

6.5 Community members are
preferentially hired

i. There are provisions that prescribe the
preferential hiring of community members.
ii. Legal registration and previously legal
offences are not significant barriers for
employment opportunities.
iii. There are provisions with measurable targets
and milestones that require hiring community
members.
iv. There are provisions with measurable targets
and milestones that support advancement of
community members into higher skilled and
higher paying positions.
v. There are provisions with measurable targets
and milestones that support retention of
community members in the project workforce.

7. Enforceability

7.1 The CDA includes a
dispute resolution mechanism

i. There is a provision for dispute resolution in
the agreement.
ii. Dispute resolution is co-managed by the
community and project representatives.
iii. The dispute resolution process provides for a
mutually agreed on arbitration process to
resolve the dispute if agreement parties cannot
agree on a resolution.

7.2 The CDA is a legally
binding document

i. The CDA avoids the use of vague
language that is difficult to enforce (i.e. a
reliance on “best efforts” or “reasonable
measures”).
ii. All provisions are written such that they are
legally enforceable, meaning that they are
specific.
iii. The CDA has been reviewed by legal experts
representing the community.
iv. Legal action is expressly stated as an
avenue available to the signatories in the
event of a breach.
v. There is a choice of law and forum
clause.
vi. The agreement explicitly states that it is
a legal document.

7.3 The CDA is jointly
governed with a clearly
outlined framework

i. There is a clear CDA governance structure
that outlines who is responsible for managing
each component of the CDA.
ii. The CDA is jointly governed by community
and project representatives.

7.4 The CDA’s provisions
have measurable targets
7.5 There are penalties for
non-compliance with the
CDA

i. The CDA provisions have measurable targets
and milestones.
i. There are penalties for non-compliance with
the CDA, including fines, disciplinary
measures, and mitigative actions.
ii. The company and community are both
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subject to penalties.
8. Effective
Implementation

9. Monitoring
and Adaptability

10. Breadth

8.1 Each provision is included
in an implementation plan

i. Each CDA provision has an implementation
plan that includes milestones, resources
(funding and human), and the responsible party.

8.2 There is funding for CDA
implementation

i. There is sufficient funding to implement
employment, business contracting, environment
and culture protection, financial, training and
education, community development, and
closure and reclamation provisions.
ii. The process of payment is clearly
outlined, in terms of when payments will be
made and who will have access and
supervision of the payments.

8.3 There is an overseer of
CDA implementation

i. There is a person or committee in charge of
implementing the CDA.
ii. The implementation person or committee is
paid.
iii. The implementation person or committee is
accountable to both the community and the
company.

8.4 The process is
collaboratively designed

i. The community and the company. collaborate
to design the CDA implementation process.
ii. Each party’s role in CDA implementation is
made clear.

9.1 Progress towards CDA
objectives and project impacts
are periodically monitored

i. There is a monitoring plan.
ii. All provisions and impacts are monitored on
a regularly scheduled basis.
iii. Monitoring is done with appropriate metrics
relevant to the objectives and targets.

9.2 The community and
company jointly monitor the
project and the CDA

i. All CDA signatories comanage monitoring.

9.3 A baseline assessment of
the environmental, cultural,
and socioeconomic conditions
of the community is
conducted

i. There is a baseline environmental assessment.
ii. There is a baseline socioeconomic
assessment.
iii. There is a baseline cultural assessment.
iv. The community is involved in all baseline
assessments.

9.4 There is funding for
monitoring

i. There is adequate funding for monitoring
provided in the CDA.

9.5 CDA deficiencies that
have been identified in
monitoring are mitigated

i. There is a provision in the IBA requiring any
deficiencies identified in monitoring results to
be mitigated.

9.6 There is a process for
amending the agreement

i. There is a process by which the parties can reopen the CDA for negotiation.
ii. The process is descriptive and accessible
to community members.

9.7 There is a transitional
plan outlined in the event of
a change in ownership.

i. The rights and obligations of the
signatories are outlined in the event of a
change in ownership.

10.1 The CDA addresses all
project phases: construction,
operation, and closure and
reclamation.

i. The CDA addresses the construction,
operation, closure, and reclamation phases of
the project.
ii. There is a closure and remediation plan.
iii. The community comanages project closure
and reclamation.
iv. Ownership of all project related
infrastructure after project closure is clearly
defined.
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10.2 The CDA contains the
breadth of necessary
provisions

There are provisions in the CDA covering
community involvement in the following
activities:
i. Employment
ii. Business contracting.
iii. Training and education.
iv. Financial payments to community.
v. Cultural protection including protection of
cultural and sacred sites.
vi. Environmental protection.

With the addition of the new sub-criterion, the maximum score attainable for a CDA on this
modified scale is 144 points.

5.3.2.1 Scoring
In addition to the introduction of several new sub-criteria and indicators, a modification is
made to the scoring mechanism used by Gunton, Ellis and Rutherford 530 and subsequently
Cascadden et al. 531 The aforementioned four-point rating scale may lead to some confusion
or misconceptions regarding the agreement and the provisions that are being analyzed and
scored. Research in the social sciences indicates that four point rating scales are likely to distort
results, as they force a choice between two opposing perspectives. 532 Support exists for the
proposition that a five point scale is preferable to a four point scale. 533 A five point scale, while
maintaining good data quality, has higher levels of internal consistency and greater construct
validity – that is, it reflects a better measure of one’s true opinion on a matter. 534 Care was
taken to not expand the scale any further, as some research suggests that larger scales produce

Ellis, Thomas Gunton & Murray Rutherford, supra note 525.
Cascadden, Gunton & Rutherford, supra note 37 at 9.
532 Ron Garland, "The mid-point on a rating scale: Is it desirable" (1991) 2:1 Marketing Bull 66 at 69; Nina
Østerås et al, “A randomised comparison of a four- and a five-point scale version of the Norwegian Function
Assessment Scale” (2008) 6 Health Qual Life Outcomes 14.
533 Bert Weijters, Elke Cabooter & Niels Schillewaert, “The effect of rating scale format on response styles: The
number of response categories and response category labels” (2010) 27:3 Intl J Research in Marketing 236.
534 Ibid; Østerås et al, supra note 532.
530
531
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more variance than five point scales. 535 In the context of the present research, a four pointscale can undermine the validity of the evaluative framework. With a four point scale, the
evaluator is essentially to choose whether a provision is weak or strong, with little room to
incorporate the varying degrees of depth that may be afforded to some indicators in
comparison to others of the same sub-criterion.
The proposed scoring scale is as follows:
Table 3. Modified Scoring Scale
Verbal Assessment

Deficiencies

Not met

Absence of the articulated sub-criterion and
indicators in the agreement.

0

Weak

Two or more major deficiencies.

1

Sufficient

No more than one major deficiency.

Strong

No major deficiencies.

2

Fully Met

No deficiencies; goes beyond the indicators listed
and attaches greater depth to its provisions.

3

5.3.3

Points

1.5

Methodology

Most CDAs are not publicly available so it is inherently difficult to conduct a comprehensive
study of their provisions. As emphasized throughout this work, the lack of transparency with
these agreements is in and of itself a cause for concern. 536 For example, in Canada, despite an

535 Andrew M Garratt, Jon Helgeland & Pål Gulbrandsen, “Five-point scales outperform 10-point scales in a
randomized comparison of item scaling for the Patient Experiences Questionnaire” (2011) 64:2 J Clin Epidemiol
200; John Dawes, "Five point vs. eleven point scales: Does it make a difference to data characteristics" (2002)
10:1 Australasian J Market Research.
536 Hira & Busumtwi-Sam, supra note 26 at 4
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estimated 265 active CDAs, very few people have been able to read and analyze them because
they are obscured from the public view through confidentiality clauses. 537 This can result in a
critical lack of knowledge for governments and communities as they try to negotiate the best
terms, as it prevents opportunities to learn from other’s past successes or missteps. 538
Despite the existing confidentiality issues, there is a growing trend for transparency in
CDAs. 539 Most notably, joint efforts by the Columbia Center of Sustainable Investment
(CCSI) at Columbia University, the Natural Resource Governance Institute, and the World
Bank have led to the creation of publicly available databases of CDAs. 540 Similarly, the
Sustainable Development Strategies Group 541 has created its own repository of publicly
available CDAs. 542 In addition to searching through these databases for CDAs, a Google
search was done for mining CDAs. In each instance, the CDA was downloaded and evaluated
based on the modified framework outlined above.
A main motivation of this project is to begin building a scored database of CDAs that can be
used to compare CDAs with one another and analyze them across a multitude of external
variables. Posited by Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh 543 and Kendra Dupuy, 544 negotiation and
resource development outcomes may be a product of overarching governance structures and
external power dynamics. Seeking to build on these contributions, the scores obtained here

537 Chris Hummel, “Behind the Curtain, Impact Benefit Agreement Transparency in Nunavut” (2019) 60:2 Le
Caheirs de Droit 367 at 371.
538 Ibid; Papillon & Rodon, supra note 351 at 216.
539 Hummel, supra note 537 at 372.
540 CCSI Database, supra note 49; “Resource Contracts” (last visited June 2022), online: Columbia Center for
Sustainable Investment <resourcecontracts.org>.
541 Sustainable Development Strategies Group, “CDA Library” (last visited June 2022), online: <www.sdsg.org>.
542 Ibid.
543 O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 16.
544 Ibid.
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are compared against a series of variables representing the governance level within a given
country. These metrics have been obtained from the Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGI) Project, which is a research initiative that summarizes the views on the quality of
governance provided by a large number of enterprise, expert, and citizen respondents in
developed and developing countries. The WGI reports aggregate and individual governance
indicators for over 200 countries and territories over the period between 1996–2020, for six
dimensions of governance: 545
1. Voice and Accountability
2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism
3. Government Effectiveness
4. Regulatory Quality
5. Rule of Law, and
6. Control of Corruption.
The WGIs are drawn from a number of different data sources by the World Bank, capturing
the views and experiences of survey respondents and experts in the public and private sectors,
as well as various non-governmental organisations (NGOs). These data sources include:
surveys of households and firms; NGOs; commercial business information providers; and
public sector organizations. 546
In addition to these analyses, this work also engages in an exploratory analysis of Kendra
Dupuy’s research relating to community development requirements in different countries. In
Dupuy’s study, it was found that foreign-direct investment is a significant and positive

545
World Governance Indicators, “WGI 2021 Interactive <info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/FAQ> [WGI Indicators].
546 Ibid.

FAQ”,

online:

World

Bank
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predictor of community development requirements for mining projects. 547 I investigate this
finding and evaluate whether greater foreign-direct investment relates to more robust CDAs.
In addition, I engage in an exploratory analysis using Dupuy’s Firm Community Development
Responsibility Index, 548 which represents the degree of responsibility that is bestowed on
companies in a given legal jurisdiction with regards to community development. Using this
index, I analyse whether assigning greater community development responsibility relates to
CDA robustness.

5.3.4

Variables of Interest

5.3.4.1

Dependent Variables

The dependent variables to be analyzed are drawn from the evaluative framework. For
clarity, the variables of interest are:
1. Overall Score on the Modified Cascadden-Gunton-Rutherford Framework
2. Empowerment
3. Respects Local Culture
4. Affirmation
5. Open Communication
6. Capacity Building
7. Equity
8. Enforceability
9. Effective Implementation
10. Monitoring and Adaptability, and
11. Breadth.
547
548

Dupuy, supra note 77 at 86.
Ibid at 72.
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5.3.4.2

Independent Variables

The independent variables that will be analyzed are drawn from the WGI:
1. Voice and Accountability. This measure captures the perceptions of the extent to which
a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. 549
2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism. This measure captures perceptions of
the likelihood of political instability and politically-motivated violence. 550
3. Government Effectiveness. This measure represents the quality of public services, the
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures,
the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the
government's commitment to such policies. 551
4. Regulatory Quality. This measure represents the ability of the government to formulate
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector
development. 552
5. Rule of Law. This measure captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of
crime and violence. 553

WGI Indicators, supra note 545.
Ibid.
551 Ibid.
552 Ibid.
553 Ibid.
549
550
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6. Control of Corruption. This measure captures perceptions of the extent to which public
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of
corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 554
Another variable of interest is the level of responsibility held by a company in a given jurisdiction.
This variable will be drawn from the Firm Community Development Responsibility Index by
Kendra Dupuy:

Table 4. Firm Responsibility Index 555
Category

Scoring

1) Firms are assigned
responsibility for carrying out
community development
activities

0 = Firms not assigned to carry out community
development activities (the state is assigned
responsibility).
1 = Firms are assigned responsibility for carrying
out community development activities.

2) Specificity of community
development project
requirements for firms

0 = No specificity for firms’ activities.
1= Firms are required to work on specific issue
areas, spend a specific financial amount, and/or
implement projects within a specific timeframe.

3) Requirement for firms to
develop specific, documented
community development plans
and/or enter into formal
agreements with either
governments or local
communities

0 = Firm is not required to develop plans or enter
into agreements or contracts with explicit
community development plans outlined.
1 = Firm must develop/present a plan or agreement
in order to acquire mining rights.

554
555

Ibid
Dupuy, supra note 77 at 72.
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Minimum Total Points Possible = No Responsibility = 0
Low Responsibility = 1
Medium Responsibility = 2
Maximum Total Points Possible = High Level of Responsibility = 3
Table 5. Distribution of Countries Across Firm Responsibility Index
0 (no firm responsibility Low Responsibility:
Medium Responsibility: High Responsibility:
assigned; state is
1 index category
2 index categories
3 index categories
responsible)
required (firms are
(category number in
required
assigned responsibility
parentheses)
for community
development)
556
Australia (1993)
Mongolia (2006)
Papua New Guinea
Ghana (1991)
Sierra Leone (2001)

(1992)

Bolivia (2014)

Canada (2002)
Sierra Leone (2009)
Greenland (2009)

5.4

Results

5.4.1

Governance and CDA Robustness

5.4.1.1

Sample Selection

Colombia Center on Sustainable Investment at Columbia University and the Sustainable
Development Strategies Group offer some publicly available databases with CDA texts,
ranging from a number of different industries in the resource development context. These
databases were supplemented with a google search for CDAs. Due to the lack of homogeneity

556

Parentheses refer to the year of adoption.
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between the different extractive sectors and an interest in reducing confounding variables, the
current analysis excludes CDAs that are outside the mining industry. There are several reasons
for this decision:
 In contrast to other extractive industries, mining exploration often takes place in a context
of extremely limited prior geological knowledge or data. 557
 Mining laws and regulations are generally very detailed with regards to procedures and
institutional structure, roles, and mandates, because they have to apply across a diverse
sector. 558
 Traditionally speaking, gas operations include a significant state element in the
transportation and distribution, and sometimes in the exploration and production phases
as well. 559 A study by the Raw Minerals Group, commissioned by the World Bank,
concluded that poor performance in mining is not a “corollary of state ownership”. 560 The
effect of state involvement is a contrasting feature between the mining and gas sector:
“The success of a state-owned mining company is determined by governance
framework/structure, assets and capital base”. 561
 Generally, there are distinct laws and legislative frameworks for oil and gas activities and
for the mining of minerals. Differences in legal design suggest the existence of underlying
differences between different extractive industries. 562

Peter D Cameron & Michael C Stanley, “Oil, Gas, and Mining” (2017), online (pdf): World Bank
<openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/26130/9780821396582.pdf> at 44.
558 Ibid at 43.
559 Ibid at 44.
560 Raw Minerals Group, “Overview of State Ownership in the Global Minerals Industry”, (2011), online (pdf):
World Bank
<openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/16968/828480NWP0Extr00Box379875B00PUBLI
C0.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> at 33.
561 Ibid.
562 See Douglas K Reece, “Competitive Bidding for Offshore Petroleum Leases” (1978) 9:2 Bell J Economics
369; Steven Barnett & Rolando Ossowski, “Operational Aspects of Fiscal Policy in Oil-Producing Countries”
(2002) IMF Working Paper 02/177; Cameron & Stanley, supra note 553 at 43.
557
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 A different balance of capital and operating costs between the extractive industries, as
mining has higher capital costs 563 and needs more people during production, ongoing
equipment investment, and continuous management of local environmental impacts. 564
In addition, CDAs that did not have both the company and community as signatories were
omitted. A key motivation for this work is to help investigate negotiation outcomes and power
dynamics between companies and communities – as such, agreements that are strictly between
the government and the company (which may or may not distribute benefits to a given
community) and agreements between communities and the government (which do not involve
the company in negotiations) are not of primary interest. 565
In total, these omissions reduced the sample size to 17 publicly available mining CDAs across
seven different jurisdictions including: Australia, Canada, Greenland, Mongolia, Papua New
Guinea, Sierra Leone and Ghana. As a whole, the CDAs analysed likely do not constitute a
wholly representative sample of the total number of CDAs that are implemented in practice.
This being said, it must be emphasized that industry practices of confidentiality inherently limit
the certainty with which one can make conclusions based on the current publicly available
dataset. More CDAs must be obtained to obtain more robust results, but this may only happen
through industry-led initiatives that bridge the knowledge gap between the public and industry
practice.

See Roberto Álvarez & Rodrigo Fuentes, “Paths of Development, Specialization, and Natural Resources
Abundance” (2006) Central Bank of Chile Working Paper No 383; Ousman Gajigo, Emelly Mutambatsere &
Guirane Ndiaye, “Gold Mining in Africa: Maximizing Economic Returns for Countries” (2012) African
Development Bank Group Working Paper No 147.
564 Cameron & Stanley, supra note 557 at 45.
565The differences between company-community CDAs, company-government-community CDAs, governmentcommunity CDAs, and company-government contracts present an unexplored avenue of research that is
deserving of attention. For example, how do such agreements differ in their provisions? How do they differ in
their outcomes? In the midst of current analysis and review, differences appeared to exist in terms of structure
and content of these agreements depending on signatories involved. This, of course, is not a conclusive finding
but one that is nonetheless worth noting.
563

134

5.4.1.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Table 6, organized from highest to lowest, summarizes the average scores per country.
Table 6. Average Overall Score By Country
Country
Score
Maximum Score Possible = 144
Australia (1)
101.00
Greenland (2)
99.25
Canada (6)
100.50
Papua New Guinea (3)
77.18
Mongolia (2)
71.25
Sierra Leone (2)
69.75
Ghana (1)
69.00

5.4.1.2.1

Score (%)
70.1%
68.9%
69.8%
53.6%
49.5%
48.4%
47.9%

Bivariate Correlational Analysis: Governance Indicator Scores
and Overall CDA Scores

A bivariate correlational analysis was conducted between the overall score on the evaluative
framework and six different governance indicators. Upon investigation, the highest correlate
to CDA robustness was Regulatory Quality, r = .73, p < .01. It is also worth noting that each
of the remaining governance indicators were found to have significant positive correlations
with Overall CDA Scores:
Table 7. Correlations between Overall CDA Score and Governance Indicators
Control of Corruption Rating

r = .67, p < .01**

Voice and Accountability Rating

r = .69, p < .01**
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Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism Rating

r = .54, p < .05*

Government Effectiveness Rating

r = .69, p < .01**

Regulatory Quality Rating

r = .73, p < .01**

Rule of Law Rating

r = .71, p < .01**

The results also show that the governance indicators themselves have significant positive
correlations with one another, ranging from r = 0.87 to 0.99, p < .001. This suggests that a
country’s overall level of governance is positively related to how robust CDAs are in that
jurisdiction.

5.4.1.2.2

Multiple Linear Regression Analysis

In addition, a multiple linear regression analysis was conducted to evaluate whether the raw
WGI Indicator Scores may predict CDA robustness. The results are available below.
Table 8. Multiple Linear Regression Results: WGI Indicator Scores x CDA
Robustness
Control of Corruption Rating

F(15) = 12.24, p = .003**

Voice and Accountability Rating

F(15) = 13.42, p = .002**

Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism
F(15) = 6.36, p = .023*
Rating
Government Effectiveness Rating

F(15) = 18.22, p < .001***

Regulatory Quality Rating

F(15) = 16.98, p < .001***
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Rule of Law Rating
F(15) = 19.52, p < .001***
The results reveal that the WGI Governance Indicator Ratings add significantly to the
prediction of CDA robustness. Notably, Regulatory Quality Ratings, Rule of Law Ratings, and
Government Effectiveness Ratings were found to be the greatest predictors, respectively.

5.4.1.3

Inferential Statistics

This analysis focused on investigating the differences in CDA robustness/score between
countries that rate high on specific governance indicators and those that rank low on specific
governance indicators.
Countries that were ranked higher than the 60th percentile by the WGI were classified as
“High” for a given governance indicator (coded as ‘1’). Those that ranked lower than the 60th
percentile were classified as “Low” for that indicator (coded as ‘2’). 566 This allowed for the
determined scores to be split into separate groups: (1) CDAs from countries with a high
governance indicators; (2) CDAs from countries with low governance indicators. Given that
a significant correlation has been identified between governance indicators and CDA
robustness, it follows that there should be significant differences in the average overall CDA
score between high governance rated countries and low governance rated countries.

5.4.1.3.1

t-Test: Overall Scores x Governance Indicators

The data collected were analyzed using a one-tailed independent sample t-test. A one-tailed
test was used after identifying a positive relationship between CDA robustness and a country’s

566

N.b. The 60th percentile was chosen as it is the median identified by the WGI.
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governance rating. Research by O’Faircheallaigh also suggests that strong regulatory
frameworks and high levels of governance can lead to better CDA outcomes. 567
Levene’s test for equality of variance was not significant for any of the grouped governance
indicators. The results are shown in Table 9 below.
Table 9. Results for Levene’s Test: Governance Indicators
Corruption Control

Levene F(1, 15) = .67, p = .43

Freedom of Voice and
Accountability

Levene F(1, 15) = .67, p = .43

Political Stability

Levene F(1, 15) = .47, p = .50

Government Effectiveness

Levene F(1, 15) = .67, p = .43

Regulatory Quality

Levene F(1, 15) = .67, p = .43

Rule of Law

Levene F(1, 15) = .67, p = .43

Non significance in this context means that the variances between the high and low
governance groups were not significantly different from each other. Thus, since there was no
significant difference between the variances, the variances could be treated as equal. This
allows for more confidence in the results of the independent t-test.
The independent t-tests conducted revealed that high governance countries have more robust
CDAs based on the modified evaluative framework. This pattern was exhibited across all
governance indicators by the WGI. The results may be summarized as follows:

567

Dupuy, supra note 77 at 72.
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Table 10. t-Test Results: High/Low Governance Level x CDA Robustness
Countries with a high control of corruption have more
robust CDAs (M = 100.28, SD = 11.12) than countries with
a low control on corruption (M = 72.81, SD = 14.47).

t(15) = 4.42, p < .001***

Countries with high freedom of voice and accountability
have more robust CDAs (M = 100.28, SD = 11.12) than
countries with low freedom of voice and accountability (M =
72.81, SD = 14.47).

t(15) = 4.42, p < .001***

Countries with high political stability have more robust
CDAs (M = 95.00, SD = 17.86) than countries with low
political stability (M = 73.33, SD = 11.31).

t(15) = 2.67, p = .02*

Countries with high government effectiveness have more
robust CDAs (M = 100.28, SD = 11.12) than countries with
low political stability (M = 72.81, SD = 14.47).

t(15) = 4.42, p < .001***

Countries with high regulatory quality have more robust
CDAs (M = 100.28, SD = 11.12) than countries with low
regulatory quality (M = 72.81, SD = 14.47).

t(15) = 4.42, p < .001***

Countries with a high rule of law have more robust CDAs (M
= 100.28, SD = 11.12) than countries with a low rule of law
t(15) = 4.42, p < .001***
(M = 72.81, SD = 14.47)

5.4.2

Foreign Direct Investment and CDA Robustness

A bivariate correlational analysis was conducted between the overall score on the evaluative
framework and FDI inflow in a given year. The FDI inflow is measured as a percentage
contribution to GDP in a given year. One CDA from Papua New Guinea was excluded and
all CDAs from Greenland were excluded from the analysis due to the lack of FDI data
available on the World Bank database for those countries. A statistically significant relationship
was not identified between these two variables, r = -.48, p = .084.
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5.4.3

Firm Community Development Responsibility and CDA Robustness

The data obtained from the CDAs was investigated using a one-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA). This method of analysis allowed for the comparison of means across multiple
groups and to determine if they differed significantly from one another. The current
investigation used a one-way ANOVA in order to test the effects that firm community
development responsibility has CDA robustness. In other words, the ANOVA was used to
evaluate whether the amount of responsibility conferred to a company through legislative
schemes had a relationship with the level of CDA robustness.
Levene’s test for equality of variance was not significant. F(1, 13) = .786, p = .39. This indicated
that the variances between the groups do not differ significantly and that the assumption of
homogeneity of variances was not violated.
The ANOVA was not significant, F(3, 13) = 1.1, p = .203, ƞ2 = .2.Thus, jurisdictional
differences in the amount of responsibility assigned to firms for community development
through did not produce a significant difference in CDA robustness.

5.5

Summary of Results

The small sample size of the dataset inherently prevents drawing conclusions with a high
degree of certainty. Nonetheless, the findings based on the available data indicate that a
statistically significant relationship exists between WGI Governance Indicators and CDA
robustness. Importantly, the bivariate regression conducted indicates that the WGI scores add
significantly to the prediction of CDA robustness. This relationship was found to exist for
both a calculated historic average of a country’s governance score, as well as the governance
scores relating to the year that the agreement was signed. Chapter 6 discusses the theoretical
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implications of this relationship and how it relates to the existing body of research on CDAs.
In particular, it lends support for the proposition that the institutional features of a host
country are related to – and perhaps predictive of – negotiation outcomes and CDA
robustness.
A relationship was not identified between the level of community development responsibility
that countries assign private mining firms and CDA robustness. It is also worth noting that
the majority of publicly available mining CDAs (i.e. 13 agreements out of 17) are from
operations in countries that assign a high degree of responsibility to private companies.
Furthermore, there was no relationship identified between CDA robustness and countries
with legislated community development requirements. The possible implications of this are
discussed in the next section.
In sum, this dataset represents a novel contribution to the existing empirical evidence
regarding the nature of CDAs and is, to date, the only dataset to investigate CDA provisions
and their relationship to institutional factors. At a minimum, it invites further investigation
into institutional dynamics and the effect that they have on CDA negotiation, robustness, and
outcomes.
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Chapter 6

6

Community Development Agreements – The Road Ahead
6.1

The Importance of Institutional Design and Strength

In Chapter 4, I identified a critical question and debate underpinning the variability in
negotiation outcomes and CDA robustness:
“What explains this variability? Which factors contribute to CDA success in
negotiation and implementation? Three possible explanations are outlined in
the literature. The first is offered by researchers who propose that CDAs are
products of neo-liberal governance strategies that have been designed to
maintain corporate and state power and to continue the marginalization of
Indigenous peoples. 568 A second is that outcomes are determined by the legal
regime of the country where the project is situated in. 569 The third posits that
variable outcomes could be the result of institutional differences affecting the
organizational, political, and negotiating capacity of local communities and
Indigenous peoples when negotiating the agreements. 570”
The analysis of CDAs in Chapter 5 goes to the heart of this question and lends support to
theories that institutional strength is predictive – and perhaps even a cause – of poor social
and economic outcomes in the resource development context. Traditionally, poor outcomes
have been used as evidence to support the aforementioned “resource curse” hypothesis – that

Prno, Bradshaw & Lapierre, supra note 35.
O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 34 at 4.
570 O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 15; Dupuy, supra note 77.
568
569
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is, the theory that natural resources are a hindrance to economic growth. 571 Recently, however,
insights have emerged from a key turn in the literature proposing that natural resources are
neither a curse nor a blessing. Known as ‘institutionalism’, 572 this theory asserts that weak
institutions – marked by factors such as poor rule of law, lack of economic freedom, poor
enforcement mechanisms – negatively affect growth and development. 573 Despite their
differences, these two schools of thought have much in common; namely, both perspectives
stress the vital role of institutions in securing good outcomes for impacted communities. 574
Research supporting this contention is growing, showing that institutional strength is
positively and strongly correlated with economic success in resource economies. 575
Negotiation and bargaining power are significant factors for impacted communities interested
in securing equitable outcomes. 576 In a study by Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, it is suggested that
overarching characteristics of weak institutions serve to create a structural inequality in
negotiating positions by generation differential pressures and incentives on impacted
communities and mining companies. 577 O’Faircheallaigh is not alone in this sentiment – there
are a number of research publications that acknowledge the importance of external factors for

Peter Kaznacheev, “Curse or Blessing? How Institutions Determine Success in Resource-Rich Economies”
(11 January 2017), online(pdf): Cato Institute <www.cato.org/policy-analysis/curse-or-blessing-how-institutionsdetermine-success-resource-rich-economies> at 6.
572 Ibid.
573 Ibid.
574 Ibid.
575 See e.g. Anne Krueger, Maurice Schiff, & Alberto Valdés, eds, Latin America: The Political Economy of Agricultural
Pricing Policy - Volume 1 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), See also Deepak Lal and Hla Myint,
The Political Economy of Poverty; Equity and Growth: A Comprehensive Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1999); William Easterly & Ross Levine, “Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions” (1997) 112 QJ
Economics 1203–50; Gary McMahon, “Natural Resource Curse: Myth or Reality?” (1997) Economic
Development Institute, World Bank, online (pdf): <fdocuments.net/document/mcmahonnatural-resourcecurse-myth-or-reality.html>.
576 O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 15.
577 Ibid at 202.
571
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negotiation outcomes. 578 The analysis conducted here lends further support for these
propositions. For both the averaged percentile-based metrics of the WGI scores and the rawscores of WGIs in a given year, positive and significant relationships were identified between
the overall robustness of CDAs and the different criteria. Notably, regulatory effectiveness
and rule of law metrics emerged as the strongest predictors of overall scores on the modified
Cascadden-Gunton-Rutherford framework. Figures 1 - 6 provide a graphical depiction of the
identified relationships between WGI scores in the year of the agreement and overall CDA
robustness.
Figure 1. Overall CDA Score x Regulatory Quality Rating

Ibid at 20; See also Daniel Druckman, “The Situational Levers of Negotiating Flexibility” (1993) 37:2 J Conflict
Resolution 236; Min Li, Leigh Tost & Kimberly Wade-Benzoni, “The Dynamic Interaction of Context and
Negotiator Effects: A Review and Commentary on Current and Emerging Areas in Negotiation” (2007) 18:3 Intl
J Conflict Management 222; Stephen E Weiss, “The long path to the IBM-Mexico agreement: an analysis of the
microcomputer investment negotiations 1983–86” (1990) 21:4 J Intl Business Studies 565; Linda L Putnam &
Ryan P Fuller, “Turning Points and Negotiation: The Case of the 2007–2008 Writers’ Strike” (2014) 7:3
Negotiation & Conflict Management Research 188.
578
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Figure 2. Overall CDA Score x Rule of Law Score

Figure 3. Overall CDA Score x Control of Corruption Score
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Figure 4. Overall Score x Freedom of Voice and Accountability Score

Figure 5. Overall CDA Score x Political Stability Score
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Figure 6. Overall CDA Score x Government Effectiveness Score

Negotiations of CDAs rely more on just the skills and power that each party brings to the
table. 579 These negotiations “take place in an institutional and social context, which profoundly
shapes what happens in the individual negotiation.” 580 Research to date, however, has not
analyzed these external factors to a significant degree.

6.2

Limitations

There are several limitations to this study that should be emphasized at this point.
1) Small Sample Size. The small sample size in this work makes it difficult to determine
whether the outcome is a true finding. It is possible that the significant relationship
identified between WGI Governance Indicators and CDAs is a spurious finding. More

579 Susan Sturm, “Negotiating Workplace Equality: A Systemic Approach” (2009) 2:1 Negotiation & Conflict
Management Research 92 at 93.
580 Ibid.
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work must be done to increase transparency around CDAs and bring them further
into the public domain to allow for study.
2) Confounding Variables. CDA robustness may be correlated with some other external
variable that has not been identified in this study. For example, it is possible that the
WGI Indicators are highly related because there is underpinning variable that has not
been identified. More research must be done to understand the nature of the WGI
indicators and the factors that most impact their rating.
3) Scoring Limitations. Although much effort was made to be as transparent and objective
as possible in the assessment, the evaluation still relies on subjective assessments,
which may vary from analyst to analyst. Further case study research and application of
the modified Cascadden-Gunton-Rutherford framework is needed to understand its
validity.
4) Lack of Outcome Evaluation. The modified Cascadden-Gunton-Rutherford framework
does not include the evaluation of outcomes of the agreements. As discussed in the
next section, the framework and scores attained creates an analytical foundation by
which the relationship between the provisions of CDAs and their outcomes may be
investigated.

6.3

Closing Thoughts - The Value of Empirical Analysis

Underpinning the totality of this work is the fact that the role and merits of CDAs cannot be
understood nor resolved without addressing the larger question of whether natural resource
development leads to a long term sustainable growth or environmental and societal
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degradation. As stated by Gunton and Markey, there is a fundamental choice that must be
made:
“Should communities integrate into world economies by pursuing
export-based resource development subject to the uncertainty of
international commodity cycles and finite local natural resources or
should they pursue alternative community-based development
strategies focused on meeting local needs to avoid the resource
curse?” 581
If the resource development path is chosen, the empirical evaluation of CDAs presents two
primary benefits: (1) the elevation of negotiating power; and (2) the explanation of outcome
variability.

6.3.1

Elevating Negotiating Power

CDAs can play a key role in balancing voluntary corporate initiatives and public regulation.
Given that they are contracts that are negotiated by the communities themselves, there is
potential for CDAs to allow for a high degree of flexibility in the management of projects and
the distribution of their benefits. 582 As discussed, the content of CDAs varies considerably
from one instance to another; they are highly adaptable and usually reflect local circumstances
and priorities. This variability suggests that CDAs, at a minimum, have the potential to address
issues that are of critical importance in specific local contexts. 583 Whether this potential is
realised relates closely to factors such as community representation in negotiations,
community capacity and, perhaps more importantly, the bargaining power of communities.
584

Gunton & Markey, supra note 9 at 9.
O’Fairchealliagh, supra note 16.
583 Ibid.
584 Ibid.
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The scale of benefits and the efficacy of a CDA reflect the relative bargaining power of
communities, on the one hand, and developers on the other. The degree of community
cohesion, strength of local political organisations, the quality of community leadership, and a
community’s prior history of dealing with development projects are all important factors that
impact bargaining power. 585 The communities facing the potential development projects are
commonly located in remote areas and often face poverty. 586 Although some communities are
more prepared and successful than others in negotiating CDAs, it is a common instance for a
community to enter the negotiations over a mining project with limited capacity, knowledge
and resources, which places them in a position of inferiority in terms of negotiation power. 587
An assessment framework and a descriptive database of scores helps build community
knowledge and improves the capacity of community representatives to articulate and promote
the full range of community interests. As discussed above, the confidentiality issues
permeating this industry carry clear implications for the negotiating capacity of communities:
communities must operate without access to the experiences of other communities. Initiatives,
such as the Open Community Contracts initiative by the Columbia Center on Sustainable
Investment, are important steps towards increasing the accessibility of agreements to
communities, practitioners, and researchers. This framework and its application helps to build
on such initiatives, providing community members with a tool that they may use to compare
and contrast different agreements. By scoring the agreements as a whole and their provisions,

Ibid.
St-Laurent & Billon, supra note 300; Naomi Adelson, “The embodiment of inequity: health disparities in
aboriginal Canada” (2005) 96:2 Can J Public Health S45.
587 St-Laurent & Billon, supra note 300.
585
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150

decisions can be made on whether an agreement is ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ and negotiation goals can
be more readily identified.

6.3.2

Evaluating the Efficacy of CDAs

As discussed in Chapter 4, there is a lack of consensus regarding the role of CDAs. To date,
the existing literature has been divided on whether these agreements reinforce the status quo
or whether they facilitate community development. It has been repeatedly established in the
literature that CDAs are context dependent, and their ability to benefit a community depends
on a host of internal and external factors. 588 Lost in this discussion however is the fact that
CDAs have emerged as industry norms and are very likely to continue being negotiated. 589 As
such, it is important to bring attention to whether CDAs relate to positive outcomes and how
the outcomes can be improved for the communities that negotiate them.
By committing to a uniform mechanism of scoring these agreements, a host of research
questions may be addressed. The current work provides a cursory example of the kinds of
analyses and insights that can be drawn from scoring CDA provisions. In addition to
investigating the relationships that CDAs have with external factors, such as institutional
strength, it becomes possible to empirically analyze CDA provisions with the outcomes of
CDA implementation. Some preliminary questions that are worthy of investigation include:
 Do more robust CDAs correlate to better outcomes? Is there a causal relationship?
 What provisions of CDAs are most predictive of successful implementation?
 What provisions undermine CDA successful implementation?
 What internal and external factors are most predictive of CDA robustness?
588
589

O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 16 at 4.
Gunton & Markey, supra note 9.
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 How do CDAs negotiated between companies and communities differ from benefit
agreements negotiated between governments and communities?
 Does a CDA that has been renegotiated to approve on an earlier version relate to
better outcomes in a given instance?
Given the global uptake of legislating community development requirements, these questions
are critical importance. This work has taken another incremental step towards identifying the
variability in negotiation outcomes. A significant positive relationship was established between
a country’s governance strength and the robustness of the CDAs. Further case study research,
and thus greater transparency from industry itself, is required to better analyze these questions.
Unless the reasons for variability are properly understood, an understanding of how more
positive outcomes can be achieved using CDAs will continue to elude researchers,
communities, and industry.
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